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FROM THE EDITORS
At the Twentieth International Seapower Symposium, held at the Naval War
College in October 2011, one thing was strikingly clear: among the leaders of
many of the world’s navies today there is a growing embrace of the vision of
maritime security cooperation first enunciated by former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen under the label of the “thousand-ship navy.”
In our lead article, “Networking the Global Maritime Partnership,” Stephanie
Hszieh, George Galdorisi, Terry McKearney, and Darren Sutton explore this vision and the obstacles that continue to stand in the way of its realization. The
rapid evolution of communications and sensor technologies is, ironically, one
such obstacle, because one of its major effects is to increase the gap between the
capabilities enjoyed by the U.S. Navy in this area and the capabilities of allied and
partner navies. The authors offer a model for intensified regional collaboration
in technology development that can help overcome this problem: The Technical
Cooperation Program, a long-standing though little-known five-nation (United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) umbrella organization involving a network of 170 research entities and some 1,200 scientists and
engineers.
Since World War II, more U.S. naval vessels have been destroyed or seriously
damaged by sea mines than by all other forms of enemy action combined. Sea
mines are the naval weapon of choice for nations of limited resources and technological capacity, as we have been reminded recently by the Iranian navy. Today,
the People’s Republic of China has a robust mining capability and an arsenal of
sea mines that may number as many as a hundred thousand. In “Taking Mines
Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Scott C. Truver provides an authoritative, detailed survey of contemporary mine warfare and mine countermeasures generally and explores the implications of China’s potential use of this
most “asymmetric” of naval weapons in any conflict with the United States and
its allies in the western Pacific. He argues that it is time the U.S. Navy took sea
mines seriously—not only from a defensive perspective but also as an offensive
instrument in the context of its emerging “AirSea Battle” concept.
Recent apparent frictions between American military commanders and the
Obama administration over troop drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as a
reminder that the civil-military relationship in the United States remains fraught
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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with controversy and misunderstanding. Two articles in this issue address this
subject. In “What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Relations,” Mackubin Thomas Owens provides a succinct overview and guide to how
to think about civil-military relations in a realistic and responsible fashion. He
argues that many military officers continue to draw the wrong conclusions from
the Vietnam War concerning the proper role of civilian authority in managing
military operations, and he sounds an important cautionary note about the tendency observable in today’s military to abuse the notion of “operational art” by
using it as a device for excluding perceived civilian meddling in military decision
making. A proper understanding of “strategy,” by contrast, shows the necessity of
civil-military collaboration in a sustained process aimed at preserving the always
delicate balance between military and political considerations. Dayne E. Nix,
in “American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. Huntington and the Political
Dimensions of Military Professionalism,” complements Owens’s account by exploring the various senses in which, given today’s evolving strategic environment,
military officers must themselves acquire “political” expertise in order to perform
their own jobs effectively. Professors Owens and Nix are both on the faculty of
the Naval War College.
If the Korean War as a whole remains a dim memory at best for most Americans, many have heard of its most famous feat of arms—General Douglas MacArthur’s amphibious assault at Inchon, behind the lines of the invading North
Koreans. In “A Remarkable Military Feat: The Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950,” Donald Chisholm, of the Naval War College’s Joint Military Operations Department, offers an account of a similar feat that has been undeservedly
forgotten—the withdrawal of elements of three American divisions from northeastern Korea under pressure from advancing Chinese Communist forces after
their victory at the battle of the Chosen Reservoir. Chisholm argues that this
brilliantly orchestrated “amphibious withdrawal” deserves to be carefully studied
as a resource for the reconstruction of an aspect of amphibious warfare doctrine
that scarcely exists in today’s American military.
Finally, as part of our long-standing effort to understand capabilities and
current trends within foreign middle-power navies, consonant with the U.S.
Navy’s continuing emphasis on global maritime security cooperation, we offer
Deane-Peter Baker’s “The South African Navy and African Maritime Security.”
Baker, currently a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, argues that South Africa’s
naval past (focusing on guardianship of the Cape sea line of communication)
continues to shape its current maritime outlook, at the expense of a focus on the
current challenges of maritime security that South Africa faces, in common with
other African littoral nations. South Africa, he believes, can play an important
continent-wide role in this regard.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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FROM THE EDITORS

5

HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH 19
The nineteenth book in our Historical Monograph series—Talking about Naval
History: A Collection of Essays, by John B. Hattendorf, the Naval War College’s
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History—is available for sale by the Government Printing Office’s online bookstore. This collection of twenty articles on
naval and maritime history selected from the recent work of Professor Hattendorf is published to mark the more than twenty-five years that he has occupied
the College’s prestigious Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History. Professor
Hattendorf ’s articles and essays range widely across five hundred years of history
and deal with four major themes: maritime history as a field of academic and
professional study, European naval history in the classic age of sail, American
naval history, and naval theory.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 334,
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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Rear Admiral Christenson became the fifty-third President of the U.S. Naval War College on 30 March 2011.
The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a
Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981.
At sea, he commanded USS McClusky (FFG 41), Destroyer Squadron 21 in USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74),
Carrier Strike Group 12, and the USS Enterprise (CVN
65) Strike Group. He most recently served as President,
Board of Inspection and Survey. He also served as the
antisubmarine warfare officer and main propulsion
assistant aboard USS Cook (FF 1083); as aide to Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 in USS Long Beach
(CGN 9); as weapons officer aboard USS Downes (FF
1070); as Destroyer Squadron 21 combat systems officer,
in USS Nimitz (CVN 68); and as executive officer of
USS Harry W. Hill (DD 986). He deployed eight times
on seven ships, twice in command of McClusky.
Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers
School in Newport, and as a new flag officer he served
as Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-submarine
Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. He also
served at the U.S. Naval Academy as a company officer, celestial navigation instructor, assistant varsity
soccer coach, and member of the admissions board;
at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in the Strategic
Initiatives Group; and on the Joint Staff, in J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) and as executive assistant to the
assistant chairman.
He graduated with distinction and first in his class from
the Naval War College, earning his master’s degree in
national security and strategic studies. He was also a
Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Christenson has been awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards),
the Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), and
the Navy Achievement Medal.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

The first responsibility of a leader is to define reality. The last is to say
thank you.
MAX DE PREE

REALITY—THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE is over 127 years old, and since

its establishment it has made a powerful difference in America’s
wars, in the prevention of wars, and in those cherished but too-infrequent periods of peace. For as long as the United States has a navy, the Naval War College
will continue to make a powerful difference while remaining the Navy’s home of
thought.
Thank you—We just updated our Missions, Functions, and Tasks Statement. I
want to lay out the four missions of the Naval War College and link them to the
four incredible deans primarily responsible for accomplishing those missions—
and to say thank you.
Before I get to the missions and deans, I want to say thank you as well to the
two people who lead the Naval War College. First is our provost and our Chief
Operating Officer, Ambassador (Ret.) Mary Ann Peters. Second is my deputy
and our Chief of Staff, Captain Russ Knight, USN. Ambassador Peters has served
three Presidents here, after a distinguished career in the State Department, spanning from assignment in Moscow at the height of the Cold War to service as
ambassador to the world’s seventh-most-populous country, Bangladesh. Captain
Knight began his distinguished naval aviation career flying the original “warhorse,” the A-6 Intruder, before commanding an F/A-18 Hornet squadron. He
also commanded Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, where he taught, flew,
led, and perfected his skills in maintaining a complex installation.

Mission 1: Educate and Develop Leaders. The College shall provide current, rigorous and relevant professional military education programs supporting the Navy’s Professional Military Education (PME) Continuum. The Dean of Academic
Affairs, who accomplishes this mission, is Dr. John Garofano. The College’s
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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“smokestack industry” is to produce graduates who know military history, how
our national security policy is formulated, and how joint military operations are
executed.
Mission 2: Help CNO Define the Future Navy and Its Roles and Missions. The
College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of
the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the combatant commanders, the Navy component commanders, the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders,
other Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. intelligence community, and
other departments/agencies of the U.S. government. The Dean, Center for Naval
Warfare Studies, who accomplishes this mission, is Professor Robert C. “Barney”
Rubel. The College’s “venture capitalist of ideas,” from war gaming to strategic
research, the center has a long history of thinking hard about the future, innovating, writing, and making a difference.
Mission 3: Support Combat Readiness. The College shall conduct Operational
Level of War education, leadership and professional ethics training, education,
and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy’s Joint Force Maritime
Component Commanders (JFMCCs) and Navy component commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. The Dean, College of Operational and
Strategic Leadership, who accomplishes this mission, is Rear Admiral Jamie Kelly
(Ret.). This college—the part of our institution to which the salt water flows
most directly from the fleet, and then back—imbues in all our students knowledge of leadership and ethics, as well as meets the fleet’s demand for confident,
competent planners at the operational level of war.
Mission 4: Strengthen Maritime Security Cooperation. The College shall bring
together flag, senior and intermediate level naval leaders from other countries to
develop them for high command in their navies; promote an open exchange of views
between international security professionals which encourages friendship and cooperation and builds trust and confidence; and study operational planning methods
and common maritime security challenges. The Dean, International Programs
and Maritime Security Cooperation, who accomplishes this mission, is Professor
Tom Mangold. One of every six students here at the Naval War College is an international officer. This program truly embodies the spirit of the Navy’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” It has built, year by year, a network
of thousands of graduates, officers who have established deep and mutual trust
and confidence through their shared experiences in the classroom and in travel,
in Newport and as far as the Golden Gate Bridge.
{LINE-SPACE}
Supported firmly by the Navy, we nevertheless benefit every day from the generous support of the Naval War College Foundation, led by its distinguished chairman, Mr. Peter Pelletier.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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Finally, we must thank our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, who has kept up the impressive record of his predecessor, Admiral
Gary Roughead, of frequent trips to Newport. Uniquely among the services, as
President of the Naval War College, I report directly to the CNO, with all the
enormous benefit that brings.
Four important missions, incredible leadership in Newport and Washington,
and friends around the world—to all of you, I say again, thank you.

JOHN N. CHRISTENSON

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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Dr. Hszieh is a Corporate Strategy Group Strategic Analyst at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Center Pacific, San Diego, California. She earned a
PhD in political science at the University of Southern
California and is the author or coauthor of numerous
articles.
Captain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is Director, Corporate Strategy Group, at the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center Pacific in San Diego, California. He
is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, and holds
master’s degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School
(oceanography) and the University of San Diego (international relations). Additionally, he is a graduate
of both the junior and senior courses at the Naval War
College as well as the MIT Sloan School’s Program
for Senior Executives. His most recent book is Leave
No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and
Rescue.
Mr. McKearney is the president and founder of The
Ranger Group. A retired naval officer whose service
spanned the Vietnam era to the post–Cold War era,
he holds master’s degrees from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and San Diego State University. He is
president of the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS) and is past chairman of the MORS symposium composite group on joint warfare.
Dr. Sutton is Head, Combat Systems Simulation
and Analysis, Maritime Operations Division, in the
Defence Science and Technology Organisation. He is
also the science and technology adviser to the Royal
Australian Navy’s Air Warfare Destroyer Project. Dr.
Sutton earned his doctor of philosophy in science (laser diagnostics for hypersonic flows) from the Australian National University.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2
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NET WORKING THE GLOBAL MARITIME
PARTNERSHIP
Stephanie Hszieh, George Galdorisi, Terry McKearney, and Darren Sutton

We will be prepared to support and defend our freedom of navigation
and access to the global commons. Our partners and allies are our greatest strategic asset.
ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN

S

ix years after Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations, proposed his “thousand-ship navy” concept at the Seventeenth International
Seapower Symposium at the U.S. Naval War College in 2005, his notion of a
Global Maritime Partnership is gaining increasing currency within, between, and
among navies.1 As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, noted
in his remarks at the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium in 2009,
navies worldwide are working mightily to enhance cooperation and interoperability on the global commons.2
Real-world operations, especially in the Pacific Rim, have demonstrated that
networking maritime forces is crucial to the effectiveness of operations that
run the gamut from humanitarian operations to dealing with insurgencies, to
nation-building, to state-on-state conflict. Additionally, these operations often
involve nations and navies that come together on short—or no—notice, and,
as a necessary condition for success in these operations, this networking must be
immediately available and robust.
The central themes of this article are that the technical challenges of netting
maritime forces together are not trivial and that overcoming these challenges is
more daunting today than at any time in history. Why? Simply because unlike the
days when flag hoists or simple radio transmissions were all that navies needed
to effectively work together, rapid technological change has reached nations and
navies unevenly and has actually impeded the effective networking of coalition
partners. To maintain the growth and development of global maritime partnerships around the world, this article proposes leveraging an example of one effort
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among long-standing partners to address the issue of naval interoperability at the
defense laboratory level.
Coalitions at sea are not new. However, globalization—one of the macrotrends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries—has prompted many
nations to join together to maintain the security and stability of the maritime
domain. Globalization—generally understood as “the integration of the political,
economic, and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated
peoples”—involves the international interaction of information, financial capital, commerce, technology, and labor at significantly greater speeds and volumes
than previously thought, and it impacts the lives and fortunes of all humanity.3 It
is important to recognize that globalization has a significant impact in the maritime domain, where events in one part of the world can swiftly impact peoples
and societies across the globe.
As globalization has grown over the past two decades, we have witnessed an
increase in maritime trade on the global commons. The tonnage of goods carried
across the oceans by the rapidly growing merchant fleets of the world has more
than quadrupled in the past four decades. This global exchange of goods has
brought ever-increasing prosperity to the community of nations.
With globalization and the concomitant dependence on reliable oceanic commerce come vulnerabilities. Those who would disrupt this trade and the rule of
law on the global commons, whether for economic or political gain, now have
far more opportunities to attack vessels on the high seas or in near-shore waters
than ever before. The dramatic increase in this century of piracy, a scourge many
thought no longer existed, is but one manifestation of the threat to the rule of
law on the global commons that the international community—and especially
navies—must address today.
Concurrently, the nexus of climate change, growing populations, and a demographic shift to coastal and near-coastal regions has resulted in a significant
increase in the impact of natural disasters—hurricanes, tsunamis, coastal flooding, volcanic events, earthquakes, and a host of others—that bring suffering to
millions. Often, only naval forces are capable of delivering relief supplies in a
timely fashion and in the volumes necessary to relieve disaster victims.
No single navy—of any nation—is robust enough to enforce the rule of law
on the global commons alone or respond adequately to a major natural disaster.
Today, through practice, global maritime partnerships have become the sine qua
non for nations working together as global forces for good in support of everincreasing levels of security, stability, and trust.
When navies assemble as a global force for good, a prerequisite for their ability to work together is that their ships, submarines, aircraft, command centers,
and forces ashore have the ability to exchange data and information—often in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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vast quantities—freely and seamlessly. Their effectiveness is directly proportional
to their ability not only to communicate but to network, at sea and ashore. But
as nations and navies proceed along different technological development paths,
the challenges to effective networking are greater today than they were years
ago, when navies used simpler—and more common—communications and
rudimentary networking means. Because of this, their ability to interoperate effectively is often challenged.
There are core reasons why navies have been especially impeded
Nations and navies are proceeding along difin their attempts to network efferent technological development paths. As a
result of this inexorable trend, naval coopera- fectively in this new century. While
the will is there, and though these
tion is under increasing stress.
navies are aligned through doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to work and network together at sea, the
technical means to realize the promise of “network-centric operations” throughout
coalitions remain elusive.4 Achieving that promise means dealing with the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) issues that currently complicate this effective networking.
Navies have overcome similar challenges in the past, however, and understanding
where we have been can help the members of today’s naval coalition avoid becoming “victims of limited experience.”5
Naval coalitions have long been an important part of maintaining sea power
and good order on the seas. During the Cold War it was a naval alliance, under the
auspices of NATO, that was able, through the building of a credible nuclear and
conventional deterrent, to check Soviet encroachment into Europe.6 However,
coalition operations have taken on renewed importance as the maintenance of
good order at sea has become a pressing concern for the international community. Naval coalitions today tend to be heterogeneous with respect to the types
of navies represented, while the operations naval coalitions undertake have also
expanded to include antipiracy patrols, as well as disaster relief and humanitarian
missions. The importance of the ability to communicate with coalition partners
transcends warfare and impacts coalition naval partners in literally every endeavor. This was dramatically demonstrated in December 2004 and early 2005 during
the Indian Ocean tsunami response, where eighteen nations worked together,
primarily on and from the sea, to deliver relief supplies.7
As they do for naval coalitions in general, naval communications continue to
represent an integral part of successful naval operations, because they allow commanders to create the all-important “operational picture.” In the arena of naval warfare, communications are needed to maintain “dominant battlespace awareness”
—knowledge of where one’s enemies and one’s own forces are. Out of this
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knowledge comes the ability to plan and strategize to defeat the enemy. In 1904,
Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, took advantage of the new
communications technology of his time—the telegraph—and developed what
Norman Friedman calls “picture-based warfare.”8 Admiral Fisher established two
war rooms—one for the world, the other focused on the North Sea—to collate
information received from telegraphic messages to plot where French commerce
raiders were attacking British merchant ships. Armed with this picture-based
view of the world, Admiral Fisher was able to direct battle cruisers to the spots.9
Future British commanders built on Admiral Fisher’s successful harnessing of
communications technologies to construct a global tactical picture—one that
served them well in the years leading up to World War I, as well as during that
conflict.
The innovative use of communications technologies to better conduct picturebased warfare continues in contemporary naval operations. Throughout the
1990s and into the twenty-first century, other initiatives have included the National Defense University’s Dominant Battlespace Concept; Admiral William
Owens’s “system of systems”; military transformation and the revolution in
military affairs (RMA); and the concept of “network-centric warfare” popularized by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka. All these have led to
significant focus on using communications to provide U.S. forces and their coalition partners a better ability to build a common picture to conduct picture-based
warfare and, in so doing, secure the tactical, operational, and strategic advantage.
But what these reformers—and others like them—have really been talking about
is moving beyond merely communicating between and among units to networking forces and forming them into single fighting entities.
COMMUNICATING EVOLVES INTO NETWORKING FOR MODERN
NAVIES
Above all, the picture is what matters. Creating effective tactical pictures
makes systems work, and it supports a new kind of warfare. The better
the picture, the more efficient the operation.
DR. NORMAN FRIEDMAN

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the U.S. Navy, reflecting its traditional
style of operations—which entailed the continuous forward deployment of a
distributed force far from U.S. territory or supporting infrastructure—developed
the concept of “networking” to ensure timely and reliable communications to
enable the most effective employment of scattered forces.10 This effort included
experimentation with the Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS),
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which was the progenitor of the tactical data systems, such as Link 11, shared by
many navies today.
Armed with increasingly reliable tactical data links, global navies began to
recognize the potential of this ability to link ships across vast distances to revolutionize naval warfare. As Loren Thompson pointed out in 2003, however, many
of the concepts driving the networking of military forces today arose two decades
ago:
In 1990, long before network-centric warfare became a central feature of joint
doctrine, the Navy established a program called “Copernicus” to assimilate emerging
information technologies. . . . The admirals managing Copernicus understood that
information technologies had the potential to revolutionize naval operations. The
Navy adopted the phrase “network-centric warfare” to describe this nascent warfighting paradigm, because it stressed integration and communications over autonomy in
conducting naval operations.11

Eight years later, Vice Admiral Cebrowski and John Garstka built on Copernicus to envision war fighting in the twenty-first century. Their 1998 U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings article, “Network-centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,”
described the potential of network-centric concepts to alter the nature of warfare
itself. Although the article was published well over a decade ago, their vision of
network-centric warfare proved remarkably prescient:
Network-centric warfare derives its power from the strong networking of a wellinformed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a highperformance information grid, access to all appropriate information sources,
weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of response, value-adding
command and control (C2) processes—to include high-speed automated assignment
of resources to need—and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters
and C2 processes. Network-centric warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare and
contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It is transparent to
mission, force size and composition, and geography.12

Theory met reality in the early part of the twenty-first century, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (known as OEF) to attack terrorist strongholds in
Afghanistan. The ensuing campaign vindicated what the proponents of networkcentric warfare had been advocating. As Admiral Vern Clark, then Chief of Naval
Operations, later observed regarding the U.S. Navy’s experience in OEF, “Eighty
percent of the Navy strike sorties attacked targets that were unknown to the aircrews when they left the carriers. They relied upon networked sensors and joint
communications to swiftly respond to targets of opportunity.”13
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Admiral Clark evolved a vision for the U.S. Navy called “Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era.”14 Some critics described the three pillars of Sea
Power 21 (Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing) as “old wine in new bottles,” but
with them Admiral Clark introduced a new term, “FORCEnet,” which referred to
“an initiative to tie together naval, joint and national information grids to achieve
unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management.”15 FORCEnet
was clearly the next step in the evolution of the Navy’s networking capabilities.
Thompson noted that “Forcenet [sic] was the greatest system-integration challenge ever proposed in the history of warfare.”16 Whether this is true or not, the
U.S. Navy made an enormous capital investment in FORCEnet and in the wide
array of programs that instantiate the network-centric warfare concept.17
The ability of navies to network vast amounts of data at high speed over
great distances—due to the advancement of C4ISR technologies over the past
decades—has ushered in new capabilities, pushed the “information envelope,”
and expanded the “art of the possible” at sea. It is not an overstatement to say that
C4ISR systems have become the sine qua non of success for most modern navies.
In fact, navies have found conclusively that their effectiveness is proportional to
their ability to network at sea and ashore. Accordingly, every modern navy has
sought to install C4ISR networking technologies—often as rapidly as they can
afford them—in order to gain that technological edge at sea.
Drawing on real-world results from the U.S.-led coalition conflicts in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government
Accountability Office) summed up the results of these conflicts:
Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their forces. DoD [the U.S. Department of Defense] has
indicated that technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow
commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements provide for greater shared situational awareness, which, in turn, speeds command and
control. . . . Improvements in networking the force and the use of precision weapons
are the primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent
operations.18

C4ISR advances not only benefit so-called high-end navies, but any navy investing in naval C4ISR technologies can gain a tactical edge. As pointed out by Paul
Mitchell in 2003 in this journal,
Network-centric warfare aims at increasing the efficiency of the transfer of maritime
information among participating units (or nodes). By optimizing the efficiency of
operations through information exchange, even small naval formations can generate
additional combat power. Data is manipulated by a series of dynamic and interlinked
“grids”: sensor grids gather the data, information grids fuse and process it, and engagement grids manage the operations generated.19
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Network-centric concepts are also being applied to developing local and regional maritime situational awareness, through various maritime domain awareness (MDA) information-sharing efforts. In short, MDA efforts are also part of
building global maritime partnerships, as various regional information-sharing
partnerships are netting up the global maritime commons. Efforts such as the
establishment of Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers
(MHQ/MOC) for the numbered fleets in the U.S. Navy are geared to provide the
capability to support MDA operations globally. National programs in the United
States—such as the Container Security Initiative, Automatic Identification System (AIS), Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MISSIS)—are part of the multiagency effort to build MDA capability to support the defense of the homeland.20
Other nations have similar efforts to build up regional situational awareness
of the maritime domain. In the pirate-infested waters of the Malacca Strait, the
trinational effort of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (MALSINDO) began as
a means of protecting the sea-lanes in the region from illegal activities—piracy,
smuggling, etc. The regional cooperation also brought about Project SURPIC
in 2005, when Singapore and Indonesia developed a joint surveillance system to
share information regarding vessel movements in the Singapore Straits.21 Singapore also established the ACCESS system and the Regional Maritime Information
Exchange (ReMIX) Internet-based system to encourage information exchanges
with other nations in the region.22
The U.S. Navy is actively engaged with regional partners and longtime allies
to build information-exchange agreements and relationships to enhance global
maritime partnerships in order to support global maritime domain awareness.
There is currently work under way between the U.S. Navy and the French Ministry of Defense to share information obtained from the U.S. Navy’s AIS Program
of Record and France’s SPATIONAV coastal systems. This information-sharing
agreement, spearheaded by the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Center Pacific (SSC Pacific), will extend U.S. awareness of vessel movement in
the European region and also the French Caribbean. The latter will provide the
United States with valuable information to support drug interdiction efforts
in the Caribbean. The final phase of the plan would allow the United States
and France to exchange information and analysis regarding noncooperative, or
“dark,” targets in order to identify maritime threats. Work is also under way with
another partner nation, Singapore, to integrate satellite imagery with AIS information to track vessel movements.
Maritime domain awareness efforts within the U.S. Navy have also been extended to developing regions to build new partnerships. One example of this is
a Sixth Fleet–sponsored project to provide the government of Ghana with the
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ability to characterize vessel traffic in the Gulf of Guinea. SSC Pacific scientists
and engineers supporting the Sixth Fleet work with the University of Ghana to
train students on open-source image processing. There is also a project going on
with the University of Ghana to track canoes fitted with radar reflectors and AIS
transmitters. The small-boat detection trials and training of imagery analysts in
that region help not only to build new relationships but also to develop a capability for persistent maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea.
Through these and other MDA efforts, the maritime domain is being netted
and global maritime partnerships are being strengthened with these emerging
information-sharing agreements. However, the ability of different naval forces to
engage in similar information-sharing activities at sea remains a work in progress.
As mentioned earlier, new C4ISR technologies have had a dramatic impact on the
ability of many navies to network with their own ships, submarines, aircraft, and
command centers. This has led to a situation where various components within
each navy can exchange large amounts of information. In doing so, these navies
have found that they become more effective across the spectrum of conflict, from
peacemaking to counterinsurgency, to major conflict.
However, this rush to install cutting-edge technology in each navy has had just
the opposite effect on its ability to network effectively with assets of other navies.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that nations and navies are proceeding
along different technological development paths. As a result of this inexorable
trend, naval cooperation is under increasing stress.
NETWORKING THE GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP: HOW BIG A
CHALLENGE?
In today’s world, nothing significant can get done outside of a coalition
context, but we have been humbled by the challenges of devising effective
coalition communications.
DR. DAVID ALBERTS

The experience of the Canadian navy in numerous deployments with U.S. Navy
carrier strike groups (CSGs) suggests the issues that persist even among two
modern, technologically advanced navies, let alone between and among multiple
navies at various levels of technological maturity.23 This documented experience
—as well as other compelling data—illustrates how the very technology that has
helped each navy communicate internally has impeded effective communications with forces of other navies. Paul Mitchell, then director of academics at
the Canadian Forces College, puts this dilemma in stark terms: “Is there a place
for small navies in network-centric warfare? Will they be able to make any sort
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of contribution in multinational naval operations of the future? Or will they be
relegated to the sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, encouraged to
stay out of the way—or stay at home? . . . The ‘need for speed’ in network-centric
operations places the whole notion of multinational operations at risk.”24
In 2010 General James Mattis, then commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command,
echoed Mitchell’s themes as well as more general concerns regarding networking: “In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if
you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based
on trust across service lines, across
What reformers have really been talking about coalition and national lines, and
is moving beyond merely communicating
across civilian/military lines, you
between and among units to networking forces really need to go home, because
and forming them into single fighting entities. your leadership style is obsolete.”25
But how important is coalition
networking, and what is the “state of play” today, as U.S. Navy combat formations
attempt to communicate and share data with coalition partners and to achieve
shared situational awareness?26 Some would say that it is not yet what it should
be. As Mitchell predicts, absent more effective means to network and exchange
data, navies may even stop attempting to operate together. He raises what is perhaps the most important question regarding coalition naval communications:
What level of communications and networking is required to make coalition
operations at sea effective?
Mitchell did not ask this question offhandedly. For a number of years the Canadian navy has deployed surface combatants with U.S. Navy CSGs for six-month
deployments. In that environment the effectiveness of coalition interoperability
moves from theory to the reality of high-tempo, forward naval operations—
operations that often involved combat. Mitchell has interviewed the commanding officers of seven Canadian ships that deployed with U.S. Navy CSGs to
determine how effectively they were able to communicate with their U.S. Navy
partners. The results indicated that while significant progress has been made,
more work needs to be done.
The experience of these Canadian commanding officers, as well as of others
working with U.S. naval forces in NATO exercises or operations, is that the “need
for speed” in network-centric operations may result in the exclusion of even
close allies. Thus, Mitchell asserts, while the guiding principle of network-centric
warfare is to increase the speed and efficiency of operations, coalitions as such
are rarely concerned about combat efficiency. Rather, their fundamental realities
are always the scarcity of operational resources or the limits of their political legitimacy, or both. This point led Mitchell to conclude that because of the impact
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of slower networks or non-networked ships in a dynamic coalition environment,
the prospects of the U.S. Navy’s keeping “in step” with coalition partners is not
high—absent enlightened efforts by all governments concerned.27
At a 2003 international C4ISR symposium, Mitchell put it directly during a
question-and-answer period:
We have been trying to work with the U.S. Navy for a long time. Ten years ago when
we basically communicated by the red phone [tactical voice nets] we did all right
because it was pretty much a level playing field. Five years ago, with CHALLENGE
ATHENA and the beginnings of networked communications, it started to become
more difficult for us as the U.S. Navy sped away from its partners. Today, with the
emerging FORCEnet, the U.S. Navy is in danger of leaving behind other navies
because all of the background and decision making that goes on over networks like
SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network] is lost to us [;] thus, when the
order is given to do something we have none of the background for it and we are not
in the battle rhythm of the operation.28

The situation Mitchell describes represents the reality of current coalition
operations at sea and indicates that there is important work yet to be done. This
is consistent with what proponents of network-centric operations have been professing for some time. In a capstone publication of the Department of Defense
Office of Force Transformation, the late Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski opined,
“The United States wants its partners to be as interoperable as possible. Not being
interoperable means you are not on the net, so you are not in a position to derive
power from the information age.”29
If this is such an important issue, why have naval professionals not worked
harder and more vigorously to solve it, and why have we not found a solution
yet? Part of the problem lies in the differing relative success that navies have had
networking at sea. Even in the days of signal flags, ships at sea found ways to
communicate to some degree. As technology advanced from flashing lights to
radio Morse code, to tactical radio voice circuits, to tactical data links, ships at
sea often had it better than forces ashore on expanded battlefields. The assurance
that “we’ve communicated at sea before and we’re doing so today” obscures how
well we could communicate and exchange data if the right technology, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures were in place.
The importance of coalition partners effectively networking has perhaps been
best articulated by Commander Alberto Soto, of the Chilean navy, in an article
in this journal: “The availability of a cooperatively created tactical picture has
long been a ‘dream of naval commanders who wanted to be able to see what was
over the horizon.’”30 He argues the criticality of building and sharing an effective common operational picture within a coalition, noting that “regional navies
have disparate capabilities, with major differences in terms of C4ISR. . . . [A]llies
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do not acquire or develop command-and-control systems or surveillance and
reconnaissance assets with the main goal of exchanging information with other
potential allies.”31
For the U.S. Navy, there is another complicating factor. Almost all officers who
attain high rank in that service have served as carrier strike group commanders,
typically as their first afloat assignments as flag officers. As a CSG commander,
they experienced the “best of the best” in the way of communications and dataexchange capabilities—with robust displays, ample switching and routing capabilities, and high bandwidth. Additionally, coalition nets such as CENTRIXS
are likely to be installed on the flagship, the aircraft carrier, and that is where
coalition naval officers embark for most exercises.32 Thus, as carrier strike group
commanders advance through policy and acquisition assignments, their collective memories of coalition communications and data-exchange capabilities
are often quite positive, their operational experience rarely having given them
first-person knowledge of significant problems. But their experiences constitute
the exception—not the rule—for they have generally not experienced coalition
networking from the position of international surface combatants attempting to
work with U.S. Navy ships.
There is another, perhaps more important, reason why an effective solution
still eludes operators who want to solve this issue. Coalition interoperability does
not fit into any requirements “bin,” for either the U.S. Navy or, most likely, coalition partners. It does not fly, float, or operate beneath the seas. It does not strike
the enemy from afar, like cruise missiles. It does not enhance readiness, like spare
parts or training. It therefore often does not have the requisite degree of highlevel advocacy. This is not to imply that those in charge of setting requirements
or acquiring weapons systems are not keen on doing the right thing—clearly they
are. However, the definition of operational needs, the requirements-generation
process, and acquisition practices have grown up over decades, even generations,
and changing them to factor in coalition communications adequately takes a
great deal of time and attention.
As yet, this is a journey that is incomplete, and part of the reason is an inability to quantify the “goodness” derived from coalition networking. With naval
establishments and acquisition bureaucracies increasingly driven by the rules of
the marketplace—measures of effectiveness, returns on investment, best business
practices, and efficiency—the absence of quantification makes it difficult to argue
for scarce research and development, and especially acquisition dollars.
But it is a process that must take place if the U.S. Navy and its likely coalition
partners are to operate at sea effectively for the next century. As Mitchell points
out, “In network-centric warfare information is the cornerstone of all action;
the existence of separate networks operating at different speeds will have an
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undeniable impact on battle rhythms.”33 Clearly, overcoming uneven or uncoordinated application of C4ISR technology by nations that would work together
to form a global maritime partnership is an essential first step in making that
partnership a reality.34
HARNESSING THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY: THE
AUSCANNZUKUS WAY
We will win—or lose—the next series of wars in our nation’s laboratories.
ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS

For the U.S. Navy, the technical challenges of networking effectively with likely
coalition partners are not trivial.35 The problem is twofold in nature: first, quantifying the difference in operational effectiveness between that of a coalition force
networked via U.S. Navy infrastructure provided by the Consolidated Afloat
Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES, discussed below) and that of a coalition force less robustly networked; and second, finding a way for likely coalition
partners to coevolve maritime systems in a way that enables maximum networking among ships and other platforms.36
The issue of coevolution is an important one, because for navies determined
to work with other, often smaller, navies as global maritime partners, a cooperative arrangement regarding technology development is crucial.37 This implies
early and frequent collaboration among scientists and engineers in the laboratories of these navies, as well as those of other prospective global maritime partners.
One vehicle for such cooperation among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations
—is The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). Although it has existed in
various forms for over half a century, TTCP is not well-known, even among
AUSCANNZUKUS naval personnel. Importantly, while an analysis of coalition
interoperability along other lines is certainly possible, TTCP’s organization and
infrastructure provide a ready-made medium that makes success probable.
TTCP is a forum for defense science and technology collaboration. Established
as a joint effort between the defense organizations of the partner nations, TTCP
is one of the largest collaborative defense science and technology activities in the
world. The statistics give some indication of its scope: five nations, eleven technology and systems groups, eighty technical panels and action groups, 170 organizations, and 1,200 scientists and engineers are involved. The forum’s purpose
is to enhance national defense and reduce costs. To this end, TTCP provides a
formal framework that scientists and technologists can use to share information.
Collaboration within TTCP acquaints participants with each other’s defense
research and development programs so that national programs may be planned
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in concert. TTCP has its center of gravity in the applied research domain but also
encompasses basic research and technology development. Its scope extends to exploration of alternative concepts prior to development of specific systems; collaborative research; sharing of data, equipment, material and facilities; joint trials and
exercises; and advanced technology demonstrations. Cooperation within TTCP
can catalyze project-specific collaboration farther along the acquisition path.
Enhancing Coalition Interoperability: MAR AG-1 and AG-6
In response to a mutually perceived need to assess the quantitative value of
network-centric naval forces, in 2002 TTCP’s Maritime Systems Group (MAR)
established Action Group One (AG-1) to conduct a three-year “Network-centric
Maritime Warfare” collaborative study. The study produced robust quantitative assessments of the benefits of the adoption by coalition naval forces of a networked
force structure. The report of AG-1 prompted leaders of the MAR in 2005 to charter a second investigative team, Action Group Six (AG-6), to examine the impact
the U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet concept would have on coalition operations.38
In establishing the basic requirements for the technologies to be included in
the study, AG-6 began by seeking a common understanding of the operational
environment facing a coalition naval force. The group developed a scenario that
evolved from a disaster assistance/humanitarian relief effort to a counterterrorism operation, and finally a high-tempo conflict at sea. Four principal measures
of effectiveness were devised to compare the success of a coalition force that fully
leveraged the U.S. Navy’s FORCEnet capability to that of one not networked.
In addition, AG-6 members shared the “technology on-ramps” of their respective national acquisition programs in order to find where complementary technological capabilities could be inserted into naval C4ISR systems. The impacts
and value of alternative coalition network structures were modeled and assessed.
The result was a set of quantitative tools that could be adopted by the acquisition
branches of the AG-6 nations.
Similarly, TTCP nations have come to regard the early manifestations of
maritime net-centricity, such as FORCEnet, as stepping-stones on a path—a
path marked out by the TTCP’s “Maritime Net-centric Roadmap”—to becoming “fully net-enabled.” The next step is the implementation of an information
architecture to deliver the military capabilities and benefits that nations perceive
as offered by network-centric warfare.
For its part, the U.S. Navy is committed to transforming, over the next several
years, its current afloat network capability and global C2 infrastructure into the
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services. The development of
CANES will produce a “service-oriented architecture” (SOA), wherein applications, services, and data are provided to “communities of interest.” SOA leverages a “publish and subscribe” messaging pattern in which information services,
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often external to any given system, are published to the network, which can then
be subscribed to (i.e., utilized) by other systems and users. CANES incorporates
information technology and network services currently provided to coalition
partners under the CENTRIXS umbrella, making the development of CANES
a critical concern to the AUSCANNZUKUS community as the pathway to the
Maritime Net-centric Roadmap’s goal of full net enablement and ultimate convergence with the future Global Information Grid.39
The AG-6 study quantified how
disparities in C4I capability within
Networking maritime forces is crucial to the
effectiveness of operations that run the gamut a U.S.-led coalition force underfrom humanitarian operations to dealing with mine its effectiveness in a range
of missions, ultimately disenfraninsurgencies, to nation-building, to state-onchising less capable units. The mistate conflict.
gration of U.S. Navy networking
capabilities to new architectures like CANES could increase that disparity, even
introduce invasive and disruptive effects not well understood by the United States
or its allies. The conclusions of the AG-1 and AG-6 studies, as well as ongoing
TTCP studies, should help allied nations stay aligned as the U.S. Navy transitions
to CANES. The AG-1 and AG-6 studies have given the MAR an excellent appreciation of U.S. and allied maritime capabilities, along with modeling frameworks
and tools that can support recommendations to national leaderships. A further
MAR study is under way that will provide an analytical assessment of requirements, funding, and execution of national programs to sustain U.S.-allied interoperability in a CANES SOA environment. It will clarify for national decision
makers the impact of such technologies upon future network architecture.
As it relates to the planned integration of coalition network services (e.g.,
CENTRIXS), this new study will inform the U.S. Navy’s CANES development
process by raising awareness of the value and impact of C4I technologies potentially incorporated into CANES. (It will raise the awareness of allied navies as
well—such inclusive efforts are often more useful for informing important constituencies than for providing prescient new information.) Like previous studies,
it will inform national acquisition agencies of what will be required, in terms of
coalition SOA, to enable TTCP navies to participate in future global maritime
partnership (GMP) net-enabled maritime operations. Also, it will provide validated analytical tools and techniques that nations can reuse to explore national
service-oriented architectures for their own interservice operations.
Leveraging TTCP Efforts across Global and Regional Maritime Partnerships
TTCP represents the work of only five nations, and the MAR AG-1/AG-6 effort
represents only a small fraction of that work. Nonetheless, the issue of coalition
networking is sufficiently compelling and the TTCP process so plainly worthy of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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emulation that outside observers consider it a best-practices example and argue
for similar efforts by other national groups. Commander Soto writes,
Since 2002 the Technical Cooperation Program . . . has focused the efforts of its Maritime Systems Group (MSG) on “Networking Maritime Coalitions” and “FORCEnet
and Coalitions Implications.” The MSG has become an important link among
national naval C4ISR acquisition programs. . . . For that very reason these [Latin
American and Caribbean] nations should tenaciously strive to become involved in
initiatives like the MSG.40

Other nations and navies, in natural clusters, can indeed take advantage of the
policies and processes that TTCP has instituted within the AUSCANNZUKUS
nations. They can replicate the TTCP model where it makes the most sense for
them. As Commander Soto suggests, the navies of South America represent one
such grouping. The ASEAN nations offer another, one that already has several
collaborative forums. NATO offers yet another, and given the wide range of similar efforts already under way there, such as the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NEC) C2 Maturity Model, the way forward may be easier than some think.
{LINE-SPACE}
It is important and necessary to use work such as TTCP or NATO’s NEC as a
means to harmonize national C4ISR acquisition programs, because the challenge
is so great. This challenge has persisted for quite some time, as pointed out over a
decade ago in an analysis of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, in Bosnia:
Coalition operations such as Joint Endeavor present a complex set of challenges for
the military C4ISR system planners, implementers, and operators. The most difficult
challenge is the provision of integrated C4ISR services and capabilities to support
the needs of ad hoc multinational military force structures and politically driven
command arrangements. Although integrated C4ISR services are the desired objective, the realities tend to drive the solution to stove-piped implementations. In spite
of technology advances, this will likely be the case for some time to come. There will
continue to be uneven C4ISR capabilities among coalition members who will continue to rely on systems with which they are most comfortable—their own.41

Lest anyone think this issue is already solved in 2012 (or will solve itself shortly), effective networking is now a “wicked problem” for navies attempting to deal
not with a “high end” environment like antisubmarine, antiair, or antisurface
warfare but with the basic task of combating piracy. The editors of a recent collected work on piracy and maritime crime highlight the importance of effective
maritime surveillance in countering piracy: “Clearly, maritime surveillance is the
key to gaining a better understanding of what is happening on the oceans, but
currently, systems are not integrated within each country, let alone at regional or
global levels.”42
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It is beyond debate that the U.S. Navy will continue to partner with other
navies to secure the rule of law on the global commons and that the effectiveness
of this combined global force will rise or fall on its ability to network at sea. The
Technical Cooperation Program provides an example of how nations can plant
the technological seed in making C4ISR systems compatible with their partners,
just as they have been able to do within their own fleets. It is a model that must be
applied—and quickly—to the navies with which the U.S. Navy will work at sea. If
these networking challenges are not addressed, the Global Maritime Partnership
will remain only a concept and never deliver its promise.
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TAKING MINES SERIOUSLY
Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas
Scott C. Truver

A

mine is a terrible thing that waits. The easy way is always mined. Any ship can
be a minesweeper—once. Sea mines and the need to counter them have been
constants for the U.S. Navy since the earliest days of the Republic. In January
1778, patriot David Bushnell used floating kegs of gunpowder fitted with contact firing mechanisms to attack a British fleet anchored in the Delaware River
above Philadelphia. Four British sailors died trying to retrieve the kegs—an
early example of the challenges of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) against an
unknown threat—but the ships were unscathed. Since that uncertain beginning,
mines and mine countermeasures (MCM) have figured prominently in the Civil
War, Spanish-American War, both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, numerous Cold
War crises, and Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM.1
In February 1991, the U.S. Navy lost command of
Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, at
the northern Arabian Gulf to more than 1,300 mines
Gryphon Technologies LC. Since 1972 he has participated in many studies and assessments for government
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Smith, lamented, “We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy,
using pre–World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time
of the birth of Christ.”2 The initial clearance operations saw three mine countermeasures vessels sunk by mines and more than a hundred personnel dead or
wounded. By the end of hostilities in July 1953, coalition MCM forces, which
accounted for just 2 percent of all UN naval forces, had suffered 20 percent of all
naval casualties.
The Korean War experience served as the catalyst for the U.S. Navy’s MCM
renaissance in the 1950s and early 1960s, as did the Operation DESERT STORM
MCM debacle for a renaissance that began in the mid-1990s and continues today
(the latter revival much less extensive than the former, however). As Rear Admiral
David G. Farragut wrote on 25 March 1864 to the Secretary of the Navy, “it does
not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.”3
Traditional navies as well as maritime terrorists can and have used mines and
underwater improvised explosive devices (UWIEDs) to challenge military and
commercial uses of the seas. These “weapons that wait” are the quintessential
naval asymmetric threat, pitting adversaries’ strengths against what they perceive
as naval and maritime weaknesses. Indeed, sea mines are key to regional navies’
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and sea-control strategies and operations. Perhaps a million mines of more than three hundred types are in the inventories of
more than sixty navies worldwide, not counting U.S. weapons.4 More than thirty
countries produce mines, and twenty countries export them; highly sophisticated
weapons are available in the international arms trade. Worse, these figures are for
sea mines proper; they do not include UWIEDs that can be fashioned from fiftyfive-gallon drums, other containers, and even discarded refrigerators.
Mines and underwater IEDs are easy to acquire or build and are cheap, but
their low cost belies their potential for harm. With costs measured from a few
hundred to several thousands of dollars, they are the weapons of choice for a
“poor man’s navy,” providing an excellent return on investment: low cost but
high effects. On 18 February 1991, for example, the billion-dollar Aegis cruiser
USS Princeton (CG 59) suffered a “mission kill” from an Iraqi-laid Italian Manta
multiple-influence bottom mine costing about $25,000; the warship was out of
service for the duration of Operation DESERT STORM and longer. Several hours
earlier that same day, USS Tripoli (LPH 10) struck an Iraqi contact mine, which
ripped a twenty-three-foot hole in the hull and came close to sinking the ship.
During the 1980s “tanker war” in the Arabian Gulf, only the heroic efforts of its
crew saved USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) from sinking on 14 April 1988 after
it struck a contact mine of World War I design.5 The warship’s damage-repair
bill came in at more than $96 million, in fiscal year (FY) 1993 dollars. In an
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accounting that usually comes as a surprise, since the end of World War II mines
have seriously damaged or sunk almost four times more U.S. Navy ships than all
other means of attack combined:6

• Mines, fifteen ships
• Missiles, one ship
• Torpedoes/aircraft, two ships
• Small-boat terrorist attack, one ship
While mines and even UWIEDs might not be naval power–projection “showstoppers,” they could certainly be “speed bumps” in critical waterways and
regions, slowing the movement of warships, military sealift, and humanitarian
response in crisis and conflict.7
FOCUS ON CHINESE MINE WARFARE
The mine warfare experiences of America and other nations are not lost on the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).8 Chinese naval analysts and historians
understand the asymmetric potential for mine warfare to “baffle the enemy, and
thus achieve exceptional combat results.”9 Mines provide what some have described as “affordable security via asymmetric means.”10
The Chinese note that hundreds of thousands of mines served tactical seadenial and strategic ends in both world wars. Throughout the Great War, Russia,
Germany, Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States relied on sea mines. Their
mining campaigns culminated in the “North Sea Mine Barrage” of June–October
1918, when British and American ships laid more than seventy-three thousand
mines, sinking thirteen U-boats and keeping more in home ports until the armistice. Mines were also used successfully in all World War II theaters. Remarkably,
Nazi submarines laid 327 mines from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the Mississippi
Delta, closing several North American ports for a total of forty days and sinking
or damaging eleven ships. Toward the end of the war in the Pacific, Operation
STARVATION showed the strategic value of mines. From March to August 1945,
U.S. Army Air Forces heavy bombers and Navy submarines laid some 12,200
mines in Japan’s shipping routes and territorial waters and ports. The results
were unequivocal: mines sank or severely damaged some 670 Japanese ships and
strangled all maritime commerce around the home islands.
Testimony in 2007 before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission by a member of the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute can serve as a prelude to this discussion:
We have recently completed a two-year-long study of over 1,000 Chinese language articles concerning naval mine warfare (MIW). Our three most important findings are:
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(1) China has a large inventory of naval mines, many of which are obsolete but still
deadly, and somewhat more limited numbers of sophisticated modern mines, some
of which are optimized to destroy enemy submarines. (2) We think that China would
rely heavily on offensive mining in any Taiwan scenario. (3) If China were able to employ these mines (and we think that they could), it would greatly hinder operations,
for an extended time, in waters where the mines were thought to have been laid. The
obvious means of employing mines are through submarines and surface ships. Use
of civilian assets should not be discounted. But we also see signs of Chinese recognition of the fact that aircraft offer the best means of quickly laying mines in significant
quantity. These aircraft would be useless, however, without air superiority.11

With that as framework, this article addresses four broad areas of concern:

• What are the current and projected statuses of China’s naval mine technologies and of its inventory, delivery systems, doctrine, and training?

• How might China employ naval mines in “Near Seas” scenarios?12
• To what extent are the U.S. Navy and allied/partner navies prepared to cope
with Chinese mine warfare strategies and operations?

• How might the U.S. Navy employ mine warfare in Near Seas combat against
Chinese forces?
There are broad MIW implications for U.S. strategies, plans, and programs,
generally, but particularly for the nascent AirSea Battle Concept, which has
captured the attention of the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations. As outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Air Force and Navy are formulating this concept to defeat
adversaries that possess sophisticated A2/AD capabilities.13 The concept is meant
to help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power
projection, including our own mines to defeat our adversaries’ naval forces and
strategies. Before turning to these questions, however, some mine warfare terms
of reference will be useful.
AN MIW “PRIMER”
Mine warfare—at sea as well as on land—comprises two broad categories
of capabilities and operations: first, mines and mining, and second, mine
countermeasures.
Damn, “Torpedoes”!
The fundamental goal of a minefield is to deny access, not to damage or destroy
a specific ship or submarine. Mines, or simply psychological uncertainty about
them (what weapons are actually in the water, and where?) can have intended
effects even without firing.14
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Although mines or underwater IEDs can be constructed in virtually any
configuration, there are four primary types: bottom (or “ground”) mines, buoyant moored mines, floating (or drifting) mines, and limpet mines. They can be
put in place by aircraft, surface ships, pleasure boats, submarines, or combat or
suicide divers, even from pickup trucks crossing bridges over critical waterways.
They are designed for operations anywhere from the surf and craft-landing zone
(less than ten-foot water depth) to deep water (greater than two hundred feet),
and their payloads can range from a few pounds to several tons of high explosive
(see the figure). The same weapon can be used in offensive or defensive modes
—to attack directly an adversary’s ships or submarines or to protect one’s own
ships, submarines, or critical sea areas, ports, or waterways.
Bottom mines, resting on the seafloor (described as “proud”), are held in place
by their own weight but can also be buried under sediment to confound mine
hunting; strong tides and currents can result in mine “creep.” Bottom mines
range from thirty-six-inch cone-shaped devices to weapons twelve feet in length.
Those intended to target surface ships are most effective in relatively shallow water, less than two hundred feet, although bottom mines remain effective against
submarines even in deep water.
Moored mines are buoyant cases held in place by anchors. There are three
types: close-close-tethered and close-tethered mines, near the seafloor; in-volume
mines; and near-surface mines. A moored mine requires a large internal air space
to make its case buoyant, which limits the amount of explosives it can contain. As
a result, the damage radius of a moored mine is usually less than that of a bottom
mine. However, they can be fitted with influence sensors or armed with torpedoes
or rockets, greatly increasing their “reach.”
Floating mines are positively buoyant and float on or near the surface, but they
are generally anchored in place. If allowed to drift they are completely indiscriminate. A variant, the oscillating mine, drifts beneath the surface between two set
depths or maintains a constant depth. International law requires that automatic
contact mines—mines that fire themselves—must become inert within an hour
after becoming free of their anchors.15 Clearly, drifting mines that are not designed to become inert are prohibited, but they continue to be used.
Finally, combat or terrorist/suicide divers can attach limpet mines directly to
hulls of targets, set to explode minutes, days, or longer after being put in place.
For example, in July 1985 two time-delay limpet mines sank the Greenpeace
vessel Rainbow Warrior in the Auckland, New Zealand, harbor. The May 2008
sinking of the Sri Lankan logistics ship M/V Invincible by Tamil Sea Tigers using
limpets underscored the vulnerability of military vessels to suicide-diver attack
in ports and waterways.16
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MINE THREAT SPECTRUM

Source: U.S. Navy.

Some mines are mobile, capable of being launched from submarines thousands of yards from intended minefields. Old mines can be refitted with modern,
highly sophisticated components to improve effectiveness and confound EOD efforts, and any mine can be equipped with counter-countermeasure features—for
example, “ship counts” or antidiver sensors—to frustrate sweeping, hunting, and
neutralization. They can be fabricated from fiberglass or plastic, making them
extremely difficult to detect, identify, or counter once in the water. They can be
designed to fire in several ways: by contact, by sensing the signatures or “influences” of a surface ship or submarine, and on command.
Contact mines are either moored or surface/drifting mines that are designed
to actuate when their cases or attachments come into contact with targets. This
is the oldest type of mine still in use. Most contact mines use a chemical “horn”
that becomes a battery to actuate the detonator when the chemical vial in the
horn is broken. Others are fitted with electric switches and internal batteries to
fire the detonator.
Influence mines can be bottom or moored weapons and can have sophisticated
sensors and firing mechanisms that do not require contact with targets. They are
fitted with combinations of magnetic, acoustic, seismic, underwater-electricalpotential, pressure, and video sensors. Modern sensors use microcomputers that
can sense a target’s approach, determine whether the sensed signature is a ship
or a sweep, and estimate the optimum time to detonate as the target passes.
Command-detonated mines are moored or bottom weapons that are fired on order by the miner when the target ship enters the minefield. Command-detonated
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minefields are generally—but not always—limited to protective/defensive operations in harbors or restricted waterways.
Thus, mines are “tools” that can be used in peacetime as well as crisis or war.
Indeed, the peacetime laying of naval mines is a legal option in a state’s own internal waters and territorial sea, even on the high seas areas (though not the highsea regions of international straits or archipelagic waters)—so long as an explicit
and effective Notice to Mariners is issued and other rules are followed, as the U.S.
multiservice Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations explains.17
Hunt If You Can—Sweep If You Must
The best MCM operations are those that prevent the minelayers from putting
their weapons in place—once in the water, mines are exceedingly difficult to
detect, identify, and neutralize. To keep them out of the water, aircraft, cruise
missiles, naval “fires” (long-range, targeted strikes, especially by gunnery), and
even special-operations forces can (assuming rules of engagement permit) attack
mine depots, assembly areas, or potential minelayers.
Failing that, MCM operations can be conducted from the high-water mark
on shore to water depths greater than two hundred feet. Countermeasures can
be carried out in crowded ports, in narrow assault “breaching” lanes, and in fleet
operating areas covering many thousands of square nautical miles. The variety of
MCM operations areas and the number of mine types and characteristics, taken
together, greatly complicate the mine-defense “problem.” Tactics, techniques, and
procedures that apply to one water regime, area, or mine threat do not usually
apply to others. No other naval warfare discipline presents such a diversity of
environments and threats.
Accordingly, several critical questions must be answered if MCM is to be
effective:

• What intelligence do we have about the weapons?
• Where might they be deployed?
• What is the miner’s objective?
• What are the local oceanographic, bottom, and environmental
characteristics?

• What is already on the bottom?
• How can we know if something new is there?
With these questions in mind, MCM operations can be broken into two broad
categories of tasks: mine hunting and minesweeping.
Mine hunting is effective against virtually all mine types. It comprises five
steps: detection, classification, localization, identification, and neutralization.
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Sonars are the primary means to detect and classify contacts as mine-like or not.
Each contact can also be identified as a mine or a non-mine by specially trained
divers, marine mammals, or such equipment as video cameras and laser systems
on mine-neutralization or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Advanced
sonars and electro-optical sensors on UUVs offer good promise to enhance
mine-hunting capabilities and remove the “man and the marine mammal” from
the minefield. Still, detection and classification/identification are slow: surface
mine-hunting tactics using hull-mounted or towed sonars are usually carried
out at very low speeds, on the order of three knots; mine hunting by helicopters
is faster—depending on the sensor system, upward of fifteen knots or so—but
less certain.
Once a contact has been detected and classified as mine-like and identified as a
mine, it must be rendered safe before the commander can declare a route or area
cleared. Depending on the accuracy with which the contact has been located, the
characteristics of the bottom (i.e., smooth or rough), sediment type, amount of
clutter, the amount of burial, and the depth of the water, among other factors, the
detection-to-neutralization process of a single mine-like contact can take several
hours if conducted by MCM ships, longer if by other systems.
In contrast, minesweeping is a matter of trawling defined swaths of water, using either mechanical or influence systems to expose or destroy any mines that
might be there (along with any mine-like but non-mine objects that are there,
too). Mechanical sweeping consists of cutting the tethers of mines moored in the
water volume or physically damaging the mines themselves in other ways, such as
chain drags to cut control wires. Moored mines cut loose by mechanical sweeping
must then be neutralized (as by gunfire or explosive charges) or rendered safe for
subsequent analysis.
Influence minesweeping consists of simulating the magnetic, electric, acoustic,
seismic, or pressure signatures of a ship so that a mine fires harmlessly. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of an adversary’s mining objectives, doctrine, tactics, and inventories are extremely important when influence sweeping,
as is specific intelligence on the operation of the sensors, firing criteria, and any
counter-countermeasures (e.g., ship counters or delay arming) of mines believed
to be present. Minesweeping is more risky to the platform than mine hunting
and, when completed, generally leaves behind a higher residual risk to ships that
transit the area. To ensure as low a risk as possible, then, most mine countermeasures operational plans include both mine hunting and minesweeping.
Before sending naval and commercial traffic through a cleared channel, a lowvalue guinea pig ship often transits first to demonstrate that the channel is indeed
safe. These low-value ships can be configured to withstand multiple hits without
sinking, in an operation called “check sweeping.” During the 1980s “tanker war”
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in the Arabian Gulf, for example, M/V Bridgeton struck a contact mine but was
able to remain under way and thereafter served (inadvertently) as a guinea pig/
minesweeper of sorts, leading the way for the U.S. Navy warships that had been
assigned to escort it and other U.S.-flagged commercial ships.
PLAN MINES AND MINING
Chinese mine inventories total perhaps as many as a hundred thousand weapons, from relatively unsophisticated but still dangerous moored contact mines
of World War I design to rocket-propelled weapons employing sophisticated
signal-processing and target-detection systems. However, this figure of a hundred
thousand mines is at best a guess; no one really knows for sure—at least from
open sources.
U.S. Government–Published Assessments
Despite a burgeoning “cottage industry” scrutinizing virtually every aspect of the
U.S./People’s Republic of China (PRC) relationship in recent years, official unclassified assessments of the PLAN MIW forces are remarkably slim. For example,
a U.S. Department of Defense 2010 report to Congress gives Chinese minewarfare capabilities virtually no mention. Its single reference, which appears in
two places, is indirect, simply acknowledging that in January 2010 the Barack
Obama administration announced its intent to sell to Taiwan $6.4 billion worth
of defensive arms and equipment, which included ex–U.S. Navy mine-hunting
ships of the Osprey (MHC 51) class, as an element of a broader commitment to
defend it against the use of force or coercion by Beijing.18
In its latest published assessment of the Chinese navy, the U.S. Navy’s Office of
Naval Intelligence provides some pertinent details about Chinese MIW:19

• The PLAN surface force in 2009 included forty mine warfare ships (in addition to twenty-six destroyers, forty-eight frigates, more than eighty missilearmed patrol craft, fifty-eight amphibious ships, fifty major auxiliaries, and
more than 250 minor auxiliaries and service/support craft).

• The Song and Yuan advanced diesel-electric submarines and the Shang
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are the PLAN’s newest indigenous
submarines and the first to be designed to employ the YJ-82 antiship cruise
missile in addition to traditional loadouts of torpedoes and mines.

• The Chinese-licensed copy of the French SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter,
the Z-8, is a medium-lift helicopter performing troop transport, antisubmarine, antisurface, minesweeping, and minelaying tasks.

• In the last fifteen years the PLAN has moved from an obsolete mine inventory comprising primarily pre–World War II mines to a robust and
modern inventory including moored, bottom, drifting, rocket-propelled,
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and intelligent mines. Advanced mines feature digital microprocessors for
enhanced targeting and integrated sensors to resist sweeping. The mines can
be laid by submarines (primarily for covert mining of enemy ports), surface
ships, aircraft, and fishing and merchant vessels.

• Although the PLAN considers its MCM capabilities to be relatively
advanced—including as it does operations in complex, multiservice environments, during emission-controlled conditions, and at night—China
recognizes that adversary mines could be a major impediment to its naval
operations. In 1988, the PLAN launched a new minesweeper, Wolei, and
might have developed an indigenously produced version of the French
Pluto Plus mine-neutralization vehicle. The PLAN looks to be maturing
into a more capable MCM force by improving its capability to protect its
waters from mines, in addition to clearing minefields Chinese forces might
have sown during a conflict.

• The PLAN is expanding its domestic research and development for underwater weapons, moving away from reliance on imported systems and technology. The PLAN has reportedly developed a maintenance and inspection
program for the upkeep of existing mine stockpiles, necessary to ensure that
the more advanced mines, using microprocessors and long-life batteries, are
operational when needed.
The Congressional Research Service provides a bit more information:20

• China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon
acquisition programs, including programs for antiship ballistic missiles,
antiship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles,
mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, destroyers and
frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships and craft, mine countermeasures
ships, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems.

• Although the aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old
technology and are much less capable than its newer submarines, China
may decide that they have value as minelayers or as “bait,” decoy submarines
that can draw out enemy submarines (such as American SSNs), which can
then be attacked by other Chinese naval forces. In related areas of activity,
China reportedly is developing new unmanned underwater vehicles and has
modernized its substantial inventory of mines.

• China’s navy exhibits limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including
C4ISR systems, antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and MCM. Countering China’s naval modernization might thus involve, among other things,
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actions to exploit these limitations and weaknesses, such as developing and
procuring electronic-warfare systems, antiship cruise missiles, Virginia (SSN
774)–class attack submarines, torpedoes, UUVs, and mines.
Current/Future PLAN Mines and Mining
Aside from these publications, interviews with U.S. Navy MIW operators, planners, and intelligence specialists at Navy headquarters and in field activities, augmented by additional sources, yield, in summary form, the following.
In the PLAN’s mine inventory are more than thirty types of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water-pressure, and other multiple-influence (e.g., acoustic- or
magnetic-sensor) mines, including remote-control, rocket-propelled rising, and
mobile mines.21 The inventory is mostly based on older, former Soviet technology, but it also boasts newer, more sophisticated, multiple-influence types. For
example, Chinese copies of Soviet AMD (or MDM) -series multiple-influence
bottom mines are common, and they can have air-, ship-, or submarine-launched
variants. The PLAN is augmenting with more-capable weapons its inventory of
1970s/1980s-era (and even earlier) mines. Most of these older mines, designed to
defend littoral areas, can be deployed only in shallow seas; only a fraction of them
can be deployed in medium depths. (Table 1 shows selected Chinese navy mines.)
The shallow-water Chen-1, -2, -3, and -6 influence mines can be placed for
defense of ports and harbors; the T-5 mobile mine can be laid in deeper waters
in channels and approaches to ports; and the Soviet PMK-1 and the Chinesedeveloped Mao-5 rocket rising mines are intended for deeper waters farther from
ports and in open-ocean areas and choke points.
China’s remotely controlled mines, such as the EM-53 bottom influence mine,
can be deployed and deactivated by acoustic codes to allow the safe passage of
friendly vessels through a mined area and then reactivated to attack adversary
ships and submarines.
China likely also possesses an inventory of submarine-launched mobile mines
(SLMMs), called “self-navigating mines” in Chinese. These are similar to the U.S.
Navy’s Mk (Mark) 67 SLMMs. Thought to be derived from Yu-type torpedoes,
China’s SLMM can travel along a user-determined course for a set period of time;
when it arrives at its programmed destination, the torpedo’s engine shuts off and
the weapon sinks to the bottom.
China began to develop rocket-propelled and rising mines in 1981 and produced its first prototype in 1989. Rising-mine systems are moored, sometimes in
very deep water, and release buoyant torpedoes or warhead-tipped rockets when
they detect targets. The guided, rocket-propelled EM-52 reportedly can reach attack speeds of eighty meters per second, is armed with a 140-kilogram warhead,
and has an operating depth of at least two hundred meters, while the Russian
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TABLE 1
SELECTED PLAN MINES
Model

TDD

C-1 500

Acoustic,
magnetic

Type/Mission
Bottom
ASW, ASUW

1000

Case Depth
(meters)

Laying Platform
Surface ships, aircraft

6–30

Surface ships, aircraft,
submarines

Warhead
(kg)
300
700

EM-52

Acoustic,
magnetic,
pressure

Rocket-propelled
straight-rising
ASW, ASUW

Surface ships

200

140

EM-56

Acoustic,
magnetic,
pressure

Mobile (13 km)
ASUW

Submarines

45

380

M-3

Contact

Moored
ASUW

Surface ships,
submarines

12–430

(large)

M-4

Acoustic

Moored
ASW, ASUW

Surface ships,
submarines

200

600

PMK-2

Acoustic
(passive/
active)

Rocket-propelled
encapsulated torpedo
ASW

Aircraft, surface
ships, submarines

400
(anchor depth >
1,000)

110

Note: ASW: antisubmarine warfare; ASUW: antisurface warfare.
Sources: Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare, pp. 12–17; Friedman, World Naval Weapon Systems; Wertheim, Combat Fleets.

PMK-2 rising encapsulated torpedo mine can be laid in waters deeper than two
thousand meters (anchor depth). (A speed of eighty meters per second means
that an EM-52 in two hundred meters of water will take about three seconds
from weapon launch to endgame attack—far too short a time for maneuver even
if the target detects the approaching weapon.) China reportedly offers these two
rising mines for export.
Minelaying platforms will likely not include dedicated MCM vessels, other than
a single 3,100-ton combination minelayer/sweeper MIW command ship, Wolei,
mentioned by the Office of Naval Intelligence. This vessel can carry as many as
three hundred weapons. The MCM force is focused on near-shore defense, and
the Chinese navy has several mining options among its other assets. That said, the
aging T-43 minesweepers can carry from twelve to sixteen mines, and the newer
Wosao Type 082 MCM ships are capable of carrying six mines each.
About 150 maritime patrol aircraft and naval bombers can carry mines, and
the employment of aircraft-delivered mines is considered a critical element in
“air blockade campaigns.”22 For example, China’s Harbin SH-5 seaplane can
carry six Chinese copies of the Russian ADM-500 mine. The aging force of H-6
bombers might still be employed in mining roles, each capable of carrying up
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to eighteen mines, as the aircraft apparently continues to be used in minelaying
exercises. The literature seems to indicate that People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Air Force bombers might also be able to deploy mines, although their availability
for mining missions is another question.
PLAN surface warships are equipped to lay mines. The four Sovremenny-class
(Project 956E/956EM) destroyers have rails for up to forty mines, and the ten of
the Luda class (Types 051/051D/051Z) can each carry thirty-eight mines. The
twenty-five Jianghu I/V–class (Type 053H) and three Jianghu III– and IV–class
(Type 053 H2) frigates each can carry up to sixty mines. The ten Hainan-class
(Type 037) coastal patrol craft are fitted with mine rails, while the thirty-five
gun-armed fast attack craft of the Shanghai II (Type 062) class can be fitted with
rails for ten mines. Chinese planners are well aware that most sea mines laid
worldwide since 1945 have been sown by merchant ships, fishing trawlers, or
junks—“vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” China has
thousands of such craft available to support a mining campaign.
Submarines have attracted particular attention as deployment platforms for
deepwater rising mines and SLMMs. The Chinese navy regards submarines as
ideal for long-range, clandestine operations that would sow weapons in an adversary’s port or naval base. The need for high-volume mine delivery is understood
as well, and submarine mine belts—external, conformal containers designed to
carry and release large numbers of mines—are seen as a clandestine means to
complement high-volume aircraft delivery. These belts can expand otherwise
limited payloads, a method pioneered in the British E-class submarines in 1915.
More recently, the Soviet navy developed a mine belt capable of deploying fifty
sea mines on either side of a submarine.
Approximately fifty-five PLAN submarines can sow mines in clandestine
operations: the Han-class (Type 091) nuclear-powered attack submarines each
carry up to thirty-six mines; twelve Song-class (Type 039/039G) diesel/guidedmissile subs also carry mines; nineteen Ming (Type 035) diesel subs, thirty-two
mines; the twelve Kilo (Project 877EKM/636) diesel-powered cruise-missile
boats, twenty-four mines; and the residual Romeo (Project 033) diesel boats,
twenty-eight mines. In all cases, however, mine loads are carried at the expense
of torpedoes.
The mine warfare school is located at Dalian, adjacent to the major surface
warfare officer school. Chinese minelaying training and exercises have extensively
involved air, surface, and even civilian platforms. For example, Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems notes, “airborne minelaying is also regularly practiced and
would be a significant component of defence planning considerations.” Also,
in particular, the PLAN views submarine delivery of mines as a critical element
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of offensive and blockade operations, and it practices this “most basic requirement of submarine warfare.” By 2002, minelaying had become one of the most
common PLAN submarine tactics—a significant difference from the U.S. Navy
submarine warfare “culture” that during the Cold War came to view mining as a
diversion from more critical tasks. Indeed, PLAN crews train to handle submarines loaded with large quantities of mines and practice deploying them from
shallow, in-port/near-port locations to choke points and deep water.
Chinese naval officers recognize the challenges inherent in “penetrating the
enemy’s antisubmarine forces and laying mines behind enemy lines.” According
to one PLAN assessment, “Secretly penetrating the combined mobile formation
deployed by the enemy’s antisubmarine forces is a prerequisite to fulfilling the
mine-laying task.” There is some evidence that China may rely on centralized
control of its submarines when conducting offensive mining missions. In carrying out offensive mine blockades, for example, “if there is a shore-based submarine command post to handle command and guidance of the submarine for its
entire course, it will not only ensure its concealment but also improve the strike
effectiveness of the mines . . . that are laid.”
The Research, Development, Test, Evaluation, and Industrial Base
Mindful of the Russian support to the North Korean mining of coastal waters
in the late summer and early fall of 1950, China has imported Russian mines,
technology, and even engineers to bolster its indigenous MIW programs. As a
leading reference explains:
China aggressively seeks foreign mine technology and is believed to have done considerable business acquiring advanced Russian mine technologies. The mine stock is
estimated to number tens of thousands of weapons, mostly derivatives of USSR/
Russian origin, including M-08, M-12, M-16 and M-26 moored contact mines; the
MYaM shallow water and M-KB deep water contact mines; the PLT-3 contact mine
(submarine laid); and KMD and air-launched AMD influence mines. Indigenously
developed mines include the EM 52 rocket-propelled rising mine, which closely
resembles the first Russian “Cluster” [NATO code name] rising mine and is believed
to be powerful enough to break the keel of an aircraft carrier; the EM 55 (submarine
laid); and the EM 56 rising mine. Ground mines include the EM 57 remote-control
mine and the EM 11 multipurpose mine.23

Recent data suggest that the PLAN is expanding “in-house” research on enhancing its indigenous deepwater rising mines: on methods to predict rocketpropelled-mine attack probability; analysis of launch-platform stability, underwater rocket propulsion, and launch trajectory; target detection, tracking, blast
maximization, and damage to ships; and the ability of targets to react to and
evade deepwater rising mines.
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There has been discussion of a theoretical nature in published Chinese naval
analyses concerning arming sea mines with tactical nuclear weapons, although
there is no direct evidence of the existence of such naval tactical nuclear weapons
programs in China. (During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy tested a mine armed
with a tactical nuclear warhead in Operation CROSSROADS, but the weapon never
went into production.)
Several sources offer insight regarding the Chinese mine research and development (R&D) and industry infrastructure, which, particularly compared to the
U.S. mine industrial base, looks to be robust. Plant 884 in Taiyuan and a satellite
facility near Houma in Shanxi Province began producing contact mines in 1958
and single/multiple-influence weapons in 1965, all based on Soviet technology.
Naval civilian research facilities for demagnetization and mines center in Institute
710, in Yichang. PLAN mine warfare testing has been concentrated in Huludao;
other test facilities are at Lüshun, Zhoushan Island, and Changshan Island. These
mine facilities are in the North Fleet area, except for Yichang and Zhoushan.
PLAN Mining Strategies and Scenarios
In late March 2011, a U.S. Navy MIW analyst cautioned:
Do not “mirror-image” the PLAN. It is not the U.S. Navy. They will do things differently than we otherwise might expect. For example, Beijing might announce in the
early, “pre-kinetic” phase of a crisis that the PLAN has laid mines in critical high sea
areas for “defensive” purposes in accordance with the international legal regime—in
essence daring the United States and others to attempt passage: are mines in place or
not? They could even command-fire one or two weapons just to heighten the anxiety.
Also, don’t discount their use of “dummy” mines in great numbers to slow down and
frustrate our and our partner-navies’ naval maneuver and MCM operations. Their
objective would be to convince regional navies and the U.S. Navy that the cost of
engagement would be too high—in essence achieving “checkmate” on the first move.
Finally, although it’s also important not to conflate capabilities with intentions, in
this case the PLAN looks to be capable of and intending to use mines during a crisis
or conflict in both “Near” and “Far Seas” scenarios.24

Another senior U.S. Navy MIW official interviewed for this article was unequivocal in his assessment that the Chinese could “seriously hamper an adversary’s ability to enter the First Island Chain. That’s a fairly significant advantage
to them in a ‘Taiwan Strait’ scenario—particularly if they executed this before
the ‘kinetic’ phase of a conflict. But that’s looking at the obvious.” He continued,
The open-source Chinese literature also indicates they are concerned about Guam
and its strategic importance as a base for USAF [U.S. Air Force] strategic bombers
and Navy attack submarines. Apra outer harbor is very narrow; outside the harbor
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entrance it gets deep quickly. We need to be concerned about the Chinese Navy’s
ability to place covertly small numbers of advanced mines in strategic locations, like
the Apra channel, even if it does no more than slow down our ability to carry out
time-phased operations.25

Much of the sea area and several of the choke points within the First and Second Island Chains and the approaches to Taiwan are minable, in what have been
described as a “strategic interior line of defense” and a “tactical exterior line of
defense,” respectively. Chinese bottom mines can be deployed in water depths of
approximately two hundred feet and still be effective against surface targets and
shallow-running submarines, while the PLAN’s rising mines can be deployed in
waters some two thousand meters deep to serve as area-denial barriers—much
like the U.S. Navy’s Mk 60 CAPTOR (enCAPsulated TORpedo) mines in the
Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom “GIUK Gap” during the Cold War.
The United States must consider the possibility of feigned or actual deployment of Chinese sea mines in conflict arising out of a crisis over territorial claims
in the South China Sea or on the Korean Peninsula. In those areas, MCM support
from South Korean and Japanese naval forces will be critically important in keeping sea-lanes open.
That said, the U.S. Navy’s concern seems to be focused on its ability to respond
to a Taiwan crisis in which naval mines are one element of an overall, combinedarms campaign. The bathymetry of the Taiwan Strait and sea areas to the immediate north and south of the island’s largest ports is sufficiently shallow for all
types of PLAN mines. Although Taiwan’s eastern coast has deeper waters, a multiaxis mining effort, involving primarily submarines and aircraft, could efficiently
blockade Taiwan. American assessments of Chinese analyses conclude that the
PLAN believes Taiwan’s MCM vessels cannot effectively counter Chinese mines
and that attempts by Taiwan to deploy its own mines could be defeated by PLA air
forces, surface warships, and submarines.
The concept of the “air blockade campaign” looks to be critical for PLAN operations in the Taiwan scenario as well as for A2/AD efforts, particularly within
the First Island Chain. According to a 2011 RAND analysis:
In conjunction with the naval and ground force elements, air forces may also implement the blockade of maritime and ground traffic. Typically, maritime blockades are
conducted jointly by the air force and navy and involve blockading maritime routes
and attacks on shipping. Bombers and fighter-bombers are employed in blockading
maritime routes, operations that generally involve mining port entrances and critical
sea-lanes to impede and eventually sever transport traffic with the outside.26

This example is perhaps of most relevance for a Taiwan scenario, and aerial
minelaying is regarded as one of the primary means employed in aerial blockades.
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Minelaying is, according to the 2000 version of Study of Campaigns, one of the
four important operations conducted during air blockades.
Beyond Taiwan, Chinese assessments of antisubmarine warfare suggest that
mines are best employed against submarines by laying them in egress/ingress
routes nearby adversaries’ bases, potentially frustrating the ability of enemy
submarines to reach the ocean or return for replenishment should the crisis or
conflict go on for long. In view of the strategic importance to the U.S. Navy of
Guam, for example, it should be expected that the PLAN would attempt to lay
mines in the approaches to bases there. Guam is within the endurance limits of
the more capable Chinese submarines armed with “self-navigating mines.” The
waters around the southern Ryukyus, including Okinawa, are also susceptible to
Chinese offensive mining operations, as could be the Tsushima Strait. Offensive
mining apparently has been a major impetus for Chinese research on mobile
mines, and the priority would be the laying of SLMMs in each choke point of the
First Island Chain, forming a blockade line and preventing U.S. nuclear and other
navies’ submarines—or surface forces—from entering China’s Near Seas areas.
In light of the Chinese navy’s intense study of historical mining campaigns
and of its focus on U.S. submarine capabilities, PLAN commanders also may
believe that a geographically broader “deep thrust” mining campaign—even if
employing only a few weapons at each attack point—might be worth the risk.
For example, sporadic mining of American West and even East Coast ports by
Chinese armed forces or PRC-sponsored terrorists may join the list of options, if
only as a means of diluting the U.S. Navy’s constrained MCM capabilities.
Here Chinese thinking on the use of commercial vessels might come into
play. Much of the Chinese merchant fleet falls under the control of the stateowned China Ocean Shipping Company (known as the COSCO Group), and
COSCO container lines maintain scheduled services to several key American
ports, including Los Angeles/Long Beach, San Francisco, Seattle, and Tacoma,
Washington, on the West Coast, and Norfolk, Virginia, on the East Coast (as well
as Kao-hsiung and Keelung in Taiwan). In addition, other, nonscheduled bulk
and break-bulk vessels in COSCO’s large fleet—modified into covert minelayers
—might be conscripted into minelaying service in an emergency. The domestic
terrorist-mining threat has become an increasing interest for the U.S. Northern
Command.
Such a course of action might be difficult for the PLA should hostilities commence and key forces on both sides concentrate in the Near Seas. Prehostilities
mine deployment, using time-delay or remote-control activation, could help
solve the problem of laying mines without U.S. or partner navies detecting or
responding to the act.
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U.S. AND PARTNER NAVIES’ MCM CAPABILITIES
“Brittle”—that is how several U.S. Navy mine warfare specialists described the
Navy’s MCM capabilities in the spring of 2011.27 This brittleness is largely due
to the state of mine warfare generally in the Navy. Mines, mining, and mine
countermeasures—from the laboratories and industry to Navy headquarters and
systems commands, to deployed forces—historically have accounted for less than
1 percent of the service’s annual total funding for programs and operations. The
vast majority of that constrained funding supports MCM, not mining, programs,
or operations.28
Brittleness also reflects the fact that American MCM is on the cusp of a broad
transformation from an aging force of specialized surface vessels, helicopters,
and diver and marine-mammal EOD systems to a highly integrated, “tailored,”
modular mine-countermeasures “system of systems” embarked on the new littoral combat ships of the Freedom (LCS 1) and Independence (LCS 2) classes. The
new “tailored” MCM forces are intended to provide direct, highly automated
MCM support to naval maneuver forces in forward areas. However, it is proving
difficult to maintain the material and operational readiness of in-service “legacy”
platforms during the transition, raising concern that the Navy might be hardpressed to respond to some crisis or conflict involving mines before the “tailored”
future arrives.
U.S. MCM in Transition
The sea is a maneuver area. From the U.S. Navy’s perspective, the goal of MCM
is to enable maneuver of naval forces, not to counter every mine. If a crisis involving PLAN mining of critical regions in Taiwanese waters and inside the First
and perhaps even Second Island Chains erupted today, the U.S. Navy’s minecountermeasures response would clearly be a “come as it is” force of uncertain
effectiveness, due to its small numbers and increasing obsolescence. As of the
spring of 2011, U.S. Navy’s dedicated MCM assets fall into three main categories.
The fourteen ships of the Avenger (MCM 1) class constitute the Navy’s dedicated surface mine-countermeasures capabilities. They are relatively slow, with
top speeds of around fourteen knots, making their response to “away games”
somewhat problematic (although they could be transported to the scene by
heavy-lift ships). To enhance responsiveness, four are forward deployed to the
Arabian Gulf (Manama, Bahrain), and four are homeported in Sasebo, Japan;
the remaining six ships are in San Diego. The Avengers are fitted with several
hunting and sweeping systems. The Navy is upgrading these ships—which in
2011 were well beyond the midpoints of their operational lives—but their backlogged modernization and material readiness bill, just to keep them ready in
the near term, amounted to some $500 million. The final MCM 1 will retire in
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2024. But for the time being, in any PLAN mine-warfare scenario, the U.S. Navy’s
initial surface MCM response would be limited to the eight ships in Japan and
the Arabian Gulf.
The airborne “leg” of the Navy’s mine countermeasures “triad” comprises two
squadrons of MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters, a total of twenty-eight airframes
—a figure that includes seven in training, as well as “pipeline” (out of service for
rework, etc.) aircraft. Both squadrons (HM-14 and HM-15) are located at the
Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) Center for Mine Warfare Excellence,
at Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia. Two helicopters are deployed to South
Korea and four to Bahrain. The helicopters carry out rapid-response MCM
tasks—they can be airlifted anywhere in the world within seventy-two hours of
the decision to deploy, assuming the availability of strategic airlift—with minehunting sonars and mechanical and influence sweeping systems. In service since
1986, the MH-53Es are capable of night operations and have a six-hour mission
capability. In 2009, the Navy began a fatigue-life-extension program of structural
upgrades to ensure that the helicopters can perform their missions until all are
retired, by 2025.
The third leg of the triad is explosive ordnance disposal. The Navy’s EOD detachments directly support mine-hunting and -clearance operations. They have
specialized training in equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures to locate,
identify, neutralize, recover, or otherwise dispose of sea mines, torpedoes, and
other undersea weapons, including underwater IEDs.
In addition, the Navy maintains several types of marine-mammal systems,
bottlenose dolphins and sea lions specially trained for mine detection and neutralization, swimmer defense, and recovery of exercise mines, torpedoes, and
other objects. In some situations the marine mammals are much more effective
than humans or hardware now in service, and presently only they can detect
buried bottom mines. Each “system” has several dolphins or sea lions that can
be deployed quickly throughout the world by strategic airlift and worked from
ships in forward operating areas. For example, Navy MCM dolphins deployed
to the Arabian Gulf in 1988 during Operation EARNEST WILL, in 1991–92 during DESERT STORM/DESERT SWEEP, and in 2003 in support of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.
It is apparent from this summary that the U.S. Navy’s dedicated mine countermeasures force is aging while the worldwide mine threat is being modernized,
particularly that of the PLAN. As a result, the Navy is making investments in a
future mine-defense force. Its formal requirements call for a new capability that
various Navy briefings and publications describe as “fast, light, agile, adaptable,
precise, and modular, to remove the man and the marine mammals from the
minefield.”
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The focal point of this next-generation MCM force is the modular littoral combat ship (LCS), which is to be the principal host for the MH-60S multimission helicopter (which, however, unlike the MH-53E, cannot conduct MCM at night and
has about half of the MH-53E’s mission endurance), unmanned aerial vehicles,
and several advanced “mission module” systems. (Of the two classes, Freedom
is a primarily all-steel monohull design, while Independence is a predominantly
aluminum trimaran.) Modular mine-countermeasures, antisubmarine, and antisurface packages are being developed to counter A2/AD strategies and contribute
to littoral sea superiority.
The MCM mission modules include the Remote Minehunting System
(RMS), AQS-20A mine-hunting sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
(ALMDS), Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), Organic Airborne
and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS), Unmanned Influence Sweep System
(UISS), and Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) system.
The ships will also possess inherent capabilities for intelligence support, surveillance, reconnaissance, special operations, and maritime interception, regardless
of the specific mission package installed. With top speeds in excess of forty-five
knots, the LCS looks to be far more responsive than the Navy’s legacy dedicated
forces. Indeed, necessary mission modules could be staged in critical regions to
allow any LCS to be reconfigured as an MCM platform, although there are growing concerns about the maturity of the MCM mission packages.29
The first units of each class, LCS 1 and LCS 2, were in service in 2011, two
more are under construction and will be delivered in 2012, and the Navy has
awarded contracts for an additional twenty ships (ten of each design). A total of
fifty-five LCSs are in the Navy’s plan, and the service intends to acquire twentyfour MCM mission packages. Two packages have been delivered, and one was
in production in mid-2011. However, several systems of the MCM mission
modules are not yet in service—only three (AQS-20, AMNS, and ALMDS) are
even in “low-rate initial production”—so it will be years before the LCS (in its
MCM configuration) replaces the Avenger class. In the meantime, the Navy is
investigating proposals to deploy MCM mission modules on other ships, such
as dock transport ships (LPDs)—or to land facilities from which the MH-60S
helicopters could operate.
The U.S. Navy’s future, LCS-focused MCM assets are also to be the core forces
dedicated to any mine-cleanup mission after crisis or hostilities. In the aftermath
of DESERT STORM, for example, it took a multilateral MCM force of vessels and
helicopters from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States more than two years to make the primary channels in the northern Arabian Gulf as mine-free as possible. Since then,
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periodic MCM operations have continued in this strategic waterway (as noted,
four of the Navy’s Avengers are homeported there). It must be expected that
MCM-tailorable LCSs will be included in any dedicated force, and concepts for
how they are to perform such tasks need to be addressed before the first weapon
fires in some future crisis or conflict.
Regional Partner Navies’ MCM
Several regional navies have made a commitment to mine countermeasures,
but all are focused on near-shore littoral operations using traditional sweeping
and hunting, albeit in some instances complemented by remotely operated and
unmanned systems. These resources might be available to assist U.S. Navy MCM
operations in response to PLAN mining of critical waterways.

Australia. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) operates six Huron-class mine
hunters (MHCs) based on the Italian Gaeta class, acquired from 1999 to 2003.30
These are modern ships, employing several types of mechanical and influence
minesweeping systems and variable-depth mine-hunting sonars. In service since
1982 are the RAN’s two 520-ton auxiliary minesweepers Bandicoot and Wallaroo,
which also deploy reconfigurable permanent-magnet influence sweeps. The RAN
has put in place a “Craft of Opportunity program” that employs fishing vessels
taken up from trade and fits them with side-scan sonars and magnetic influence
sweeps. The RAN also has two small (about 115 tons full-load displacement)
auxiliary minesweepers—MS(S)/MSA Bermagui and Koraaga—converted from
tuna boats, capable of deploying side-scan sonars and magnetic influence sweeps.
Finally, the RAN operates three MCM drones employed by craft-of-opportunity
vessels.
Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia Navy operates eleven coastal mine-hunting
and minesweeping ships, of which only about five are in active service.31 Two are
modern, Tripartite-class MHCs taken from Royal Netherlands Navy production
in 1988: Pulao Rengat (ex-Willemstad) and Pulao Rupat (ex-Vlardingen). They
embark remotely operated mine-hunting vehicles that can neutralize confirmed
contacts, mechanical sweep equipment, and magnetic and acoustic influence
sweeps. The remaining nine ships, ex–German navy Kondor II–class coastal patrol ships, have been employed primarily as patrol craft, although their original
mechanical sweep gear has been retained and more modern magnetic-influence
sweeps have been tested. The three (or fewer) active Kondor IIs are obsolescent,
at best.
Japan. Like the RAN, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has modern and capable MCM forces.32 The need for robust MCM is seared in the Japanese navy’s memory by the experience of Operation STARVATION, the many years
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needed to clear ports, harbors, straits, and nearby seas after World War II, and
the mine experiences of the Korean War and Operation DESERT STORM. Published sources show a JMSDF mine warfare order of battle comprising about
thirty-five surface mine hunters and minesweepers, three drone-control ships,
and six radio-controlled MCM drones. These include a mix of new acquisitions
(e.g., the twelve Sugashima-class MHCs, which joined the fleet in the late 1990s
and early 2000s) and ships that were in service in the mid-1980s—certainly not
“old,” in comparison to those of other regional navies, including the PLAN. The
two Uraga-class mine countermeasures support ships, which entered service in
1997–98, also serve in minelaying roles. The ships are fitted with mechanical and
influence sweeping equipment and can operate remote mine-hunting vehicles.
Since 1989, the JMSDF has also operated MH-53E Sea Dragon AMCM helicopters; a total of eleven were in service at this writing and employed minesweeping
and -hunting equipment similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s MCM helicopters.
These aircraft are being replaced by the MCH-10, which will operate the OASIS
minesweeping system, now under development in the United States, as well as
in-service systems.
Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Navy operates four coastal mine hunters based
on the Italian Lerici design acquired in the middle and late 1980s.33 They are
equipped with on-board and off-board mine-hunting systems and influence and
mechanical sweep gear. EOD divers can be embarked.
Philippines. The Philippines Navy operates no MCM ships or craft. Several exU.S. minesweepers have been modified for patrol duties and are no longer capable of mine countermeasures.
Republic of China. Rather remarkably, given the potential for extensive PLAN
mining during a “Taiwan scenario,” the Republic of China’s MCM capabilities
are poor.34 The Taiwan navy has only twelve small coastal mine hunters and
sweepers, eight of which are ex-U.S. or ex-Belgian vessels built during the 1950s.
The eight older ships are capable of minesweeping only; they are fitted with
acoustic and magnetic systems as well as wire sweeps to cut moored mines free
for subsequent destruction. The four units of the MWW 50/Yung Feng class were
delivered in 1991 but were not commissioned until 1995. They can conduct
mine-hunting as well as sweeping operations. As noted earlier, in January 2010
the Obama administration announced its intent to sell to Taiwan $6.4 billion
in defensive arms and equipment, which included Osprey-class mine hunters—
Taiwan reportedly wants two MHCs—but the deal is still pending.
Republic of Korea. The South Korean navy understands well the value of mines
and mine countermeasures, and in any contingency on the Korean Peninsula
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or with China mine warfare would be pivotal for the coastal defense of both its
coasts.35 Critical sea lines of communication, particularly through the Tsushima
Strait, are indispensable to the ability of South Korean and American forces, and
perhaps Japanese forces as well, to fight and win. Despite this requirement, South
Korean MCM forces are modest: a single (appropriately named) Wonsan-class
minelayer/MCM ship, a planned ten-ship Yangyang class of coastal mine hunters,
six SK5000-class MHCs based on the Lerici design, five ex-U.S. MSC 289–class
coastal minesweepers (transferred between 1963 and 1975), and three ex-U.S.
MSC 268–class coastal minesweepers (transferred in 1959). These last two classes,
if still in service, are obsolete; the others, however, are newer (in service from 1993
on) and can operate modern minesweeping and mine-hunting systems. In July
2009 the Republic of Korea requested a Foreign Military Sales purchase of eight
Seahawk multimission AMCM helicopters. (This is the same “main battery” that
will operate from the U.S. LCSs, and it would employ the AQS-20A towed sonar
mine countermeasures system, AES-1 ALMDS, ASQ-235 AMNS, and ALQ-220
OASIS.) Three months later, however, the deal was postponed.
Singapore. The Republic of Singapore Navy operates four Bedok-class MCM vessels based on the Swedish Landsort design.36 All were placed in service in 1995.
These are modern, capable MCM ships, carrying two remote-control mineneutralization systems. A mine rail is fitted, allowing the ships to lay mines. Beginning in 2009, they received service-life extensions, which included advanced
integrated MCM combat systems, new hull-mounted and towed syntheticaperture sonars, and expendable mine-disposal systems.
Vietnam. Although its inclusion in this “partner navies” discussion might seem
problematic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam operates a small number of obsolescent coastal and inshore MCM vessels and craft, perhaps as many as eight, all
ex–Soviet navy minesweepers.37 They would be irrelevant in virtually any contingency involving the PLAN.

{LINE-SPACE}
In general, the MCM assets in Pacific Rim partner navies cannot substitute for
a more robust American mine-warfare capability in the region. Their technical
and operational limitations and the likelihood that they would be tasked in their
home waters mean that most would probably be unavailable to support Near
Seas mine countermeasures. The U.S. Navy’s own MCM capability—brittle or
not—will undoubtedly determine the extent to which Chinese mines can frustrate American strategies and operational plans. But whether U.S. Navy mines
and minelaying capabilities are sufficiently effective, in turn, to defeat PLAN
strategies, operations, and forces is uncertain.
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U.S. MINES AND MINING
“I have always deemed it unworthy of a chivalrous nation,” wrote Admiral Farragut in 1864 of what we now call mine warfare, after having “damned the torpedoes” at Mobile Bay.38 In that he echoed the Royal Navy’s rejection half a century
earlier of “a mode of war which they who commanded the sea did not want, and
which, if successful, would deprive them of it.”39
The U.S. Navy has had a “love/hate” relationship with its own naval weapons
that wait, from Bushnell’s screw-torpedo and floating powder kegs to advanced,
autonomous, twenty-first-century, networked weapons. Since the end of World
War II, Navy planners have focused on mine countermeasures to defeat adversaries’ mines rather than on sustaining our own mine inventories—perhaps with
good reason, given the Navy’s post–World War II encounters with mines. There
were a few exceptions, such as the advanced, deepwater Mk 60 CAPTOR mines
targeting Soviet ballistic-missile and attack submarines.
The result has been the gradual atrophy of the “pillars” of America’s naval
mining capabilities: the technological/industrial base, modern and effective
mines, adequate mine stockpiles, minefield planners, trained specialists to ready
the weapons, and the means to put them in place. If U.S. Navy MCM capabilities
are brittle, so, too, are the Navy’s mines and mining capabilities. Without our own
mines, we essentially give adversaries a “free pass.” Instead, they should be made
to solve MCM problems of their own, posed by the mines of the United States
and its maritime partners.
This is particularly important in any strategy to use American mines to deny
sea areas to PLAN surface ships and submarines. But in such an attempt, if undertaken today, the U.S. Navy would—in an instance of asymmetric irony—be
pitting its mining weakness against the PLAN’s mine-countermeasures weakness,
with ultimately uncertain results.
Ramping Up Mining
That said, senior Navy leaders, including the Chief of Naval Operations and the
commanders of the Third and Fifth Fleets, are warming to “offensive” mining.
In the fall of 2010, Captain John Hardison, then deputy program manager of
the Navy’s Mine Warfare Programs Office (PMS-495) in the Naval Sea Systems
Command, identified remote control and improved targeting for offensive mining as among his command’s “top items of interest.”40 He echoed Admiral John
C. Harvey, Jr., Commander, Fleet Forces Command, who said the Navy needs to
avoid losing its naval mining capabilities—although, the admiral also admitted,
funding mine R&D was not at the top of his list of priorities.41
One measure of relative priorities is the fact that U.S. Navy mine inventories pale in comparison to those of other countries. The American stockpile is
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significantly smaller than even North Korea’s estimated fifty thousand mines,
while the PLAN might have, as noted, on the order of a hundred thousand mines,
and Russia has been estimated to have about 250,000. Ominously, all three (and
another twenty or so mine-producing countries) actively sell their weapons to
other states and nonstate actors.
The Navy’s mine arsenal includes diminishing numbers of the increasingly
obsolescent Mk 67 submarine-launched mobile mine, which will be out of service by the end of fiscal year 2012. The Mk 67 is a modified Mk 37 torpedo with
its wire guidance removed and a thin-wall mine warhead and multiple-influence
(magnetic/seismic/pressure) target detection device (TDD) installed. A shallowwater bottom mine meant for use against submarines and surface ships, the Mk
67 is launched from the torpedo tubes of a submarine and runs to a preselected
location or distance, at which point the motor shuts down and the mine sinks to
the bottom. Arming takes place at a preset time or distance, and the mine either
“sterilizes” (i.e., shuts itself down) or self-destructs at a predetermined end of life.
This is the Navy’s only submarine-delivered mine, and after FY 2012 the U.S. Navy’s submarine force will have no minelaying capability. There are suggestions for
a modification to the Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo into a dual-purpose weapon
—that is, torpedo or SLMM, at the turn of a switch. If pursued, that would be
well into the future, as no funding has been programmed.
The Navy does have the dedicated, aircraft-laid, thin-walled, two-thousandpound Mk 65 Quickstrike (QS) bottom mine, as well as low-drag bomb-conversion
kits for the aircraft-laid five-hundred-pound Mk 62 and thousand-pound Mk
63 QS bottom mines. The Mk 62/63 weapons use general-purpose Mk 82 (five
hundred pound) and Mk 83 (thousand pound) low-drag bombs as explosive
warheads. Arming takes place at a preset time after the mine enters the water and
comes to rest on the bottom, and the mines either self-destruct or sterilize at the
end of life.
The in-service multiple-influence Mk 57, Mk 58, and advanced Mk 71 TDDs
are used with the converted general-purpose bomb QS weapons and the Mk 65
dedicated mine. The TDD Mk 71 for the QS Mk 65 was fielded in the spring of
2011, and the Navy has one approved software algorithm for its use, with three
more ready for final testing. The Mk 71 is a programmable device capable of
responding to a broad spectrum of target types, from small combatant craft and
quiet, diesel-electric or air-independent submarines to major warships. The Mk
71 development program dates to the early 1990s, and acquisition began in FY
2005, but it has been chronically hamstrung by low-level funding and changing
priorities, as well as by a “tech refresh” to make it more producible. The development of a new Mk 75 safe and arming fuse for Mk 62 and Mk 63 QS bomb
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conversions has also taken longer than anticipated, but it should enter service by
2017–18. As an example of the fragility of the American mine industrial base,
only a single company produces the Mk 71/75 TDDs, and a sole subcontractor
company that provided a critical component has ceased production, forcing the
Navy to look for alternative sources.
There is no surface minelaying capability in the U.S. Navy, although the service
might investigate rolling Mk 62 and Mk 63 Quickstrikes off virtually any available ships (e.g., the LCS) or craft—something Libya, using Soviet/East German
“export” mines, did from a ferry (M/V Ghat) in the Red Sea during the summer
of 1984.42
With the demise of the Mk 67 SLMM in 2012, the nation’s sole minelaying
capabilities will reside in naval aviation and the U.S. Air Force. The Navy’s P-3C
Orion maritime patrol aircraft and F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet can drop QS
mines (P-3C mine loadouts are four Mk 63 or two Mk 65 mines, and Hornets
can carry all three QS variants), but the P-3Cs will start leaving service in 2013.
They will be replaced by the P-8 Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft; it
too will also have a mining capability, but its ability to lay mines in meaningful
numbers is years away.
Minelaying training for F/A-18 Hornet pilots ramped up in 2011, and the
Navy’s minefield planners have seen a renaissance of sorts within the aviation
strike warfare community. However, the last time the U.S. Navy aircraft laid
mines “in anger” was during the DESERT STORM “air war” in February–March
1991. A sortie of four A-6 Intruders from Attack Squadron 55 embarked on USS
Ranger (CV 61) attempted to mine the Khwar 'Abd Allah waterway with Mk 36
Destructor mines (DSTs, predecessors of the Quickstrike) in January 1991, but
with uncertain results. One aircraft was shot down and the crew lost, a reminder
of how dangerous airborne mining can be. The Navy did employ Mk 36 DSTs
against Iraqi bridges and runways (a tactic perfected against traffic along jungle
trails during the Vietnam War), with better effect and no losses.43
The U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit strategic bombers constitute the nation’s only high-volume mining capability. B-1s
can carry more Quickstrike mines than the seemingly ageless B-52s (expected
to remain active through 2040, the first B-52H having entered service in 1961),
and the B-52s and B-1s—but not B-2s—regularly train for and practice this mission.44 Close collaboration between the Navy and Air Force has been on the rise
in recent years, and in 2011 planning began for B-52s and B-1s to deliver mines
for an in-water mine test. However, in wartime, high-volume mining will be only
one of several missions demanded of Air Force strategic bombers and, if the
minefields are at great distances, their supporting fleet of aerial tankers.
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Mining-specific training continues to be a concern for planners. The focus
at the Mine Warfare Training Center in San Diego has been on MCM rather
than mining, although the Naval Mine and Anti-submarine Warfare Command
(NMAWC) is increasingly emphasizing training for aircrews in mining tactics,
techniques, and procedures. But the Navy’s institutional knowledge base for mining and minefield training largely amounts to “received wisdom” passed down by
experts in the Mobile Mine Assembly Division of the Navy Munitions Command.
In the late spring 2011 there were only two minefield planners in the U.S. Navy—
a retired Coast Guard captain and a Limited Duty/Surface Ordnance naval officer
assigned to NMAWC—in addition to a handful of enlisted rated minemen (none
of whom have formal training).
Looking to an ambiguous future, in the fall of 2010 Captain Mark Rios, Resource Sponsor for Mine Warfare (N852) in the Expeditionary Warfare Directorate (N85) of the Navy Staff, observed that while the Navy has a good ability to lay
indiscriminate mines, it could create mines that would more effectively and discriminately target enemy ships and could be turned on and off by remote control.
“We want there to be a discussion about how we can use mines,” Captain Rios
noted in October 2010.45 “Clearly some of our adversaries or potential adversaries have submarines and patrol craft that are very nimble and fast. Early on in
the conflict, mining their harbors or their approaches to come in and out of port
would reduce the number of ships and submarines that could come out to attack
us and this reduces the threat.” He also mentioned that N85 is assessing concepts
for “glide mines” (fitted with global positioning system targeting, they could be
launched from tactical aircraft well outside the range of adversary antiaircraft
weapons) and mine-laying UUV “trucks” (that could be clandestinely deployed
from the Navy’s special-forces/guided-missile attack submarines).46
That vision will likely prove optimistic. There have been only a few efforts—
halfhearted and short-lived—since the Cold War ended in 1991 to develop new
mines. An improved submarine-launched mine based on the Mk 48 torpedo was
initiated but died in 2002, and there was the “2010 Mine,” a modern air-dropped
mine to complement the Quickstrike mines by 2010. That too was canceled.
Several years ago the Navy proposed a new family of mines, Sea Predator, that
fell victim to the tyranny of the budget when available funds were shifted to solve
the land-IED problem in Iraq and Afghanistan.47 That said, low-level testing and
proof-of-concept work have continued, and the Navy has modeled a networkedmine approach with some analytical success. The Sea Predator concept called for
an advanced, remote-control, autonomous mobile mine (in some concepts more
like an armed UUV than a traditional mine) that would nonetheless take advantage of the basic mine characteristics—high lethality, long endurance, “man out
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of the loop” tactics, strong psychological impact, and force-multiplying features
that free manned platforms for other duties. Sea Predator was to have an exceptionally large damage width. It was also to be deployable by both submarines and
surface ships (the littoral combat ship was a candidate platform). Thus the distinction among smart mobile mines, torpedoes, and UUVs is becoming blurred.
Some have suggested acquiring foreign mines for American service. For example, in 2005 the Naval Research Advisory Committee concluded,
The U.S. Navy should consider employing mines in offensive operations, to create
barriers to deny areas of interest/operations to hostile submarines, UUVs, and SDVs
[swimmer delivery vehicles]. The current U.S. mine capability is limited and rapidly
dying. It is unlikely that the planned 2020 Mine [Sea Predator] will be developed
on time, at cost, and with the capabilities originally expected. Accordingly, the Panel
recommends the use of existing and in-development foreign-built mines that could
be fitted with advanced sensors to meet the use described above.48

As this article was prepared, the Navy was considering a “drill down” study to get
to the “ground truth” about acquiring and employing foreign mines.
Still, this nascent interest in advanced, sophisticated offensive mines has not
yet translated to funding, and given increasing pressures on Defense and Navy
budgets, “business as usual” will likely set in. Within the mine warfare community itself, investment in advanced new mines looks to be held hostage by resource
competition. The Navy’s mine-warfare resource sponsor (that is, the requirements and funding office) has a difficult problem: balancing MCM and mines/
mining while having to fund both legacy and future MCM systems as they are
brought on line, with no growth in total budget. In short, while the technologies
for improving mines are mature, the Navy’s will to develop, acquire, and deploy
them remains uncertain.
This in turn brings into question emerging strategies to deal with the PLAN
anti-access/area-denial challenges, generally, and the Chinese mine threat,
specifically.
U.S. Mines in the AirSea Battle Concept
While still being refined and debated in mid-2011 (and at this writing still not
formally released), an “AirSea Battle Concept” outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review—focused largely on defeating a Chinese A2/AD strategy in both
Near and Far Seas scenarios but also addressing those of Iran and North Korea—
has implications for the nation’s future mines and mining capabilities:
Develop a joint air-sea battle concept. The Air Force and Navy together are developing
a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military
operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and areadenial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate
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capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace
—to counter growing challenges to American freedom of action. As it matures, the
concept will also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations.49

Specifically regarding U.S. mines and mining, observers have outlined several
candidate AirSea Battle “future capabilities” and concepts to defeat A2/AD systems of China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries. These could include:50

• Enhanced capabilities are needed for undersea operations generally, including submarines, submersible robotic systems, and mines.

• Offensive mining appears particularly attractive, given its comparatively low
cost and the difficulty and time-consuming nature of countermine operations. Mining will generally be effective only in areas close to hostile territory, near the approaches to ports and naval bases, and in choke points.

• Significant numbers of smart mobile mines capable of autonomous movement over extended distances to programmed locations are needed. Such
mines should be deployable by submarines and stealthy Air Force bombers.
Smart mobile mines might prove particularly effective in attriting PLAN submarines and surface forces or blocking their access to and from their bases.

• Stealthy minelaying platforms capable of penetrating A2/AD systems are
preferable. Assuming that submarine-launched weapons—armed UUVs
and more traditional mines—are in the inventory, these capabilities will
likely need to be deployed almost exclusively from submarines during the
early stages of a conflict, as submarines represent the only highly survivable
maritime asset of the United States and its maritime partners. However,
they have limited payload capacity, must trade off mine loads for torpedoes,
have lengthy transit times (whereas the theater is enormous), and, perhaps
most important, are needed for other high-priority missions. Establishing
effective minefields near all PLAN bases would require a prolonged effort if
submarines alone were assigned the mission.

• The AirSea Battle Concept would also employ stealthy Navy and Air Force
aircraft to lay mines, and they could prove particularly effective in that role,
given their large payloads.

• The Air Force should equip its stealthy, large, long-range/long-endurance,
manned and unmanned platforms with an offensive minelaying capability
and then train and conduct exercises in conjunction with the Navy for offensive minelaying missions within the PLAN’s A2/AD zone.
These AirSea Battle mining initiatives are years, if not longer, away from bearing fruit, and whether they ever do depends on an American commitment to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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design, engineer, and acquire modern mines—problematic at best. However, if
advanced U.S. mine-development programs are pursued, they promise to challenge PLAN naval forces generally, but also Chinese MCM forces, which, like
those of the United States, are “brittle,” particularly when compared to China’s
mines and mining capabilities.
Moreover, from a broader countermining perspective, U.S. Air Force strategic
aircraft, Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft, long-range land-attack cruise missiles, and aircraft carrier–based armed unmanned aircraft systems would certainly be used to attack mine depots and warehouses, assembly areas, and minelaying
platforms should intelligence be sufficiently precise and accurate. While prehostilities (“prekinetic”), preemptive destruction of PLAN mining capabilities is
probably out of the question for a variety of reasons—diplomatic (it would be a
significant escalation of a crisis), operational (PLAN submarines would probably
be deployed and weapons laid well before bombers departed bases in Guam and
Missouri), and practical (how would the United States determine whether mines
were on board a given COSCO merchant ship or fishing boat—that is, solve the
quintessential maritime-domain-awareness challenge?)—it is unlikely that the
option to do so would not be included in operational plans.
CHINESE NAVY MCM CAPABILITIES
Compared to the PLAN’s extensive mine/mining capabilities, Chinese minecountermeasures forces look much less impressive.51 Various sources indicate
a total order of battle of about twenty-eight active MCM vessels (with another
sixty-eight or so in reserve) and four “mine warfare drones” (with another fortytwo in reserve), plus another seventy small, port- and harbor-focused MCM
craft. PLAN minesweeping forces are strictly coastal and port/harbor vessels,
except for the T-43 minesweepers and the single MCM command ship.
The first Chinese minesweepers were nine coastal ships delivered after the end
of World War II: four former Japanese 222-ton units delivered in 1947 and five
350-ton former U.S. Navy yard minesweepers in 1948. The first postwar-design
minesweepers, and the beginning of a credible Chinese mine warfare force, were
the four T-43 minesweepers obtained from the Soviet Union in 1955. China began building copies at Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan and at Donglang Shipyard in
Canton (Guangzhou). The first two were launched in 1956, and by 1976 a total of
twenty-three had been built. Wuchang ceased production in 1960, but Donglang
continued until a total of forty minesweepers had been built. As many as sixteen
T-43s may remain active, with the rest in reserve or modified for patrol duties, if
not scrapped. Chinese MCM equipment on the T-43s includes mechanical and
magnetic sweep gear.
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In the late 1970s/early 1980s, the Chinese copied the German remote-control
Troika minesweepers, producing more than fifty, designated the Futi class (Type
312). These are capable of magnetic and acoustic sweeping under remote control
up to five kilometers from a shore control station. Although several PRC minesweepers have been marketed for export, the only sales were to Thailand and
Pakistan.
Four steel-hulled, 320-ton Wosao (Type 082)–class coastal minesweepers are
in service, the first of them commissioned in 1988. The second was not seen until
1997. They are equipped with mechanical, magnetic, acoustic, and low-frequency/
infrasonic sweeps.
At least five Wochi-class mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs) are in service and are capable of acoustic and magnetic minesweeping. The first of the
class, Zhangjiagang, was commissioned in 2007; the second, Jingjiang, in November 2007; and the remaining vessels at regular intervals. Final numbers in the class
are not known, but indications are that it might replace the remaining T-43s.
Only one Wozang-class MCMV is known to be in commission. Commissioned
in July 2005, it was thought to be a successor to the T-43; however, no additional
hulls have been seen. The hull seems to be built of glass-reinforced plastic to
reduce its magnetic signature and to have acoustic-reduction features to reduce
self-noise. It is believed to be capable of remotely operating mine-hunting/
sweeping vehicles.
Wolei can serve as a command ship during mine-clearing operations. Another
one-of-a-kind unit is hull 4422 of the Wosao class; it was designed for export, but
there were no customers. In 1976, about twenty Shanghai II patrol boats were
built for minesweeping and named the Fushun class.
China’s approximately seventy smaller coastal and auxiliary minesweepers
are attached to various maritime-district control roles. Examples include the
four-hundred-ton Lienyun-class minesweepers, which are designated with district letters—such as J-141 and J-143, under the Shanghai Maritime Military
District—and the Fushun 250-ton coastal sweeper E-303. All of the coastal and
harbor minesweepers are equipped solely with simple, mechanical sweeps that
counter only moored contact mines.
The PLAN has apparently developed towed-array MCM sonars operated from
helicopters. The Changhe Z-8, similar to the French Super Frelon design, is the
largest helicopter yet built in China. The Z-8 carries out auxiliary roles in the
PLAN, such as towing of mine-clearing systems, vertical in-flight refueling of
ships, and support to the submarine fleet.
In short, the PLAN MCM force appears to be quite limited and devoted primarily to minesweeping in near-shore regions, ports, and waterways. In direct
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counterpoint to the U.S. Navy’s MIW posture, PLAN attention seems to be focused on mines and mining rather than the countermeasures needed to deal with
its adversaries’ mines.
AN EXCELLENT RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Mines, like the poor, will always be with us. Mines and their terrorist-counterpart
underwater IEDs are easy to acquire or build and are cheap, but their low cost
belies their potential to do significant damage. With costs measured from a few
hundred to several thousand dollars, they are asymmetric weapons of choice for
a “poor man’s navy,” providing an excellent return on investment. To summarize
the discussions of this article:

• Current and projected future Chinese naval mine technologies, inventories,
delivery systems, doctrine, and training are robust. The PLAN seems to take
mining seriously.

• China could rather easily employ sea mines in several Near Seas as well as
Far Seas scenarios, in addition to the “Taiwan scenario.” Also, given development of stealthy minelaying systems, particularly advanced submarines, the
PLAN could extend mining operations to key targets beyond the First Island
Chain. Indeed, mines could be employed in virtually any crisis or conflict.

TABLE 2
PLAN/U.S. NAVY MIW COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
Mine Warfare Area

PLA Navy

U.S./Partner Navies

Mines and mining

“Quantity has a quality all its own.” Mix
of many older but still dangerous weapons with new, sophisticated devices
supported by strong RDT&E efforts.
Doctrinal foundation for mining appears to be strong. Uneven capabilities
with regard to submarine, surface, and
airborne mine-delivery platforms.

Limited mine capabilities and likely to
worsen without significant investment
in RDT&E and acquisition of modern
weapons and delivery platforms. Doctrinal foundation for mining is weak. With
the demise of the Mk 67 SLMM in 2012,
the only U.S. minelaying capability
resides in Navy tactical aircraft and Air
Force strategic bombers.

Mine countermeasures

“Brittle,” obsolescent platforms and systems, mixed with small numbers of
more modern technologies, systems.
MCM command, control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance capabilities uncertain.

“Brittle” and worsening in near term
until LCS and MCM mission modules
in service in numbers post-2020. Need
concept of operations for post-2020 “hybrid organic/dedicated” MCM forces.
Other than Australia and Japan, regional partner navies’ MCM capabilities are limited and constrained to
coastal operational environments.

Note: RDT&E: research, development, testing, and evaluation.
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U.S., allied, and partner navies in the region thus must be mindful of the
potential that they will have to counter Chinese weapons that wait.

• The U.S. Navy and its allied and partner navies are ill prepared to cope with
Chinese mine warfare strategies and operations. In addition to the eight
American MCM ships in the region, only the Australian and Japanese MCM
forces look up to the task of countering Chinese mines in approaches to
ports and harbors, in choke points, and in the open sea. All others are likely
to be held back for local or littoral operations. Assuming the eventual success of the LCS and its organic tailored-mission MCM systems, however, the
balance might become more even.

• The U.S. Navy is significantly hamstrung in types and numbers of mines and
in its ability to deploy them in the Near Seas with precision and in high volume. The lack of sufficient numbers of modern, sophisticated, and effective
mines casts doubt on emerging concepts like the AirSea Battle, exposing the
reality behind the rhetoric, at least in the mine warfare arena.
Table 2 provides a thumbnail assessment of the PLAN, U.S. Navy, and regionalpartner navy mine warfare balance as of the spring of 2011.
The conclusions reached in 2009 by analysts of the U.S. Naval War College’s
China Maritime Studies Institute remain sound.52 First, China has a large inventory of naval mines, many of which are obsolete but still deadly, and somewhat
more limited numbers of sophisticated modern mines, some of which are optimized to destroy enemy submarines. Second, we think that China would rely
heavily on offensive mining in any Taiwan scenario. Third, were China able to
employ these mines—and all think that it could—they would greatly hinder
operations, for an extended time, in waters where the mines were even thought
to have been laid.
In short, the U.S. Navy and its regional maritime partners damn China’s “torpedoes” at their peril.

NOTES

This article is adapted from a presentation to
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Press.
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WHAT MILITARY OFFICERS NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY REL ATIONS
Mackubin Thomas Owens

C

ivil-military relations describe the interactions among the people of a state,
the institutions of that state, and the military of the state. At the institutional
level, there are “two hands on the sword.”1 The civil hand determines when to
draw it from the scabbard and thence guides it in its use. This is the dominant
hand of policy, the purpose for which the sword exists in the first place. The military’s hand sharpens the sword for use and wields it in combat.2
From the time of the Revolution to the present, U.S. civil-military relations
essentially have constituted a bargain among the aforementioned parties—the
people, the civil government, and the military establishment—concerning the
allocation of prerogatives and responsibilities between the government and the military, in answer to
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tension have led the parties to renegotiate the bargains
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in order to restore equilibrium.
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This is not to say that in the United States the parties to the bargain are equal.
The American civil-military bargain is the outcome of an “unequal dialogue.” It
is “a dialogue, in that both [the civilian and military] sides expressed their views
bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly—and [an]
unequal [one], in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous
and unquestioned.”5 In the United States, the military, despite having a monopoly
on coercive power, has generally accepted its position relative to the other parties.
As the idea of a periodic renegotiation of the civil-military bargain would suggest, there have been some fairly serious civil-military clashes over the past two
decades. They primarily reflect changes in the security environment but also have
been driven to some degree by changing social and political factors.
For example, a substantial renegotiation of the civil-military bargain took
place with the end of the Cold War. The change in the security environment occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a lack of consensus regarding
what the military was expected to do in the new security environment. The result
was a period of drift that had an impact on civil-military relations. During this
period, some observers worried that the military had become more alienated from
its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, that it had become
politicized and partisan, that it had become resistant to civilian oversight, that
officers had come to believe that they had the right to confront and resist civilian
policy makers—to insist that civilian authorities heed their recommendations
—and that the military was becoming too influential in inappropriate areas of
American society.6
Arguably another renegotiation of the civil-military bargain began to take
shape after the attacks of 9/11, as the military found itself fighting protracted
irregular wars instead of the conventional wars it prefers. Illustrative of civilmilitary tensions were clashes between the uniformed services and President
George W. Bush’s first secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, over efforts to
“transform” the military from a Cold War force to one better able to respond to
likely future contingencies, and the planning and conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These tensions peaked with the so-called revolt
of the generals in the spring of 2006, which saw a number of retired Army and
Marine Corps generals publicly and harshly criticize Secretary Rumsfeld.7
With Rumsfeld’s departure and the apparent success of the “surge” in Iraq,
some expressed hope that harmony might return to American civil-military
relations. To be sure, Rumsfeld’s successor as secretary of defense, Robert Gates,
did a great deal to improve the civil-military climate. But subsequent events—
including Gates’s decision to fire two service secretaries and a service chief, to
recommend against renominating the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a
second term, and to force the retirement of a combatant commander, as well as a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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public disagreement on military strategy between President Barack Obama and
the ground commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and the latter’s subsequent relief—make it clear that the state of U.S. civil-military relations
remains contentious at best.8
The new secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, as well as new service chiefs and combatant
commanders, will be deeply involved in a likely renegotiation of the civil-military
bargain as the country draws down from a decade of war just as it faces severe
fiscal constraints. It is a given that the Defense Department will face substantial budget reductions, placing a great deal of stress on civil-military relations.
Whether they realize it or not, military officers of all grades, not only the most
senior commanders, will be deeply involved in the constant negotiating that
shapes the U.S. civil-military bargain. Here’s some of what they need to know.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INCLUDE MORE THAN CIVILIAN
CONTROL
Most of the debate over American civil-military relations since the 1990s has
been dominated by concerns about civilian control of the military establishment.
Indeed, some observers believe that the focus on civilian control has obscured
other equally important elements of civil-military relations.9 But as noted above,
the domain of civil-military relations encompasses four questions in addition to
control of the military.
The first additional question raises the issue of what degree of military influence is appropriate in a liberal society such as the United States. The extreme form
of military influence in society is militarism, a state of affairs in which military
values predominate and the military devours a disproportionate share of society’s
resources. What is the proper scope of military affairs? In today’s environment,
what constitutes military expertise? Does it go beyond what Samuel Huntington
called in The Soldier and the State, his classic study of civil-military relations, the
“management of violence”?10 Should it?
For instance, to what extent should the military influence foreign policy? Has
American foreign policy become “militarized”? Do combatant commanders exercise too much power? Have they become the new “viceroys” or “proconsuls”?11
What is proper regarding the military and domestic politics? Should active-duty
officers be writing op-eds in support of particular programs or policies? Should
retired officers get involved in partisan politics? What is the military’s proper role
in influencing the allocation of resources?
Next, what is the appropriate role of the military? Is the military establishment’s
purpose to fight and win the nation’s wars or to engage in constabulary actions?
What kind of wars should the military prepare to fight? Should the focus of the
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military be foreign or domestic? The United States has answered this question
differently at different times and under different circumstances. For example,
throughout most of its history the U.S. Army was a constabulary force. It permanently oriented itself toward large-scale conflicts against foreign enemies only in
the 1930s. The end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 have suggested new
answers—for example, a focus on “irregular warfare” (counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism), as well as an openness to the use of the military in domestic
affairs, such as disaster relief in response to emergencies like Katrina, domestic
law enforcement during the Los Angeles riots, or border security. What impact
do such issues have on civil-military relations?
Next, what pattern of civil-military relations best ensures the effectiveness of the
military instrument? All of the other questions mean little if the military instrument is unable to ensure the survival of the state. If there is no constitution, the
question of constitutional balance doesn’t matter. Does effectiveness require a
military culture distinct in some ways from the society it serves? What impact
does societal structure have on military effectiveness? What impact does political
structure exert? What impact does the pattern of civil-military relations have on
the effectiveness of strategic decision-making processes?
And finally, who serves? Is military service an obligation of citizenship, or
something else? How are enlisted members recruited and retained? How should
the U.S. military address issues of “diversity” in the force? What about reserves,
racial and ethnic minorities, women, and homosexuals?
Obviously, questions regarding military service have been answered by Americans in various ways. Through most of its early history, the United States maintained a small regular peacetime establishment that mostly conducted limited
constabulary operations. During wartime, the several states were responsible for
raising soldiers for federal service, either as militia or volunteers.
While the United States resorted to a draft during the Civil War and again during World War I, conscription became the norm in the United States only from
the eve of World War II until the 1970s. Today the U.S. military is a volunteer
professional force. But even now the force continues to evolve, as debates over
such issues as the role of the reserve components in the post-9/11 military force,
women in combat, service by open homosexuals, and the recruitment of religious
minorities, especially Muslims, make clear.
The question of civilian control is important, but a myopic focus on this issue
means that other important questions are often ignored. In addition, the fact that
liberal societies like the United States often take civilian control for granted raises
several further questions: Does civilian control refer simply to the dominance of
civilians within the executive branch—the president or the secretary of defense?
What is the role of the legislative branch in controlling the military instrument?
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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Is the military establishment “unified,” that is, does it speak with anything like a
single voice vis-à-vis the civil government?
What is the nature of military advice? Should military leaders “insist” that
their advice be heeded? What courses of action are available to military leaders
who believe the civilian authorities are making bad decisions? In other words, is
there something that might be called a “calculus of dissent” that military leaders
can invoke in cases where they believe civilian decisions are dangerous to the
health of the country? These issues, addressed below, are part and parcel of what
officers need to know about civil-military relations.12
CIVILIAN CONTROL INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
It involves Congress as well. As the constitutional scholar Edward Corwin once
famously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilege
of directing American foreign policy” between Congress and the president.13 But
there is a similar tension at work with regard to civil-military relations. Those
who neglect the congressional role in American civil-military relations are missing an important element.14
The military has two civilian masters, and this has implications for civilmilitary relations that officers must understand. For instance, while the president
and secretary of defense control the military when it comes to the use of force, including strategy and rules of engagement, Congress controls the military directly
with regard to force size, equipment, and organization, and indirectly regarding
doctrine and personnel. Indeed, Congress is the “force planner” of last resort.
The U.S. military accepts civilian control by both Congress and the president
but offers advice intended to maintain its own institutional and professional
autonomy. On use of force, the military is usually granted a good deal of leeway
regarding the terms and conditions for such use.
By not dissenting from executive-branch policy, American military officers
implicitly agree to support presidential decisions on the budget and the use of
force, but they also must recognize an obligation to provide their alternative
personal views in response to Congress. However, officers must recognize that
Congress exerts its control with less regard for military preferences than for
the political considerations of its individual members and committees. Thus
congressional control of the military is strongly influenced by political considerations, by what Samuel Huntington called “structural,” or domestic, imperatives
as opposed to strategic ones.
When the president and Congress are in agreement, the military complies.
When the two branches are in disagreement, the military tends to side with the
branch that most favors its own views, but never to the point of direct disobedience
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to orders of the commander in chief. Military officers are obligated to share their
views with Congress. Doing so should not be treated as an “end run” undermining civilian control of the military.15
THE ABSENCE OF A COUP
The absence of a coup does not indicate that civil-military relations are healthy or
that civilian control has not eroded. All too often, officers seem to believe that if
the United States does not face the prospect of a Latin American– or African-style
military coup d’état, all is well in the realm of civil-military relations. But this is a
straw man. A number of scholars, including Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, the late
Russell Weigley, Michael Desch, and Eliot Cohen, have argued that although there
is no threat of a coup on the part of the military, American civil-military relations
have nonetheless deteriorated over the past two decades.16
Their concern is that the American military “has grown in influence to the
point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and decisions,” which manifests itself in “repeated efforts on the part of the armed forces
to frustrate or evade civilian authority when that opposition seems likely to
preclude outcomes the military dislikes.” The result is an unhealthy civil-military
pattern that “could alter the character of American government and undermine
national defense.”17
In theory, Kohn argues, “civilians have the authority to issue virtually any order and organize the military in any fashion they choose.”
But in practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree
among themselves. Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority
by framing the alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences;
by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect
channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching
friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions, or
carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. . . . We are not talking about a
coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the
tune in military affairs in the United States today.18

But this seems to support the contention that actual civil-military relations represent the outcome of constant bargaining.
Kohn argues that balanced civil-military relations in the United States have
traditionally rested on four foundations, which, he argues, have eroded: the rule
of law and reverence for the Constitution; a small force in peacetime; reliance on
the citizen-soldier; and the military’s own internalization of military subordination to civilian control. Kohn cites Major General John J. Pershing’s instructions
to First Lieutenant George Patton in 1916: “You must remember that when we
enter the army we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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government, entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances.
We are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to do so or
else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the complete
understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.” Or in the words
of Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Thirty-two years
in the peacetime army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and keep my
name out of the papers.”19
While Kohn acknowledges that civil-military tensions are not new, he argues
that current conditions are such that the threat of military insubordination is
much greater than in the past. First, thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,
the military is united in an unprecedented way. Whereas in the past the armed
services often were at odds over roles, missions, budgets, and weapons systems,
today they can work together to shape, oppose, evade, or thwart the choices civilians make. Of course in view of the upcoming budgetary battles that can be expected over the next few years as resources for defense are substantially reduced,
this unity may well deteriorate.
Second, many of the issues in play today reach far beyond the narrowly military, not only to the wider realm of national security but often to foreign relations
more broadly. In certain cases military affairs even affect the character and values
of American society itself. Kohn argues that this expanded role represents a significant encroachment on civilian control of the military. Third, military advice
and advocacy are now much more public than they once were. Fourth, senior
officers now lead a large, permanent peacetime military establishment that differs fundamentally from any of its predecessors. Kohn argues that this military is
increasingly disconnected, even estranged, from civilian society, while at the same
time it is becoming a recognizable interest group, “larger, more bureaucratically
active, more political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than
anything similar in American history.”20
According to Kohn, the erosion of civilian control gives rise to “toxic” civilmilitary relations, which, he argues, damage national security in at least three
ways: by paralyzing national security policy; by obstructing or even sabotaging
the ability of the United States to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise international leadership; and by undermining the confidence of the military as an
institution in its own uniformed leadership.21
The military has “pushed back” against civilian leadership on numerous occasions during the last two decades. This pushback has manifested itself (to use Peter Feaver’s formulation) in various forms of “shirking”—“foot dragging,” “slow
rolling,” and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy or individual policy
makers.22 Such actions were rampant during the William Clinton presidency and
during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. Such pushback is
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based on the claim that civilians are making decisions without paying sufficient
attention to the military point of view. This leads to the next principle of civilmilitary relations: officers have an obligation to make their case as strongly as
possible but do not have the right to “insist” that their advice be accepted. However, there must be a “calculus of dissent.”
MILITARY ADVICE: PROFESSIONAL SUPREMACISTS VS. CIVILIAN
SUPREMACISTS
During the 1990s, some military officers explicitly adopted the view that soldiers
have the right to a voice in making policy regarding the use of the military instrument, that indeed they have the right to insist that their views be adopted. This
assumption has been encouraged by a serious misreading of a very important
book by H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.23
The subject of Dereliction of Duty is the failure of the Joint Chiefs to challenge
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara adequately during the Vietnam War. Many
serving officers believe the book effectively makes the case that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff should have more openly opposed the Lyndon Johnson administration’s
strategy of gradualism and then resigned rather than carry out the policy. But
the book says no such thing. While McMaster convincingly argues that the chiefs
failed to present their views frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors,
including members of Congress, he neither says nor implies that they should
have obstructed President Johnson’s orders and policies through leaks, public
statements, or resignation.
This misreading of Dereliction of Duty has dangerously reinforced the increasingly widespread belief among officers that they should be advocates of particular
policies rather than simply serving in their traditional advisory role. For instance,
according to a survey of officer and civilian attitudes and opinions undertaken
by Ole Holsti for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) in 1998–99,
“many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian
decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American
forces abroad.”
Peter Feaver has called this view “McMasterism,” in order to distinguish it
from McMaster’s own, more nuanced argument. McMasterism essentially argues
that, first, civilians actively try to suppress the military’s opinion; second, military opinion is right, or at least more right than civilian opinion; and third, the
military should ensure not only that its voice is heard but also that it is heeded.
McMasterism essentially blames the U.S. failures in Iraq that predated the surge
on the generals, because, it claims, they went along with civilian preferences
rather than blocking them.24
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Two recent and widely disseminated examples of McMasterism are Army lieutenant colonel Paul Yingling’s “A Failure of Generalship” and Marine lieutenant
colonel Andrew Milburn’s “Breaking Ranks.” The former exhorts the generals to
“find their voices” and excoriates them for not making “their objections public.”
The latter states that “there are circumstances under which a military officer is
not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order.”25
Feaver argues that McMasterism reflects the viewpoint of what he calls the
“professional [military] supremacists,” who argue that the primary civil-militaryrelations problem during wartime is ensuring that the military can prevent the
civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging. But “civilian supremacists”
contend that this view of the role of military leaders is questionable and at odds
with the principles and practice of American civil-military relations.
McMasterism is reflected in the TISS study cited above. When “asked whether
military leaders should be neutral, advise, advocate, or insist on having their way
in the decision” to use military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming
active-duty officers who responded answered that leaders should “insist” regarding the following issues: “setting rules of engagement, ensuring that clear political
and military goals exist, developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and “deciding what kinds
of military units will be used to accomplish all tasks.” In the context of the questionnaire, “insist” definitely implied that officers should try to compel acceptance
of the military’s recommendations.26 There is little to suggest that this view has
changed.
According to the civilian supremacists, the uniformed military in the American system does not possess a veto over policy. Indeed, civilians even have the
authority to make decisions in what would seem to be the realm of purely military affairs. This school of thought holds that “the primary problem of [wartime
civil-military relations] is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance
is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with
that direction.”27 They add that the record illustrates that the judgment of the
military is not necessarily superior to that of civilian decision makers.
Consider some historical examples. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln
constantly prodded George McClellan to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862.
McClellan just as constantly whined about insufficient forces. During World War
II, despite the image of civil-military comity, there were many differences between Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. George Marshall, the greatest
soldier-statesman since Washington, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in
1940 and argued for a cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready.
History has vindicated Lincoln and Roosevelt.
Similarly, many observers, especially those in the uniformed military, have
been inclined to blame the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on the civilians. But the
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American operational approach in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed
military. The consensus today is that the operational strategy of General William
Westmoreland was counterproductive; it did not make sense to emphasize attrition of People’s Army of Vietnam forces in a “war of the big battalions”—that is,
one involving sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy
the enemy with superior firepower. By the time Westmoreland’s successor could
adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late.28
During the planning for Operation DESERT STORM in late 1990 and early
1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), presented a plan calling for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions
in southern Kuwait followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. The problem was that
this plan was unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the ground
war—the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam’s Republican Guard. The
civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by CENTCOM and ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative
and effective, a further indication that in wartime the military does not always
know best.29
This pattern persisted in Iraq. For instance, while Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not foresee the insurgency or the shift from conventional to guerilla war,
neither did his critics in the uniformed services. In December 2004, Tom Ricks
reported in the Washington Post that while many in the Army blamed “Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq,” one close observer—U.S. Army major Isaiah
Wilson III, an official historian of the campaign and later a war planner in Iraq—
placed the blame squarely on the Army.30 In an unpublished report, he concluded
that senior Army commanders had failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq
and therefore did not plan properly for victory, that Army planners suffered
from “stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt,” and that Army commanders
in 2004 still misunderstood the strategic problem they faced and therefore were
still pursuing a flawed approach.
Critics also charged that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon shortchanged the troops in Iraq,
in part by failing to provide them with armored “Humvees.” Yet a review of Army
budget submissions makes it clear that the Army did not immediately ask for the
vehicles; its priority, as is usually the case with the uniformed services, was to
acquire “big ticket” items. It was only after the insurgency began and the threat
posed by “improvised explosive devices” became apparent that the Army began
to push for supplemental spending to “up-armor” the utility vehicles.
While it is true that Rumsfeld downplayed the need to prepare for postconflict
stability operations, it is also the case that in doing so he was merely ratifying the
preferences of the uniformed military. Only recently has the uniformed military
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begun to shed the “Weinberger Doctrine,” a set of principles long internalized
by the U.S. military that emphasize the requirement for an “exit strategy.” But
if generals are thinking about an exit strategy, they are not thinking about “war
termination”—how to convert military success into political success, which is
the purpose of postconflict planning and stability operations. This cultural aversion to stability operations is reflected in the fact that operational planning for
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM took eighteen months, while planning for postwar
stabilization began (halfheartedly) only a couple of months before the invasion.31
It should also be noted that the most frequently cited example of prescience
on the part of the uniformed military—General Eric Shinseki’s February 2003
statement before Congress suggesting that “several hundred thousand” troops
might be necessary in postwar Iraq—was no such thing. As John Garofano has
observed, “no extensive analysis has surfaced as supporting Shinseki’s figures,
which were dragged out of him by Senator Carl Levin only after repeated questioning.” Garofano notes that in fact the figures were based on a “straight-line
extrapolation from very different environments.”32 That is, the Army’s Center of
Military History based a figure of 470,000 troops for Iraq on the service’s experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the primary mission had been peacekeeping.
This effort to estimate necessary troop strength was inept—critics called it naive,
unrealistic, and “like a war college exercise” rather than serious planning.33
Finally, to the extent that Shinseki was correct, he was correct for the wrong
reasons. His focus was on humanitarian concerns rather than on the critical
society-building work that the U.S. military had to implement in Iraq.34 Garofano
concludes that the oft-made charge against Rumsfeld—that he punished Shinseki
for “being right”—is not supported by the evidence. War planning “comes down,
as it did in Vietnam, to analysis, getting it right, and providing clear alternatives
that address or confront policy goals.”35 This the uniformed military in general
and Shinseki in particular failed to do.
THE “CALCULUS OF DISSENT”
This is not to suggest that the military has no option if military advice is not
heeded. The minimalist position is articulated in The Armed Forces Officer, an
official publication that lays out the moral-ethical aspects of officership and the
question of military deference to civilian authority in very stark terms: “Having rendered their candid expert judgment, professionals are bound by oath to
execute legal civilian decisions as effectively as possible—even those with which
they fundamentally disagree—or they must request relief from their duties, or
leave the service entirely, either by resignation or retirement.”36
Many have argued that the choices provided by The Armed Forces Officer are
too narrow. They contend that in terms of Albert Hirschman’s classic study of
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responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states, the publication offers officers only the choices of “loyalty” and “exit.” But Hirschman argues that under
certain circumstances, the institutionalization of greater “voice”—that is, dissent
—can help stem massive exit.37
For instance, Leonard Wong and Douglas Lovelace write that there are alternatives “beyond blind obedience, resignation or retirement.”38 They propose a range
of actions available to senior military leaders to achieve Hirschman’s “voice”
when confronted with decisions by civilian leaders that they believe are flawed.
They identify two variables: the degree of civilian resistance to military advice
and the seriousness of the threat to national security that the policy embodies.
When the degree of civilian resistance to military advice is low and the magnitude of the threat is low, the options for the military are acquiescence or compromise. When resistance to military advice is low but the threat is high, options
involve frequent interaction between the uniformed military and the civilians,
work to achieve consensus, and cooperative analysis.
When the degree of civilian resistance to military advice is high and the magnitude of the threat is low, the options for military officers include declining advancement or assignment, requesting relief, waiting the civilians out, or retiring.
When both civilian resistance to military advice and the level of the threat are
high, the authors suggest, options range from a public information campaign,
writing articles, testifying before Congress, and joining efforts with others to
resignation.39
Don Snider accepts the idea of broadening the choices available to uniformed
officers when faced with what they believe to be flawed policy decisions by civilians but questions whether the two variables employed by Wong and Lovelace
alone provide adequate guidance for a strategic leader of the American military
profession who is considering dissent.40 For Snider, the imperatives of military
professionalism and the “trust” relationship between the military profession and
other entities within American society and government also must play roles.
Snider suggests three trust relationships, to be rated along a continuum ranging from “fully trusted”—the ideal—to “not trustworthy.” The three relationships
are that between the military profession and the American people; that between
the military profession and the people’s elected representatives, in both the executive and legislative branches; and that between senior leaders of the military
profession and their subordinate leaders.41
Following Huntington, Snider identifies three responsibilities of military leaders. The first is the “representative function,” the professional requirement “to
represent the claims of military security within the state machinery”—that is, to
“express their expert point of view on any matter touching the creation, maintenance, use, or contemplated use of the armed forces.” The second responsibility is
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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to exercise the “advisory function.” This is the professional imperative “to analyze
and to report on the implications of alternative courses of action from the military point of view,” and to provide “candid professional military advice to elected
and appointed civilian leaders, regardless of whether the advice was solicited or
regardless of whether the advice is likely to be welcomed.” Such advice does not
include policy advocacy, which both Huntington and Snider consider beyond
the legitimate role of military officers. The third responsibility is to exercise the
“executive function.” This requires the military professional “to implement state
decisions with respect to state security even if it is a decision which runs violently
counter to his military judgment.”42
Having laid out the three trust relationships and the three responsibilities of
professional military leaders, Snider addresses how the “other” in each trust relationship involving the military profession—respectively, the American people, civilian leaders, and junior leaders within the military profession itself—perceives
and understands acts of dissent on the part of the military profession’s senior
leaders. Such a moral analysis, he argues, must address at least five considerations.
The first is the gravity of the issue to the nation and therefore to the clients of
the military profession. The second is the relevance of the strategic leader’s expertise with regard to the issue that might impel dissent. Does the issue at hand fall
squarely within the scope of the dissenter’s expertise as a military professional?
The third consideration is the degree of sacrifice on the part of the dissenter. Is
the dissent motivated solely by a disinterested desire to serve the nation, even
in the face of personal sacrifice, or does it involve a self-serving subtext, such as
the advancement of the dissenter’s own professional or political ambitions? The
fourth consideration is the timing of the act of dissent. Was it timed to undercut
the actions or policy from which the officer wishes to dissent? Finally, is the act
of dissent congruent with the prior, long-term character and beliefs of the dissenter? Does the dissent strike those who know the dissenter as uncharacteristic
or atypical?43 Snider goes on to argue that a complete assessment on the part of
the dissenter would analyze the five considerations in the light of the three trust
relationships.
Of course, in practice, argues Snider, some factors are more salient than others.
Like Wong and Lovelace, he believes that the gravity of the issue with regard to
national security is most important. “Logically, the higher the stakes, the greater
the temptation and justification will be for dissenters to speak out.”44 This is the
case because the only reason to have a military is to ensure national security. That
is what the military profession is all about. Of course, to engage in dissent, no
matter the stakes, seems to be in conflict with the inviolate principle of the subordination of the military to civilian authority. The interpretation of acts of dissent
is complicated, argues Snider, by the deeply polarized nature of American politics
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012

85

80

Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

today and the perception on the part of some that the military as an institution
has become too identified with the Republican Party.45
The moral calculus of dissent also requires that we consider the relevance of
the expertise and knowledge of the dissenter. Why should we listen to the dissenter? “If the issue does not fit within the compass of the profession’s expertise,
or only marginally so, one would expect observers to dismiss dissenters as freelancers operating without standing, much as an Oscar-winning Hollywood actor
who sets up shop as an authority on national defense.”46
Part of the problem with this criterion is that the meaning of professional
military expertise has changed since Huntington’s time. Following Harold Lasswell, Huntington referred to the expertise of the professional military officer as
the “management of violence.” But today that description seems far too narrow.
The fact is that today’s military officer is really a “national security professional,”
whose expertise extends to the interconnected intellectual space of everything
from strategic theory, strategic thinking, and strategy formation to diplomacy,
nation building, and homeland defense.47 Thus in practice it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between what military and civilian national security professionals do.48 As historical examples cited earlier illustrate, even when it comes
to purely military affairs the professional military officer is not necessarily more
correct than the civilians.
The sacrifice incurred by the dissenter and the timing of the dissent must be
judged according to the standard of common sense. “For the true professional, a
right understanding of one’s loyalties always places loyalty to self dead last. Thus,
absent personal sacrifice, such dissent quickly leads to the suspicion of and the
search for ulterior motives.”49 The same applies to the timing of the dissent. “If
something is worthy of an act of dissent, then it is worthy. Thus, as soon as that
is discerned and decided by the strategic leader, the act should follow immediately.” If there is a substantial delay, the other partners in the trust relationship,
especially the subordinate leaders within the profession, may suspect a lack of
moral agency on the part of the dissenter as well as the impact of ulterior motives on the act.
Finally, it is critical that the strategic leader contemplating dissent be an authentic leader of competence and moral integrity who has previously displayed a
steadfastness of character. Subordinates who judge leaders to be cynical or lacking in integrity are unlikely to construe an act of dissent by such individuals as
disinterested.
In principle, U.S. military officers accept civilian control and recognize the
limits of dissent. But as the previous discussion illustrates, the actual practice of
military subordination is complicated by a number of factors. The first of these
is organizational and institutional—the separation of powers related to military
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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affairs between the executive and legislative branches. But even more important
is the tension between the loyalty and obedience of military professionals, on
the one hand, and their military judgment and moral beliefs, on the other. The
civil-military tensions visible both before and since 9/11 are illustrative of these
complications.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND SERVICE DOCTRINES
The combination of civil-military relations patterns and service doctrines affect
military effectiveness. In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pattern is how well it contributes to the effectiveness of a state’s military, especially at
the level of strategic assessment and strategy making.50 However, Richard Kohn
has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military in
this realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of operations other
than those associated with large-scale conventional war. “Nearly twenty years
after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money
than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat insurgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each
with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations’
governments in a matter of weeks.”51
He attributes this lack of effectiveness to a decline in the military’s professional
competence with regard to strategic planning. “In effect, in the most important
area of professional expertise—the connecting of war to policy, of operations to
achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has been found
wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics,
weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with
strategy.”52
This phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, in recent failure to adapt to a
changing security environment in which the challenges to global stability are “less
from massed armies than from terrorism; economic and particularly financial
instability; failed states; resource scarcity (particularly oil and potable water);
pandemic disease; climate change; and international crime in the form of piracy,
smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized lawlessness.” He
observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in
which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign
and national security policies. He echoes the claim of Colin Gray: “All too often,
there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside.”53 Is there something inherent in current U.S. civil-military affairs that accounts for this failure
of strategy?
The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be
attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of these is the continued
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dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the
“normal” theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is a clear line of
demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W.
Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the “surge”
in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since
the Vietnam War. Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon
Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was
the cause of American defeat in Vietnam.
The normal theory can be traced to Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the
State, in which he sought a solution to the dilemma that lies at the heart of civilmilitary relations—how to guarantee civilian control of the military while still ensuring the ability of the uniformed military to provide security. His solution was a
mechanism for creating and maintaining a professional, apolitical military establishment, which he called “objective control.” Such a professional military would
focus on defending the United States but avoid threatening civilian control.54
But as Cohen has pointed out, the normal theory of civil-military relations
often has not held in practice. Indeed, such storied democratic war leaders as
Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln “trespassed” on the military’s turf as a
matter of course, influencing not only strategy and operations but also tactics.
The reason that civilian leaders cannot simply leave the military to its own devices during war is that war is an iterative process involving the interplay of active wills. What appears to be the case at the outset of the war may change as the
war continues, modifying the relationship between political goals and military
means. The fact remains that wars are not fought for their own purposes but to
achieve policy goals set by the political leadership of the state.
The second factor, strongly reinforced by the normal theory of civil-military
relations, is the influence of the uniformed services’ organizational cultures. Each
military service is built around a “strategic concept” that, according to Samuel
Huntington, constitutes “the fundamental element of a military service,” the
basic “statement of [its] role . . . or purpose in implementing national policy.”55 A
clear strategic concept is critical to the ability of a service to organize and employ
the resources that Congress allocates to it.
It also largely determines a service’s organizational culture. Some years ago,
the late Carl Builder of the RAND Corporation wrote The Masks of War, in which
he demonstrated the importance of the organizational cultures of the various
military services in creating their differing “personalities,” identities, and behaviors. His point was that each service possesses a preferred way of fighting and
that “the unique service identities . . . are likely to persist for a very long time.”56
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The organizational culture of a service, in turn, exerts a strong influence on
civil-military relations, frequently constraining what civilian leaders can do and
often constituting an obstacle to change and innovation. The critical question
here is this: Who decides whether the military instrument is effective, the civilian
policy makers or the military itself?
An illuminating illustration of this phenomenon at work has been the recent
attempt to institutionalize counterinsurgency doctrine within the U.S. Army.
This is a difficult task, given the service’s focus on the “operational level of war,”
which manifests itself as a preference for fighting large-scale conventional war—
despite the fact that throughout most of its existence, the conflicts in which the
U.S. Army engaged were actually irregular wars. Beginning in the late 1970s, the
Army embraced the idea of the operational level of war as its central organizing
concept. This made sense in light of that service’s major war-fighting concern of
the time—defeating Warsaw Pact forces on the Central Front of Europe—but
also, as Hew Strachan has observed, “the operational level of war appeals to
armies: it functions in a politics-free zone and it puts primacy on professional
skills.”57
Herein lies the problem for civil-military relations: the disjunction between
operational excellence in combat and policy, which determines the reasons for
which a particular war is to be fought. The combination of the dominant position of the normal theory of civil-military relations in the United States and the
military’s focus on the nonpolitical operational level of war means that all too
often the conduct of a war is disconnected from the goals of the war.
As an essay published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute puts it, the operational level of war has become an “alien” that has devoured
strategy.
Rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of
campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of
war”—assumed responsibility for campaign planning. This reduced political leadership to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widening the gap between
politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles
that have not always contributed to strategic success, producing “a way of battle”
rather than a way of war.
The political leadership of a country cannot simply set objectives for a war, provide
the requisite materiel, then stand back and await victory. Nor should the nation or its
military be seduced by this prospect. Politicians should be involved in the minuteto-minute conduct of war; as Clausewitz reminds us, political considerations are
“influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.”58
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The task of strategy is to bring doctrine—concerned with fighting battles in
support of campaigns—into line with national policy. But instead of strategy, we
have Gray’s “black hole.”
The third factor contributing to the perseverance of the American strategic
black hole is one that was, ironically, intended to improve U.S. strategic planning
—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In
passing Goldwater-Nichols, Congress sought to address two central concerns: the
excessive power and influence of the separate services and the mismatch between
the authority of the combatant commanders and their responsibilities. The act
increased the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while reducing
that of the Joint Chiefs themselves, and it increased the authority of the theater
commanders. Congress expected that such reorganization would, among other
things, improve the quality of military advice to policy makers.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for integrating theater strategy and
national policy. But if they are marginalized, as they were during much of the
Bush administration, such integration does not occur. This is an institutional
problem illustrated by the case of General Tommy Franks, the commander of
U.S. Central Command, who, in directing the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 and
the first phase of the war in Iraq, was able to bypass the Joint Staff. His justification is found in his memoirs, American Soldier: “Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan had been nitpicked by the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff, and I
did not intend to see a recurrence of such divisiveness in Iraq.” He essentially sent
a message to the chairman, the service chiefs, and the Joint Staff: “Keep Washington focused on policy and strategy. Leave me the hell alone to run the war.”59
Of course, such an attitude is a dysfunctional consequence of the well-intentioned
institutional arrangement created by Goldwater-Nichols, reinforcing as it does the
idea that there is an autonomous realm of military action within which civilians
have no role. The result of such a disjunction between the military and political
realms is that war plans may not be integrated with national policy and that strategy, despite lip service to its importance, in practice becomes an orphan. In the
absence of strategy, other factors rush to fill the void, resulting in strategic drift.
The current civil-military framework fails to provide strategic guidance for
integrating the operational level of war and national policy. Rectifying this situation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they
do business.
{LINE-SPACE}
U.S. civil-military relations since 9/11 raise a number of issues. How informed
are civilian leaders when they choose to commit the military instrument? How
well does the prevailing pattern of civil-military relations enable the integration
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of divergent and even contradictory views? Does this pattern ensure a practical
military strategy that properly serves the ends of national policy?
The state of post-9/11 American civil-military relations also points to the issue
of trust—the mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military
leaders and the exchange of candid views and perspectives between the two parties as part of the decision-making process.
Establishing trust requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain reexamine their mutual relationship. On the one hand, the military must recover
its voice in the making of strategy, while realizing that politics permeates the
conduct of war and that civilians have the final say, not only concerning the goals
of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other, civilians must understand
that implementing effective policy and strategy requires the proper military instrument and therefore must insist that soldiers present their views frankly and
forcefully throughout the strategy-making and implementation process. This is
the key to healthy civil-military relations.
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amuel P. Huntington died in December 2008, but this Harvard academic
continues to have a significant impact on the conduct and state of American
civil-military relations. Mackubin Owens’s recent US Civil-Military Relations
after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain and Suzanne Nielsen and Don
M. Snider’s 2009 edited work American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and
the State in a New Era both challenge and contextualize Huntington’s work for
contemporary theorists and practitioners of civil-military relations. This is indeed a worthwhile effort, as America’s civil-military relations have received much
“airtime” over the past few years. General Stanley McChrystal’s seeming challenge
to the political leadership over proposed Afghanistan troop levels, Lieutenant
Colonel Andrew Milburn’s Joint Force Quarterly article challenging traditional
conceptions of civilian control, and Bob Woodward’s revelations in Obama’s
War regarding the 2009 tensions between the Pentagon and the administration
over Afghanistan strategy highlight the relationship between the military and our
civilian leaders while raising the issue of the military’s participation in political
discourse.1 Do these instances point to “the troubled quality of American civilmilitary relations,” or do they serve as continuing proofs of the vitality inherent
Commander Dayne E. Nix, CHC, USN (Ret.), served in the American constitutional system as created by the
twenty-seven years in the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy. founders?2
He holds a PhD from Salve Regina University. He is
In this article, I will discuss Huntington’s view
the author of a book on Muhammad Iqbal of Pakistan
that
the American constitutional system inevitably
(Mellen, 2011). Dr. Nix currently teaches joint maritime operations for the U.S. Naval War College at the draws our military leaders into the political process
Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California.
and therefore requires astute and well-developed poNaval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2
litical expertise on their part in order to maintain the
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uniquely American civil-military relationship. In doing so, I will address Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations, some historical examples of the military’s involvement in the political process, the contemporary security missions
and roles that require political insight on the part of military leaders, and barriers
to acquiring and utilizing that insight. In pursuing this discussion I argue in no
way that the unique system of civil-military relations in the United States should
be overturned but rather that our leadership’s failure to recognize and train for
the political roles and requirements inherent in today’s global security environment threatens the effectiveness of U.S. grand strategy and accomplishment of
national security goals.
THE CLASH OF THEORY WITH REALITY: HUNTINGTON’S
OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE THEORY
In January 2011, Fareed Zakaria, a former student of Huntington’s, published
a reflection on his mentor that offers particular insight regarding Huntington’s
approach to political theory. “Sam would often say to me, ‘You have to find a big
independent variable and a big dependent variable’[;] . . . you’ve got to start with
something big to explain. . . . ‘Your job is to distill it, simplify it, and give them a
sense of what is the single, or what are the couple, of powerful causes that explain
this powerful phenomenon.’’’3 In Huntington’s own words,
A good theory is precise, austere, elegant, and highlights the relations among a few
conceptual variables. Inevitably, no theory can explain fully a single event or group of
events. An explanation, in contrast, is inevitably complex, dense, messy, and intellectually unsatisfying. It succeeds not by being austere but by being comprehensive.
A good history describes chronologically and analyzes convincingly a sequence of
events and shows why one event led to another.4

The Soldier and the State follows the approach outlined above and is the
Huntington treatment of civil-military relations that has become the standard
in professional and academic discourse. Huntington suggests a theory of civilmilitary relations caught between the variables of military professionalism and
the military’s participation in the political process.5 The author outlines the historical development of military professionalism in Europe and the United States,
with some emphasis on the constitutional intentions of America’s Founding
Fathers. The Soldier and the State also provides a somewhat limited, even “messy
and intellectually unsatisfying,” explanation of the development of military professionalism and civilian control of the military in the U.S. constitutional system.
Huntington’s theory suggests two types of civil-military relations, subjective
control and objective control of the military by political leaders. In the subjectivecontrol model, the military is closely integrated with and participates in the
political and social system. Officers and enlisted personnel are drawn from civil
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society to form a militia when danger threatens; once the danger is past, they
return to society and serve in multiple capacities, including political ones. In this
system, Huntington suggests, military professionalism is minimal. His objectivecontrol model describes a very different type of military and political system,
one that is both differentiated and professional. Here military professionals and
political leaders focus their efforts in distinct arenas of expertise. The military
remains separate from the political system and focuses on developing expertise in
the profession of arms, that body of knowledge embodying the “management of
violence.”6 In this model, military professionalism is maximized.7 Huntington’s
objective model adopts a purely Clausewitzian approach whereby “war is the
continuation of policy by other means,” with senior military professionals providing security for the state while serving as military advisers to the politicians,
who practice their own expertise in the realm of politics and national strategy.8
Professionalism in one area precludes competence in the other.9
Huntington clearly prefers the objective model;10 his preference has served as
a source of discussion and controversy since The Soldier and the State was first
published. In spite of his preference, however, Huntington clearly demonstrates
that U.S. civil-military relations do not actually correspond to his objective
model. Instead, our military and our civilian government operate somewhere on
the continuum between his subjective and objective poles—to the detriment of
military professionalism, at least in Huntington’s view.11
Huntington’s “Civilian Control and the Constitution,” published a year before
The Soldier and the State, examines the civil-military dilemma from the founders’ perspective and provides us with additional insight into the professor’s
thinking. It suggests that the subjective approach was the more familiar of the
two in the political and cultural context of the early United States and that it
influenced the founders’ treatment of the civil-military problem in writing the
Constitution. Military professionalism, in Huntington’s view, did not exist in
late-eighteenth-century America; instead, the military art was part and parcel of
every gentleman’s knowledge base.12 The founders placed great confidence in the
citizen-soldiers of the militia as guarantors of the country’s security and defense
and had great distrust for standing armies. Yet they also recognized the potential
for a crisis that would require a national military organization and so provided
Congress the authority to raise and fund an army and a navy. Concerned as they
were for the defense of the young nation from outside forces, the founders were
also wary of concentrating too much power in any one arm of the government
and thus divided control over the military between Congress and the executive.13
The president serves as the commander in chief, while Congress declares war,
raises the military establishment, and pays for its operations.
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Thus developed that particularly American approach to civil-military relations, the division of authority over the military between Congress and the executive.14 Huntington suggests that as a result of this constitutional arrangement, his
objective form of civil-military control is literally impossible in the United States.
Military leaders, obligated to provide military advice to both the president and
Congress, are constantly drawn into political controversy. In fact, Huntington
states that the unintended consequence of the founders’ constitutional construction is that “the separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts.”15
Since World War II, the military in the United States has developed significant
political power, generally exercised by senior military leaders during budget and
strategy debates in the rarefied atmosphere of the nation’s capital. The exercise of
this political muscle has been most evident during budget battles on Capitol Hill;
when political leaders have attempted to modify popular military institutions
(as when President Harry Truman attempted to eliminate the U.S. Marine Corps
and ran into a political buzz saw); and, especially, during attempts at defense
reorganization (e.g., the political infighting that preceded passage of the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act).16 Most recently, Bob Woodward reported in Obama’s
War that the Barack Obama administration perceived the military’s efforts to
publicize its views on Afghanistan strategy as a deliberate campaign to influence and limit the president’s options regarding troop levels there.17 The political tactics utilized by the military in such cases are familiar to those acquainted
with interest-group politics: press releases, interviews by senior military officials,
back-channel discussions with congressional leaders, public speeches discussing
military and political strategies, publication of studies supporting military or
service views, congressional testimony, and, most recently, expert opinion offered
on national news programs by recently retired officers.
The political power of the military has developed and matured since Huntington published The Soldier and the State in 1957. During the post–World War II
and Korean War periods, interservice rivalry was so intense that military leaders
often exhausted their political energy in turf and budget battles with each other,
resulting in enhanced civilian control.18 Huntington sounded a cautionary note
as he regarded this contentious environment, suggesting that should the services
unite their efforts, “inter-service peace would probably have certain costs in decreased civil-military harmony.”19 In fact, an unintended consequence of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which strengthened the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and forced jointness on an unwilling military, has been a strengthening of
the military’s political power. The military has become a political constituency
that must be addressed in the Washington power equation.20 Richard Kohn, a
well-known commentator on contemporary civil-military relations, observes,
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“The professional military, with its allies and communities, has developed into
a potent political force in American government. Knowledgeable people, particularly those who, in each administration, are charged with the direction of
national security affairs, recognize this, even if they cannot, for political reasons,
admit it openly.”21
These considerations regarding the military’s participation in the political process relate specifically to the development of military policy within our government
—an inherently political, competitive, and often contentious process. That process pits the needs of foreign policy against those of domestic policy, and the
military, commanding a significant portion of our national resources, is a key
player in that process.22 In order to operate effectively in that arena, our military
leaders must develop and practice sophisticated political acumen, a capability not
traditionally associated with military professionalism. Yet it is one they ignore
at their peril as they are inevitably drawn into the political process by America’s
unique constitutional system. It is also a capability required in today’s international security environment, one that draws our military leaders into missions
that require a similar application of political expertise.
THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT DRAWS
THE MILITARY INTO POLITICAL ISSUES
The contemporary security environment requires a transformation of skill sets
for our military. Even before the terror attacks on 9/11, the military was coming
to grips with the fact that the post–Cold War world had changed.
In the past twenty years . . . the quest for “security” has replaced war aims, and the
result has been a more nuanced approach to international power. National security
is now seen as a complex arrangement of political, economic, social, and military
factors. American military power is hegemonic but it is recognized that even overwhelming military power can accomplish only limited security objectives. . . . The
frame of reference is less about “victory” and more about “prevailing” in a globalized
competitive environment.23

During the William Clinton administration, the military was used extensively
for “military operations other than war,” in Haiti, Somalia, and other distant hot
spots. These operations facilitated security for a global economic engine that
demands a stable environment—the reality being that the “hidden hand of the
market will never work without a hidden fist.”24 The U.S. military is universally
understood to provide and facilitate that security. Many in the American military
have resisted this role, arguing that our armed forces were not structured for
“nation building” or stability operations. The issue even made it into the 2000
election, when George W. Bush campaigned on a platform deriding the Clinton
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administration’s nation-building missions, which, he contended, had overextended the U.S. military.
The issues became more focused after 9/11, with the realization that the
United States was now engaged in a new kind of war, a “global war on terror,”
in which the overriding concern became security against religiously inspired
radicals who threatened the world with weapons of mass destruction. American
citizens were reminded daily of their new insecurity, as airport scanners became
ever more intrusive and suicide bombings dominated the nightly news. This
new war included a number of “small war” missions familiar from our nation’s
past, as well as some new ones, but all required the transformation of a military
that had been created in the Cold War for battles in Europe against the massed
armored divisions of the Soviet Union. In this new environment, our military’s
firepower “would become an instrument of last rather than first resort.”25 “Asymmetric warfare,” “counterterrorism,” “counterinsurgency,” “limited war,” “fourthgeneration war,” “stability operations,” and “complex irregular war” all began
to compete for pride of terminological place and led to the creation of a new
acronym, ROMO—the range of military operations.
All of the missions within the ROMO share a common denominator: success
requires the application of extensive and well developed political skill by our
nation’s armed forces. This is true because of the characteristics of limited war
in the contemporary world. Clausewitz’s dictum cited above certainly applies in
major theater war, but it has special application in today’s conflict environments
where unity of effort, legitimacy, and perseverance are essential to success and
involve our operational forces and their leaders in extensive political interaction.
Today’s security environment is a coalition environment. Every war the United
States has fought in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been waged with
allies. As Churchill so famously quipped, “The only thing worse than fighting
a war with allies is fighting one without them.”26 The requirement to conduct
operations with United Nations (UN) forces, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and “coalitions of the willing” indicates that this reality will not
change in the near future. It forces our military to forge a unity of effort with
coalition partners rather than the unity of command preferred by all military
leaders. However, the maintenance of coalitions is difficult. Differing military
and social cultures, languages, and home constituencies involve military leaders
in often difficult interactions with their international counterparts to maintain
strategic, operational, and tactical direction. These efforts are fundamentally
political, and local misunderstandings can endanger mission accomplishment as
well as the relationship between partner nations. These realities were highlighted
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM at Basra, where the U.S. command dictated
direct confrontation against local enemy forces, while the British preferred a
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more “indirect” approach, that of negotiating with the opposition.27 A similar
situation was reported in Afghanistan, where the Italian contingent was reported
to have paid bribes to the local Taliban in exchange for a reduction in attacks on
its forces.28 These differences of approach, as well as inherent cultural differences,
doctrinal mismatches, and domestic political realities (e.g., European sensitivity
to troop casualties and opposition to Iraq and Afghanistan deployments), make
the sustainment of coalition unity of effort a delicate political matter.
The requirement for legitimacy in today’s security operations involves our
military forces in political issues on a number of levels—in the tactical (local)
area, internationally, and back home. In the tactical area, our forces are required
to pay attention to “hearts and minds.” This is not a new reality. Colonel C. E.
Callwell, in his classic work on Britain’s small wars, held that the goodwill of
the local population was never assumed.29 This is certainly true in today’s threat
environments. Whether engaged in a humanitarian relief operation, a noncombatant evacuation operation, or counterinsurgency, America’s military must
earn the goodwill of local populations and their leaders, as well as the support of
political leaders and supporters at home. The concept of the “strategic corporal”
is well known—that the acts of every member of the military have direct impact
on hearts and minds on the local scene. Those actions can also have potentially
strategic impact, either positive or negative, due to the ubiquitous media environment. A single misstep by any member of coalition forces can receive immediate
exposure on 24/7 news programs, with the potential for significant impact on
public opinion.
As the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan passes the ten-year mark, the requirement for perseverance takes on new meaning for our nation and its military.
The recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests that the United States
must plan and prepare to fight the kinds of wars it is engaged in now, which is
a significant shift from previous QDRs, which were more future oriented.30 The
counterinsurgency, peace-building, and stability operations we face today require
long-term perseverance and commitment. Yet perseverance in such operations
inevitably draws the military into political discussion, for it is dependent on the
will of Congress, the president, and the American people, as well as their counterparts in coalition and partner nations. The United States could be in Afghanistan
another ten years, in spite of the scheduled drawdown of U.S. forces there. Indeed, sensitive to the charge that the United States abandoned Afghanistan after
the Soviet defeat there in the 1980s, one American leader is reported to have said,
“We’re never leaving.”31 Our continued military presence is a necessary guarantor
of security and stability for the region. In light of this requirement, the strategy
of the Taliban has been to focus its efforts on the coalition center of gravity, the
political will undergirding that presence.32 American military leaders understand
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this essential point and wisely engage the media, Congress, the president, and
the international community in order to sustain that will. It is no surprise that
General David Petraeus (formerly commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and
currently director of the Central Intelligence Agency) is known as one of the most
politically astute of America’s military leaders since Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Eliot Cohen emphasizes the political realities that the U.S. military must successfully negotiate in counterinsurgency, indeed, across the entire range of military operations our nation faces today:
While all the elements of national power have a role in successful counterinsurgency,
political objectives must retain primacy. All actions, kinetic or nonkinetic, must be
planned and executed with consideration of their contribution toward strengthening
the host government’s legitimacy and achieving the U.S. Government’s political goals.
The political and military aspects of an insurgency are usually so bound together as
to be inseparable, and most insurgents recognize this fact. In counterinsurgencies,
military actions conducted without proper analysis of their political effects will at
best be ineffective and at worst aid the enemy.33

If American forces are to be successful in the diverse environments of the ROMO,
they must consider the political implications of every action and mission, a reality requiring significant political expertise and practice on the part of military
commanders and the personnel they lead. However, the very characteristics of
what Huntington termed “the military mind” may limit their effectiveness.
ADAPTING THE MILITARY MIND TO THE CONTEMPORARY
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The evidence is clear: the U.S. military is inevitably drawn into political issues
both at home and abroad. There is, however, a paradox regarding the political
power that the military possesses. The effective use of political power requires
nuance and skillful political calculation, traits not usually associated with the
military personality. In exercising its power in political situations, the military
often comes off as a “bull in a political china closet.” General McChrystal’s firing
is a case in point. Viewpoints differ as to whether the general’s public comments
during President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy review were calculated or innocent, but his interactions with the press and those of his staff do not attest to great
political skill. This seeming lack was also evident during General Colin Powell’s
tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He adapted the “Weinberger
Doctrine” to then-current military strategy, advising that the military should
be used only when victory was certain and pursuant to a clear political strategy.
He often argued against committing the military to far-flung contingency operations. “Powell seemed to ignore the need to bend operational capabilities to
political imperatives, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright somewhat testily
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acknowledged when she responded, ‘What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’”34
Huntington might comment that these events prove important points of his
theory—that there exists a “military mind” and that true military professionals
must necessarily be “incompetent” in political affairs.35 Yet the contemporary
security environment requires that they operate competently both in the charged
atmosphere of the U.S. capital and across the global commons. To do so, the military must address a number of tendencies inherent in the “military personality.”
The first of these tendencies involves the practical application of the principle
that the military is and should remain apolitical. Military members are appropriately taught, whether in “boot camp,” Officer Candidate School, or other entrylevel training, that military personnel should limit their participation in the political process to voting and are prohibited from participation in political events
in uniform. As a result, military members generally view politics with distaste,
if not downright hostility. Many view themselves as separate from and morally
superior to politicians, whom they see engaged in political turf wars and nasty
electoral campaigns. Indeed, Professor Huntington defines the military professional as separate from politics, giving as an example General George C. Marshall,
who refrained from voting in order to preserve his political neutrality and professionalism.36 Eisenhower also kept his political views private, to such an extent
that President Truman offered him an opportunity to run on the Democratic
presidential ticket—an offer that was refused due to what turned out to be “Ike’s”
Republican leanings.37 However extreme and unrealistic these examples sound in
a communications culture where retired admirals and generals serve as commentators on the nightly news, Admiral Mullen’s 2011 guidance reminds the military
of the necessity to remain “apolitical.”38 The danger is that political partisanship
is mistaken for political competence by military leaders and personnel. The effort
to remain apolitical may lead military members to avoid the necessary political
education and awareness they require to operate in today’s complex environments. The unintended consequence is ignorance and downright incompetence
when the mission requires awareness of political sensitivities and repercussions.39
A second dynamic that mitigates military effectiveness in the contemporary
security environment is a failure to appreciate fully the application of the Clausewitzian view of war as the continuation of politics. Clausewitz is taught in every
military school, a key element in the Joint Professional Military Education curriculum of service colleges and at the military academies. Yet the realities of the
modern battlefield bring political requirements into conflict with the ingrained
instincts of the military mind, a conflict of which the result is a tendency to
ignore the political implications of Clausewitz in favor of victory—“to view
military victory as an end in itself, ignoring war’s function as an instrument of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1

102

Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue

NIX

97

policy.”40 Military leaders who believe that their role is to “break things and kill
people” are often insensitive to and frustrated by the political requirements of
contemporary missions.
Korea was perhaps the first war in which the U.S. military had to face the challenges of a limited war in which political requirements contradicted its intuitive
drive for battlefield victory.41 General Douglas “No Substitute for Victory” MacArthur, especially, chafed under the political guidelines laid down by President
Truman. In an aptly titled chapter—“Frustration in Korea”—of his memoirs,
MacArthur reports feeling that President Truman’s will to win had been “chipped
away by the constant pounding whispers of timidity and cynicism.”42 His eventual relief “confirmed civilian control over the military services and revealed the
General as a heroic figure, single-mindedly committed to victory on the battlefield, but seemingly without any real appreciation of the larger political implications of the war he was fighting.”43 MacArthur was not the only Korean War
military leader uneasy with the political limitations set by politicians unwilling
to engage in a larger war with China and, possibly, the Soviet Union. The majority of Korean War generals, with the World War II experience of unconditional
surrender just a few years behind them, were focused on battlefield success at the
expense of political realities. These generals experienced, Huntington writes, “a
feeling of unease because victory was denied, a sense of frustration and a conviction that political considerations had overruled the military. . . . General [Mark]
Clark reported that all the commanders in the Far East with whom he discussed
the issue hoped that the government would remove the political restrictions
which denied them victory.”44
This frustration with the limitations imposed by political restrictions on
military operations has not disappeared over time. As recently as the Kosovo
campaign of 1999, General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
concluded, “Using military force effectively requires departing from the political
dynamic and following the so-called ‘principles of war.’”45 An even more recent
example of this frustration is the storm of criticism, from both military and civilian quarters, that arose in response to the restricted rules of engagement established by General McChrystal (later confirmed by General Petraeus) in pursuit
of the “hearts and minds” strategy in Afghanistan, an obviously political move by
military leaders who “wrote the book” on counterinsurgency.
Additional traits of the military mind that might limit the military’s effectiveness in the ROMO are those that facilitate operational mission accomplishment
but potentially violate political considerations.

• The military is adept at independent worldwide operations and minimizes
the need for outside assistance. Officers are taught that, should a leadership
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vacuum arise, they must exercise initiative, exert leadership, and bring order
out of chaos. Where military members consider this “gung ho” approach
an operational necessity, other U.S. agencies and coalition partners often
consider them pushy and overaggressive.

• Huntington suggests that the military mind is realist in perspective, seeing
the world in terms of competition for power. Numerous observers report
(and my personal experience bears out) that military personnel generally
see the world as a realm of conflictual, zero-sum competition for power. Often, if military people do not have an external enemy, they create one—even
from within their own ranks or from “the interagency.” This tendency leads
to competition within the ranks as well as conflict with partner organizations. Unity of effort is difficult to establish in this type of environment.

• Senior commanders require regular, sometimes daily, briefings on the accomplishments of units in the field. Subordinate commanders are generally in the area of operations for limited tours, ranging from four to fifteen
months, during which they are subject to, and must produce for their own
subordinates, regular personnel evaluations. The result is an emphasis on
“metrics” and on short-term gains easily transferrable to the next day’s
briefing graphics (and perhaps upcoming fitness reports). This “results
orientation” may create impatience with interagency or nongovernmentalorganization efforts that produce transparent or long-term effects, such as
relationships with and influence on local leaders. It is difficult to quantify
human relationships and interaction, and State Department civilians in the
field frequently chafe at their military partners’ emphasis on “bricks and
mortar” projects that look good on briefing slides.

• A final dynamic that undercuts the political expertise of U.S. military leaders
is the “American way of war,” as characterized by a number of writers. This
dynamic involves the complete Clausewitzian triad: our military leaders,
our civilian political leaders, and the people of the United States. There is a
historical preference on the part of these constituencies for wars of limited
duration, with clearly defined “bad guys,” clear paths to victory through
overwhelming “high tech” force, and a rapid return of forces to America’s
shores after conflict termination. Fundamental to this approach is an
idealism that seeks to spread democracy to those denied the benefits of the
American political system. In short, “War [should be] clean, independent of
politics, and fought with big battalions.”46
This last characteristic deserves added attention, as it arises from within the
military culture and self-image as well as from our national approach to war,
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growing out of our shared history and cultural context. It is also a result of the
pressures placed on the military by its loyal supporters, friends, families, and the
media. Our nation’s “short attention span” does not contribute to the political
will necessary to support complex and long-term contingencies across the world
in pursuit of global security needs. One needs only remember the image of
President Bush on board the USS Abraham Lincoln with the words “Mission Accomplished” emblazoned in the background. It is a fundamental strategic error
to conceive that the defeat of the enemy’s military and the achievement of political aims are synonymous. Unfortunately, this mistake is all too common, as the
American experience in Iraq illustrates.
The military traits discussed here often work effectively to accomplish military
ends but conflict with successful political outcomes. The direct, confrontational
manner of the American military may seem offensive and brash to many within
the interagency realm, more used to diplomatic approaches. The competitive orientation and need for an enemy may result in an inability to “play well with others”; the zero-sum and realist perspective may neglect the possibility of compromise or nuanced approaches to problems and relationships. The upshot of these
traits—admittedly generalized here—is to make the military generally ineffective
in the political realm. These aspects of the military mind and personality do not
make the military incapable of political mission accomplishment. But they do
reveal the limitations inherent in utilizing the military for stability, reconstruction, nation building, and other tasks requiring a nuanced, political approach.
In the military’s defense, of course, there are senior officers who thrive in the
political environment. Generally, they have served in geographic combatant commands, where they are required to exhibit international political expertise and
engage coalition partners effectively. They have also learned how best to combat
their enemies on their home turf. As one commentator put it, “‘Political’ generals
do better in counter-insurgency than ‘gung-ho’ warriors,” an insight that applies
to many dimensions of the contemporary security environment.47 But military
leaders with highly developed political acumen, such as an Eisenhower or a
Petraeus, are the exception rather than the rule. American military culture values,
and is more likely to produce, a George S. Patton, Jr.
A REDEFINITION OF VICTORY?
The contemporary military finds itself actively participating in the political process, both at home and abroad. At home, this involvement is a result of the constitutional process established by the founders, a process that requires the military
to advise both the president and Congress and to participate in the crafting of the
nation’s military policy. Overseas, the missions the military has been called on to
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perform involve it in political issues at every level, from the general serving as a
combatant commander to the corporal assigned to a provincial reconstruction
team. The following recommendations are offered to assist both military and civilian leaders in accomplishing the goals of the nation’s national security strategy.
First, the military needs to redefine its concept of professionalism to embrace
all the missions that it has been assigned, including stability, peace-building, and
reconstruction operations. The Defense Department has designated “stability
operations” as a core mission;48 accordingly, the military must incorporate the
requirements and capabilities (including appropriate political training) of stability operations and other, associated missions into its training regimens. This
will require abandonment of debates as to whether we “do” nation building or
whether a force designed for a major theater war can adapt to such missions.
American military forces are amazingly flexible and will accomplish whatever
mission is assigned to them. The reality of today’s security environment requires
their leadership to come up with the means to address the thorny issues that will
arise and to adapt training and deployment cycles accordingly.49
Second, the military needs to recognize that the political and governance
expertise required for many of the missions on the “lower end” of the ROMO
resides within other agencies of government, especially the State Department and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Overcoming institutional barriers and forging working relationships with interagency personnel is a
requirement of the contemporary battlefield, and meeting it will greatly facilitate
mission accomplishment. Karl Eikenberry, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (as well as a retired lieutenant general and former commander of U.S. forces
in Afghanistan), advised 2010 graduates of the Army Command and Staff College “to see our civilian counterparts as empowered partners who complement
your work. And welcome them as part of your engagement team. Take them with
you and provide the security they need to do their jobs.”50 His comments also
hint at the need for civilian members of the interagency to develop the skills and
understanding necessary to work effectively with the military. After a decade of
improvisation, “State” and USAID are themselves developing in-house expertise
on stability operations, emphasizing training and lessons learned. One Senior
Foreign Service officer with political-military experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan notes,
State is not the modern equivalent of the British Colonial Office, and the governance
and development work Foreign Service Officers find themselves doing on Provincial
Reconstruction Teams was not a core State competence a decade ago. But just as the
Army and Marines have had to accept the centrality of Stability Ops, so State has
recognized we’re in the grass-roots stability business for the long haul.51
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Third, civil affairs units and their expertise (where military political experience does exist) must be incorporated at every level of the military. Currently,
the majority of Army civil affairs units reside in the reserves. Their numbers
have been increased in recent years, and they are currently seeing extensive duty
in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps and Navy have also expanded their civil affairs capabilities, establishing responsibilities for that function within artillery
battalions, on each coast, and in teams throughout the Department of the Navy.
These capabilities must be expanded and given the additional role of training all
members of the military in the political requirements of their missions. As we
have seen in current conflicts, each military member, regardless of rank, can have
a potentially strategic impact, if only through an unfortunate act that flies in the
face of political sensibilities.
A further need is for military leaders to adapt to the contemporary reality of
“fourth generation warfare: . . . [a] political and not a military struggle.”52 In fact,
everything about contemporary warfare has a political component, and military
leaders must apply themselves to understand and plan for the political dimensions of conflict and security. These dimensions require advanced specialized
training and assignments to billets where military members can gain experience
in political settings and the opportunity to practice political skills. This might
include personnel exchanges with interagency partners. Such contact would
make it easier for military officers to take orders from civilian executives, whose
department may be the “lead government agent” in particular contingencies. In a
similar vein, as Eliot Cohen points out, civilian leaders should take the initiative
in “prodding” military leaders with probing questions to discern the advisability
of their operations.53 Finally, the military must address its definition and its vision of victory. The political requirements of a conflict may dictate that success
be a matter of negotiation, treaty, or UN resolution rather than the defeat of a
military force or the surrender of opposing commanders.
Finally, the political realities of the contemporary security environment require that civilian leaders establish political expectations and end states. “The
military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman. Civilian control exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.”54 But in order for this appropriate subordination to
take place, civilian leaders must clearly state what the “ends of policy” are. They
do not always do so, for a number of reasons. Policies may shift over time as a
result of victory on the battlefield or shifts in political will at home. Political leaders may hesitate to communicate clear expectations, aware that they will be held
accountable by their constituencies. Coalition considerations may hinder the
development and communication of clear political guidance. Whatever the cause,
lack of guidance from political leaders results in confusion on the battlefield and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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the squandering of resources. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart reminds us of a precious truth: “The object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your
own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to
the peace you desire.”55
In the end, General MacArthur’s words, written after he had been relieved
of his Korean command, are instructive: “The supremacy of the civil over the
military is fundamental to the American system of government, and is wholeheartedly accepted by every officer and soldier in the military establishment.”56
Whether our military is drawn into political engagement through the constitutional form of government or as a result of the missions it must undertake in pursuit of global security, and whatever the decisions of the nation’s civilian leaders,
the American military is committed to that constitutional form of government
and the supremacy of the civilian over the military. As Huntington so forcefully
stated, in the U.S. system the rightness or wrongness of civilian policy “does not
concern the military man. He must assume that policy is ‘the representative of all
the interests of the whole community’ and obey it as such.”57
The opening paragraph of this article cited continuing questions regarding
the nature of civil-military relations in the United States and the constitutional
system created through the wisdom of the founders. This discussion and the ongoing dialogue between our civilian and military leaders regarding the nature of
that relationship are indeed evidence of the vitality of our constitutional system
and of the theory that Samuel P. Huntington so thoughtfully formulated.
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A REMARK ABLE MILITARY FEAT
The Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950
Donald Chisholm
The difficulty . . . to be got over is to know how not only to invade with
success; but likewise to retreat with safety.
THOMAS MORE MOLYNEUX

I kept the sea always on my flank; the transports attended the movements
of the army as a magazine; and I had at all times, and every day, a short
and easy communication with them. The army, therefore, could never
be distressed for provisions or stores, however limited its means of land
transport; and in case of necessity it might have embarked at any point
of the coast.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY

A

mphibious operations exploit the great facility and inherent flexibility of
movement and maneuver that the sea affords in order to concentrate military power at the decisive time and place ashore.1 Such operations are founded
on sea control, regularly capitalize on surprise and enemy weakness, and are
usually carried out in support of broader operational and campaign objectives
ashore—severing enemy land lines of communication, establishing lodgments
for follow-on forces, establishing control of choke points or denying the enemy
use of decisive physical points, outflanking less mobile
Dr. Chisholm is professor in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College. He is the enemy land forces, and the like.
author of Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and
We are wont to identify amphibious operations with
Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel
System, 1793–1941 (2000), which received the 2001 amphibious assaults, especially those executed during
Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distin- World War II, when the assault was refined to a high
guished Contribution to Naval Literature, and Coorart. In truth, however, militaries have for many centudination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in
Multiorganizational Systems (1989), along with nu- ries found it useful to conduct an olio of amphibious
merous articles, chapters of collected works, reviews, operations during peace as well as war. Appropriately,
monographs, and papers. His Spring 2000 article in
this journal on command and control in Korean War therefore, in addition to the assault, U.S. joint doctrine
amphibious operations received three awards.
identifies four other categories of amphibious operation: raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and those in
© 2011 by Donald Chisholm
Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2
support of other kinds of operations with objectives
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of conflict prevention or crisis mitigation (e.g., disaster relief and noncombatant evacuations).2 The last type has constituted the majority of amphibious
operations conducted since World War II. Still, the amphibious assault, as such,
remains most vivid in the mind’s eye. Notwithstanding Omar Bradley’s 1949
declaration that atomic weapons had rendered the large-scale amphibious assault
anachronistic, events of the ensuing decades—famously, Inchon, less than a year
later—suggest that the practical utility of the amphibious operation neither has
dimmed nor is likely to do so in the foreseeable future.3 Its successful execution
still poses the greatest risk to potential and actual enemies, as Argentina learned
through hard experience in 1982, Saddam Hussein recognized during Operation
DESERT STORM, and Task Force (TF) 58 demonstrated to the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001. And now the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are returning
their attention to the amphibious assault, after ten years in the desert.4
The present discussion, however, contemplates the amphibious withdrawal,
those “operations conducted to extract forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.”5 The capability to plan and execute amphibious
withdrawals, no less than their more glamorous and practiced assault siblings,
remains a practical essential in the military repertoire. Forces successfully withdrawn and redeployed will live to fight again another day, and the enemy must
honor and plan against such a capability. If the amphibious assault against a
hostile shore is among the most complex, technologically and organizationally, of
all military undertakings, the amphibious withdrawal does the assault one better
—its execution comes as a “branch,” a contingency, against reversal of fortune,
thus as reaction rather than proaction.
History records a great many military situations in which the success or failure
of amphibious withdrawals of land forces profoundly altered operational and
strategic outcomes. Arguably, the inability of Cornwallis in 1781 to extract his
troops at Yorktown led to his surrender and success for the American revolutionaries. Certainly Lord Wellington thoroughly understood the power this capability
afforded him during his Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon’s forces. The
Royal Navy permitted him not only to reinforce by sea at the places and times
required by the ground situation but also to withdraw troops under pressure.
He did so on several occasions, most importantly in January 1809 at Vigo and
Corunna, where nearly thirty thousand British troops were evacuated, thereby
saving Britain’s only field army, as well as perhaps the government and the war.6
A surprising number of major military extractions from the beach, shown in
table 1, were executed in the twentieth century.7 In every event, ground forces
facing destruction by superior enemy strength and position were withdrawn by
naval forces. All these withdrawals were executed without any doctrinal foundation; some without air or sea superiority; most absent purpose-built amphibious
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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TABLE 1
Month/Year

Location

Actor(s)

Scale

Dec. 1915–Jan. 1916

Gallipoli, Turkey

Britain

140,000 British, Australian, and New
Zealand troops

Dec. 1915–Feb. 1916

Durazzo/San Giovanni, Albania

Serbia,
Italy

136,000 troops, 36,350 horses

May 1940

Dunkirk, France

Britain,
France

338,000 troops

April 1941

Attica and Peloponnesus, Greece

Britain

43,000 troops

Oct. 1941

Odessa

USSR

86,000 troops, 150,000 civilians

Dec. 1941

Hangö, Finland

USSR

20,000+ troops

Feb. 1943

Guadalcanal

Japan

12,000+ troops

Aug. 1943

Sicily, Italy

Germany,
Italy

39,660 German and 62,000 Italian
troops

Aug. 1943

Sardinia, Italy

Germany

25,000 troops, 2,300 vehicles, 5,000 tons

Aug. 1943

Kolombangara, Solomon Islands

Japan

9,000 troops

Sept.–Oct. 1943

Sea of Azov, USSR

Germany,
Romania

200,000 troops, 16,000 wounded,
27,000 civilians, equipment

Sept.–Oct. 1943

Corsica, France

Germany

6,250 troops, 1,200 POWs, 3,000+
vehicles, 5,000 tons

March 1944

Odessa, USSR

Germany

24,300 troops and civilians, 54,000 tons

May 1944

Crimea, USSR

Germany

130,000 German and Romanian troops

March 1945

Courland, Latvia

Germany

2.2 million troops and civilians

Dec. 1950

Wonsan, Korea

United
States

3,800 troops, 1,146 vehicles, 10,000
tons, 4,800 civilians

Dec. 1950

Chinnampo, Korea

United
States

1,800 U.S. troops, 5,900 ROK troops,
3,000 refugees

Dec. 1950

Hungnam, Korea

United
States

105,000 U.S. and ROK troops, 91,000
civilians, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 tonsa

Dec. 1950–Jan. 1951

Inchon, Korea

United
States

4,963 UN troops, 63,220 ROK troops,
64,200 civilians, 1,404 vehicles, 62,144
tons

a. U.S. Marine and Air Force transport aircraft lifted an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo from Yongpo Airfield adjacent to
Hungnam.

shipping; some over very short distances, some over long; some by commanders and staffs inexperienced in amphibious techniques; and others were poorly
planned, if at all. In some, the withdrawing force suffered significant casualties in
the process; in most, the bulk of heavy equipment was left behind. In every one,
however, the amphibious withdrawal permitted the commander to retrieve forces
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otherwise doomed to destruction or captivity and subsequently to reinsert them
into combat. For this alone, the amphibious withdrawal demands our attention.
Dunkirk and Hungnam represent the antipodes of the twentieth-century
amphibious withdrawal. Dunkirk in May 1940 amounted to a hurried evacuation, executed under great pressure from the Luftwaffe, by a hasty assemblage of
British and French naval vessels, augmented by myriad civilian ships and small
craft. The British Expeditionary Force left behind most of its heavy equipment
and arms, as well as about forty thousand British soldiers (along with many more
French). However, the nearly 350,000 troops successfully returned to England,
when recovered, rearmed, and reequipped, once again confronted the Germans
in North Africa and Europe.
Conversely, Hungnam constituted a planned, carefully staged massive redeployment of forces against enemy pressure. Most of General Douglas MacArthur’s
X Corps ground troops—the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and the battered
7th Infantry Division—arrived at and staged off the beach at Hungnam as organized fighting units. In addition, X Corps’s 3rd Infantry Division moved by
road and amphibious lift from Wonsan to Hungnam before being redeployed
south. All these units brought out their fighting equipment and supplies. The
Marines brought their wounded (many others had already been evacuated by
air) and virtually all of their dead down the gauntlet from the Chosen Reservoir.
The Navy immediately treated the wounded and provided the troops with showers and warm food on board ship.8 The Navy also lifted the Republic of Korea
(ROK) I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam, where it was reembarked and lifted
to Bokuko Ko. When the U.S. Navy closed out Hungnam on 24 December 1950,
it destroyed all facilities, leaving behind nothing for advancing enemy forces.
The Navy also redeployed United Nations (UN) forces from Chinnampo and
Inchon on the west coast. Thus, during December 1950, the U.S. Navy conducted
five nearly simultaneous amphibious redeployments from both coasts of Korea.
The total evolution was remarkably well organized and executed; not a single life
was lost to enemy action, and material losses were light.9
Oddly, Hungnam and its associated efforts never worked their way into the
American mythological consciousness—although, justifiably, the 1st Marine Division’s epic fighting withdrawal from Chosen to Hamhung did.10 It was, rather,
the brilliantly conceived and executed landing at Inchon in September 1950—a
masterstroke that reversed the tide of the Korean War—that immediately captured the popular imagination and continues to receive the lion’s share of attention from military historians and the military itself.11
More important, the amphibious withdrawal, generally speaking, has never
worked its way into U.S. doctrine in a meaningful way. Recognizing the requirement for seizing advanced bases in support of War Plan ORANGE, the U.S. Marine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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Corps in its 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations laid the intellectual
foundation for the great amphibious assaults of Campaign GRANITE in the Central Pacific, General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign, and the Mediterranean and European campaigns. By war’s conclusion, the amphibious assault,
even of the magnitude and complexity of that planned for the September 1945
invasion of Kyushu, largely had been rendered a well-structured problem.12
Conversely, the Tentative Manual did not contemplate amphibious withdrawals. The Navy’s 1938 Manual for Landing Operations, known as FTP-167, provided doctrinally only for planning and organizing the amphibious assault—ditto
for the Army’s 1941 Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5); both were
derived from the Tentative Manual. As it happened, World War II brought no
such reversals of fortune for U.S. forces. Although it was believed at certain junctures that, the situation being in doubt—notably, in the 1943 operations at Buna
(New Guinea) and Anzio (Italy)—amphibious extraction might be required, in
the event it was not, and no practical experience was gained. The extent to which
narratives of the various World War II withdrawals conducted by other militaries
then penetrated American military consciousness remains unclear, but it cannot
have been very great.
We are only slightly better off today. Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (its current edition was issued in August 2009),
recognizes and defines amphibious withdrawal but devotes only two pages, out
of more than two hundred, to it.13 The subsidiary 1989 JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine
for Landing Force Operations, last updated in 2004, granted the withdrawal
several more pages, but surprisingly the current (2010) JP 3-02.1, now entitled
Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation, fails even to mention withdrawal—
presumably “embarkation” (an aspect of movement) and “withdrawal” (a form
of maneuver) are to be treated as synonymous.
Perhaps a certain misplaced optimism now makes it difficult to imagine a
future situation in which an amphibious withdrawal might be appropriate. This
would be thin gruel for the commander who confronts the real-world necessity
for such an operation. Consequently, even though now sixty years in the past, the
Hungnam redeployment still warrants our careful consideration. It offers enduring lessons with regard to the problem of amphibious withdrawal; to the process
by which it was conceptualized, planned, and organized; to the practical value
of sea control to the conduct of land operations; and to effective approaches to
solving ill-structured military problems.
KOREA IN 1950
The Korean War was a land war, and yet, because of the theater’s geography and
the state of its communications infrastructure, friendly naval forces played an
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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essential role throughout. The Korean Peninsula, which runs roughly six hundred
miles north to south, has an east-to-west span of mostly less than two hundred
miles, leaving few locations more than a hundred miles from the coast. Its area
totals about eighty-three thousand square miles. The northern part is defended
by high mountains—a long mountain string isolates a major portion of the east
coast—and the west is marked by hills and river drainage basins. In 1950, notwithstanding forty years of Japanese occupation, land communications remained
difficult at best, with few sealed roads or railroads available to negotiate the difficult terrain. These few road and rail lines described more or less an X, with its
intersection at Seoul. Movement north and south, though problematic, was easier
than east and west.
Militarily usable ports, shown on map 1, then comprised, on the west coast,
Chinnampo, Inchon, and Kunsan, dominated by the great tidal range of the shallow Yellow Sea; on the east were Songjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Pusan, with
deep water just offshore. Sailing distances from major American naval installations in Japan to Korean ports were short enough to allow quick turnaround;
even Yokosuka, for example, on Japan’s east coast, lay only 655 sea miles from
Pusan. Terrain and hydrography afforded additional opportunity and flexibility
to forces capable of amphibious operations over the beach, as UN forces were.
In short, the factor of space greatly favored the force able to assert and maintain sea and air control, granting it thereby greater freedom of movement and
maneuver than a land-restricted opponent enjoyed. This essential fact had not
escaped General MacArthur, who had learned the lesson during World War II
and subsequently noted, in reference to the Inchon landing, that “deep envelopment, based upon surprise, which severs the enemy’s supply lines is, and always
has been, the decisive maneuver of warfare.”14 The general also properly understood that naval support secured his own lines of supply and provided the ability
to hold necessary beachheads more or less indefinitely.
United Nations forces had promptly established sea and air control in the first
days of the war and effectively exploited it for naval gunfire support, air strikes,
air-to-ground support, and amphibious lifts and assaults. During the first year
of the war North Korea and its Russian and Chinese sponsors made few attempts
at sea denial, but among these, notably, were the extensive sea mining at Wonsan,
the mining of Hungnam harbor, and the sowing of free-floating mines along the
east coast.15 The affected ports would play pivotal roles in the war.
THE ROAD TO HUNGNAM
Against this physical backdrop unfolded the events of the first six months of
the Korean War. North Korean forces attacked across the thirty-eighth parallel
in the small hours of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Four days later, General Douglas
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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MAP 1

Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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MacArthur, Commander, Far East Command, personally visited the active front
just south of Seoul and concluded that U.S. naval and air support would be insufficient by themselves to stop the invaders, who were already sweeping aside the
South Korean defenders. Absent immediate employment of U.S. ground troops,
the North Koreans would surely overrun the entire peninsula. Piecemeal insertion of small U.S. units by airlift was succeeded by disparate small sealifts from
Japan as MacArthur sought to buy time in order to mount an amphibious operation that would lay bare the North Koreans’ lines of communications and enable
their forces’ envelopment and destruction. Events moved rapidly, however: the
forces initially designated for a July assault at Inchon landed instead, on 17 July,
at Pohang Dong, in order to reinforce the fragile Pusan perimeter—enabled by
friendly sea and air control.
That perimeter held, and with the heroic deployment of the 1st Marine Division, speedy assembly of the requisite amphibious shipping over the next two
months, and organization of X Corps, the general realized his operational vision
with the 15 September Inchon landing. Although follow-on land operations
failed to envelop and destroy the North Koreans as intended, the latter’s offensive
largely culminated, and, mostly no longer fighting in large, organized units, they
fled north, pursued by Eighth Army units from the Pusan perimeter.
A second X Corps amphibious landing, this time on the east coast at Wonsan,
aimed to cut off and complete the destruction of the invaders. Unfortunately, the
Soviets had anticipated such an assault and had covertly commenced extensive
mining in late July, the clearance of which delayed landing X Corps, reembarked
after Inchon. The 1st Marine Division did not land until 26 October, while the
7th Infantry Division landed instead farther north, at Iwon. By that time the
ground war had already largely passed north of Wonsan, although guerrilla activity plagued the mountainous areas just inland.
Meanwhile, an early October United Nations resolution had expanded the
strategic objective from simply destroying the North Korean army and restoring
South Korea’s integrity to pacifying North Korea, which for the moment seemed
entirely possible. The X Corps commander, Major General “Ned” Almond, repeatedly urged his subordinate ground commanders to move faster toward the
northern reaches of Korea in the mountains adjacent to the Yalu River, which
they did, as did their Eighth Army counterparts in Korea’s west. Almond established his headquarters at Hamhung; the Navy cleared and opened the port at
Hungnam for its support.
The Chinese had other ideas, however. Feeling threatened by the looming presence of United Nations forces near their border, beginning in late October they
had secretly started moving vast numbers of ground troops into the mountains
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of northern Korea. American forces took Chinese prisoners almost immediately.
However, ambiguity initially obtained as to whether these were individual volunteers or from organized units. All doubt disappeared on 7 November, when
the 1st Marine Division was hit hard by sizable Chinese units. Nonetheless, each
succeeding estimate of Chinese strength was obsolete by the time it was published: 16,500 on 2 November; 100,000 a week later; 145,000 on the 15th; a range
of 142,000 to 167,000 on the 23rd.16 In fact, the Chinese had moved across the
border in even greater numbers than those, and it was now an entirely new war.
On 15 November, in concert with an all-out air effort against the Yalu River
bridges, MacArthur ordered X Corps to redirect its efforts to the west to assist
Eighth Army; the Marines were to attack west against the enemy’s line of supply
—apparently on the assumption that they would meet little resistance—while
other X Corps units moved north along the east coast. On 24 November, having
opened Chinnampo for naval logistic support, and supported by Fifth Air Force,
Eighth Army units attacked north from the Chongchon River—II Corps on the
left, IX Corps in the middle, and the ROK II Corps on the right—with orders to
link up with X Corps. Shortly, however, Chinese forces counterattacked heavily
against the ROK II Corps, which broke, exposing the IX Corps right flank. The
5th and 7th Marine Regiments, by this time nearing the Chosen Reservoir, met
heavy opposition and on the 27th were struck by two Chinese divisions.
“NO, GENERAL, WE DON’T KNOW HOW TO DO THAT”
The stage was now set for Eighth Army to commence its hasty retrograde movement in the west, while the Marines and fellow X Corps units were to begin their
fighting withdrawal back to Hungnam.17 Meanwhile, what of the Navy, which
was cast in a supporting role to the land forces and might very well have to pull
them all off the beach?
Within a week of the 7 November Chinese attack against the Marines, Vice
Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, had published his
Operation Plan 116-50, outlining general procedures for emergency evacuation
of UN forces from Korea to Japan. It included hydrographic data on Korean
ports, along with capabilities of available shipping, and it established command
relations for the redeployment. On 15 November, the commanding general of 1st
Marine Division, General Oliver P. Smith, conveyed his serious concern about the
ground situation to the chiefs of staff of Vice Admiral Joy and of Rear Admiral
James H. Doyle, commander of Amphibious Force, Far East, reinforcing the need
for contingency plans. Joy, at the prescient recommendation of his deputy chief
of staff, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke (who had arrived in Japan in late August),
began accumulating time-charter shipping in Japan rather than releasing it for
return to the United States.
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As was well known, and had just been proved once again in Korea, the U.S.
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army were well prepared to make amphibious assaults.
But they were not so well prepared for extractions. Although veteran amphibious
professionals all, the commanders and their staffs on the scene in Korea had neither previous directly comparable practical experience nor specifically applicable
doctrine to guide their thinking and decision making for Hungnam. Where the
assault had been rendered a well-structured one by World War II experience, the
withdrawal remained ill structured.
“Ill structured” problems are distinguished from “well structured” ones by
the degree to which their boundaries, constituent parts, and the relationships
among those parts are understood. That is, “ill” and “well structured” refer to the
fidelity of the decision maker’s representation of the problem to the existential
problem itself. Well-structured problems are readily recognizable and assignable to discrete categories and are therefore directly susceptible of solution by
computational means—that is, by selection and application of courses of action
from existing solution sets. The pre–World War II Tentative Manual for Landing Operations had begun the practical structuring of the amphibious assault,
which was understood to be necessary for acquiring the forward operating bases
required for the anticipated Pacific campaign against Japan; forces required,
phases, timing, sequencing, and synchronization were all roughed out. Careful
assessments of initial wartime amphibious experience refined that structuring:
shipping requirements, command relations, prelanding bombardment, coordination of close air support, and hydrographic intelligence were all adjusted. The
organization of boats for ship-to-shore movement was carefully reworked. By the
time of the June 1944 Marianas operations, the problems had been so thoroughly
structured that the plans were confidently executed against more or less alerted
opposition.
Conversely, ill-structured problems require decision makers to impose structures on them and to generate solutions for them—often at the same time. Typically, ill-structured problems are those that have not been encountered previously
in quite the same forms and for which no predetermined, explicit sets of ordered
responses (i.e., doctrines) exist.18 In war, it may be said, each opponent attempts
to present the other with enough surprise that the problem posed cannot be structured and made solvable in the time and with the forces available.
Thus, Japan’s systematic employment of thousands of kamikazes and hundreds of Shinyo and Renrakutai surface suicide boats against U.S. naval forces at
Okinawa for a time rendered ill structured the problem of force protection. The
practical challenge was simultaneously to figure out the structure of these threats
and to devise effective methods for dealing with them.19 Out of 1,300 ships involved at Okinawa, assaulted in the teeth of that dual challenge, the “Fleet That
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Came to Stay” sustained thirty-six ships sunk and another 368 damaged, with
more than 4,900 sailors killed.20
Neither do ill-structured problems remain constant while decision makers
seek to impose structure on them. Their components and their interrelationships
often change in a very short time frame, rendering initial efforts to understand
them obsolete—especially in war, which we understand as a complex interactive system. This was the case in November–December 1950 in Korea. Both the
operational situation and understanding of that situation changed rapidly. The
Navy’s practical challenge was to ascertain what rapidly changing conditions on
the ground and successive decisions by MacArthur and his principal ground
commanders would demand of it for support.21
The learning curve for ill-structured problems is generally very steep, and trial
and error constitute the main mechanism for generating information and reducing uncertainty about the problem—that is, converting it into a well-structured
one. Notably, the centralized, hierarchical organization structures effective for
well-structured problems do not fit ill-structured ones, which are more readily
addressed by decentralized, self-organizing systems, within which discretion resides at many points. Such systems allow experts to exercise their best judgment,
adjusting as required, while achieving unity of effort principally through lateral
communications.22 Even then, the most that can be attained in real time is to render such problems well structured in the small, while the larger problem remains
ill structured.23 The structure of the overall problem will likely only be known in
retrospect, after its attempted solution.
Although no name for the concept had yet been coined, Rear Admiral Doyle
implicitly grasped the challenges posed by an ill-structured problem and the relationship between type of problem and the command-and-control (C2, in today’s
shorthand) relations that would be appropriate. He proceeded accordingly.
Doyle realized that the unprecedented character of the potential problem
of extracting large numbers of troops and amounts of equipment from widely
separated hostile beaches on two coasts dictated against a programmed, standard
C2 structure below. As Commander, Task Force (CTF) 90, he had at his disposal
Amphibious Groups 1 and 3. Facing the prospect of simultaneous retrograde
movements by Eighth Army on the west coast and by X Corps on the east, Doyle
retained overall command of the redeployments but directed Amphibious Group
3, under Rear Admiral Lyman Thackrey, to attend to Eighth Army at Chinnampo
and Inchon, leaving Amphibious Group 1, under his direct command, to support
X Corps at Songjin, Wonsan, and Hungnam.
At MacArthur’s request, Amphibious Group 1, under Doyle, had arrived in
Japan in early June 1950 to train Eighth Army in battalion-level amphibious operations. The day North Korea attacked, it was conducting a landing exercise at
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Sagami Wan. Initially little more than a token training unit, during the months
preceding Hungnam the group grew many times over to become a full-fledged
amphibious force.
Doyle was a distinguished veteran amphibious officer, arguably the most
amphibiously experienced serving senior officer. He had been Admiral R. Kelly
Turner’s operations officer at Guadalcanal, 1942–43, and had then served in
Admiral Ernest King’s Commander in Chief Amphibious Section, 1943–45,
including work on the Joint Amphibious Warfare Committee. In early 1948 he
had assumed command of the Amphibious Training Command at Coronado,
California; in January 1950 he reported as Commander, Amphibious Group 1.
Officers with extensive World War II amphibious experience populated
Doyle’s staff. They were overqualified and technically too senior for their billets—
the fortuitous result of a difficult civilian economy and a greatly drawn-down
Navy. They knew in detail the intricacies of amphibious planning. They were
used to working together, having experienced little turnover in the preceding
two years, and had planned and executed three major amphibious exercises in
the spring of 1950, followed by the three major Korean amphibious operations.
The admiral knew his staff, its members knew each other, and all had developed
effective working relationships.
Doyle, in his capacity as CTF 90, had a second capable amphibious force in
Thackrey’s Amphibious Group 3. It had arrived in Korea shortly following Inchon. Thackrey had run that port’s operations after its capture and in October
landed the Army’s 7th Division at Iwon.
Mobile Training Team Able of the Amphibious Training Command’s Troop
Training Unit had embarked with Amphibious Group 1 when it went to Japan.
Commanded by Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Team Able’s officers and
men had worked together for some time and were personally known to Doyle.
Team Able had been integral to all three previous amphibious operations. Doyle
had seconded the unit to the 1st Cavalry Division (which lacked amphibiousexperienced personnel) to plan that division’s part in the Pohang Dong landing.
Doyle then placed the unit on a similar temporary assignment with X Corps for
the Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon operations; Forney served as the corps’s deputy
chief of staff. He and his men did the bulk of that command’s amphibious planning for those operations.24 Thus, Team Able and Amphibious Group 1’s staffs
were no strangers to each other; neither were Team Able and X Corps staffs
strangers. Doyle later commented that Forney “could get along with anyone—
and without compromising himself. This facility proved invaluable, for the corps
commander [Almond] was at best prickly, at worst arrogant and overbearing.”25
Conversely, Doyle and Major General Smith had quickly developed a close and
mutually respectful relationship in planning and executing the Inchon and
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Wonsan-Iwon operations, which was mirrored in the effective working relationships between their staffs (Smith and most of his staff had sailed on board Doyle’s
flagship for both operations).
Secure in the knowledge that they were seasoned professionals who had
learned their craft not in peacetime training but in the hard schools of the Southwest and Central Pacific, Mediterranean, and European campaigns of World War
II, Doyle, as we shall see shortly, would grant his subordinates considerable independence to make such arrangements for the Hungnam redeployment as their
professional experience suggested were appropriate. The several elements were
then to coordinate as required to achieve unity of effort through direct lateral
communication.
Doyle understood that effectively addressing the problem of amphibious
withdrawal also required that he be afforded by his own superiors considerable
leeway in the exercise of command. Shortly after October 1950’s Wonsan-Iwon
operation, Doyle plainly told his “old and very close friend” Vice Admiral Joy
that he could not and would not come under the Seventh Fleet commander, Vice
Admiral Arthur D. Struble, in any future operation. (Figure 1 shows the Naval
Forces Far East command organization obtaining in November 1950.) Doyle’s
conflict with Struble, eight years his senior, no doubt had roots in personalities,
and perhaps in competition for credit, but it extended well beyond into profound
differences in professional philosophy and practice.26
For Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon, Doyle had reported directly to Struble. During these operations, Doyle felt, Struble had regularly interfered in his exercise
of command. Consequently, judging that he needed Doyle’s expertise more than
Struble’s, Joy issued on 13 November a preliminary plan for evacuation of UN
forces from Korea that established a naval task organization as shown in figure
2. It had Doyle reporting directly to him, while granting Doyle considerable discretion and unusually wide-ranging responsibilities, not only for the redeployment itself but for shipping protection, control of air support and naval gunfire
support in the embarkation areas, and maintenance of the blockade along the
Korean east coast. Joy directed Struble to provide support to Doyle.27 At the same
time, this unusual arrangement allowed Struble freedom of maneuver and the
ability to address whatever threats the Soviets and Chinese might pose from the
sea, either to Doyle’s operations or, in the worst case, to Formosa or Japan.
Subsequently, however, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Forrest Sherman—who believed Hungnam carried potential for great disaster—
intervened. He did not want an amphibious commander to control the fast carriers. He was also well aware of continuing friction between Struble (who was his
protégé) and Doyle. Sherman had previously weighed in with Joy after July 1950’s
Pohang Dong landing, and as a result the command relations that had obtained
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for both Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon had been those acceptable to Struble (but
not to Doyle). For his part, Doyle believed that “Sherman knew little, if anything,
about amphibious operations”; of his own relationship with the CNO, he later
commented, “We never were mutual admirers.”28
Sherman directed Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, to give
Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commander, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, verbal orders (of which Joy was ultimately made aware) to go to Korea (his
fifth trip there) and assume command at Hungnam if, in his judgment, Doyle was
not executing effectively. Doyle learned of Shepherd’s orders only years later.29
Major General Smith knew only that Shepherd was the CNO’s representative at
Hungnam.30
In the end, however, Joy’s C2 structure stood, with its great leeway granted
Doyle to organize and execute the redeployment operations, as well as the forces
requisite to the job—amphibious shipping, naval gunfire ships, escort-carrierbased aircraft, and Marine ground-based air. Doyle coordinated additional air
and naval gunfire support with Struble as needed. Although the Air Force did
not contribute air-to-ground support to X Corps, it provided night “heckler”
coverage, and its transports proved essential for evacuating the wounded from
Chosen Reservoir.31
FIGURE 1
NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, KOREA—NOVEMBER 1950
COMNAVFE
COMNAVFORJAP
CTF 96
VADM C. T. Joy

Task Force 95
UN Blockading and Escort Force
RADM A. E. Smith

Seventh Fleet
VADM A. D. Struble

Task Force 77
Striking Force
Task Force 79
Service Squadron 3
Task Force 72
Formosa Patrol
Task Group 70.6
Fleet Air Wing 1

Task Force 90
PhibFor FE
RADM J. H. Doyle

TG 96.1 Fleet Activities Japan–Korea
TG 96.2 Fleet Air Japan
TG 96.3 SCAJAP
TG 96.4 Service Group
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group
TG 96.9 Submarine Group

TG 95.1 West Coast Group
TG 95.2 East Coast Group
TE 95.21 East Coast Element 1
TE 95.22 East Coast Element 2
TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group
TG 95.7 ROK Navy
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FIGURE 2
NAVAL TASK ORGANIZATION FOR HUNGNAM—DECEMBER 1950
COMNAVFE/CTF 96
VADM C. T. Joy

Task Force 90
RADM J. H. Doyle

Seventh Fleet
VADM A. D. Struble

TE 90.00 Flagship Element CAPT C. A. Printup
1 AGC

TF 77 Fast Carrier Force
RADM E. C. Ewen

TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element
CDR R. W. Arudt
TACRON 1

TG 77.1 Support Group
CAPT I. T. Duke
1 BB, 1 CL, 1 CLAA

TE 90.02 Repair/Salvage Element CDR L. C. Conwell
1 ARG, 1 ARL, 2 ARS, 1 ATF

TG 77.2 Screening Group
CAPT J. R. Clark
17–22 DD

TE 90.03 Control Element LCDR C. E. Allmon
2 APD, 1 PCEC
TG 90.2 Transport Group CAPT S. G. Kelly
TE 90.21 Transport Element CAPT A. E. Jarrell
3 APA, 3 AKA, 2 APD, 1 PCEC, 3 LSD (W/9 LSU),
11 LST, 27 SCAJAP LST, MSTS shipping assigned
TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group
RADM R. H. Hillenkoetter
1 CA, 4 DD, 3 LSMR, plus 1 CA, 1 DD from TG 95.2

TG 77.3 Carrier Group
RADM E. C. Ewen
3–4 CV
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group
RADM R. W. Ruble
1–2 CVE, 0–1 CVL, 3–8 DD
TG 79.2 Logistic Support Group
CAPT B. L. Austin
Units assigned from Service
Squadron 3 and Service Division 31

TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and Minesweeping Group
RADM J. M. Higgins
1 CA, 4 DD, 6 PF, plus DMS, AM, AMS from TG 95.6

ACCELERATING EVENTS ON THE GROUND
On 28 November Joy alerted Doyle to the high probability of major evacuation
operations. Doyle immediately commenced planning for “redeployment by water
of own and friendly troops in Korea either as an administrative ‘outloading’ or
a general emergency based on Joy’s OpPlan 116-50.” Joy advised Doyle to put
his ships, then still in Japan, on six-hour notice for movement to Korea. Doyle
in turn directed his ships to assemble in Sasebo (a short 165 miles from Pusan)
and issued Operation Order 19-50 for planning purposes. His basic plan was for
Amphibious Group 3 to conduct west-coast operations and Amphibious Group 1
east-coast operations, while overall responsibility remained with Doyle as Commander, Task Force 90.
On 30 November, MacArthur directed X Corps to concentrate in the Hamhung–
Hungnam area, while Eighth Army retired southward to Pyongyang and Seoul.
Doyle now placed all ships in port on two-hour notice, and Amphibious Group 3
departed Japan for Inchon. However, Eighth Army’s rapid southward movement
had already uncovered Chinnampo, necessitating redirection of the group to that
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port. Late on 3 December the transport group steamed up the eighty-four-mile
swept channel to Chinnampo, on the assumption that an evacuation was imminent but without specifics on troops and equipment to be extracted, the tactical
situation, or even who was to command the operation.
Fortunately, Thackrey discovered that shipping already in place at Chinnampo was adequate to requirements. He had extracted 1,800 Army and Navy
port personnel and 5,900 ROK troops, along with civilian refugees who showed
up unannounced, by late 4 December.32 At Inchon, from 7 December to 5 January, when the port was closed and destroyed even as Chinese troops entered the
city, Thackrey outloaded 4,693 UN and 63,220 Korean military personnel, 1,404
vehicles, and 62,144 tons of cargo, along with 64,200 Korean civilians, all subsequently landed at Pusan.33
For the moment, it remained unclear whether United Nations forces would
have to withdraw entirely from Korea to Japan or could and would maintain
lodgments at Pusan and Hungnam throughout the winter. However, on 1 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur to withdraw X Corps and
“coordinate” that movement with Eighth Army, which was to hold its position
across the waist of Korea. On 7 December high-level discussions in Tokyo modified that plan to have Eighth Army hold Seoul until it became necessary to retire
upon Pusan.34 The following day, when the senior Navy and Marine commanders
conferred on board Doyle’s flagship, they still had to consider two possibilities:
that of establishing and maintaining a lodgment at Hungnam and the more likely
one of withdrawal. Fortunately, the next day the Joint Chiefs approved the revised
plan, and the decision was made to redeploy south.
Such fluidity does not conduce to easy operational planning, but Doyle and
his staff met the challenge, having preliminary plans already in hand both for defending a perimeter at Hungnam and for withdrawing from that port, as well as
from other east- and west-coast ports. Now they knew they would be executing a
withdrawal: “Troops and supplies that had reached the theater through three ports
and troops that had arrived overland now had to be funneled out through a single
harbor; personnel and gear that had come in over a period of two months were to
be removed in the space of two weeks.”35 At the same time, the amphibious forces
had to continue unloading supplies required by the withdrawing troops and those
supplies necessary to the defense of the perimeter around Hungnam.
Doyle and his staff initially made the analogy between the operant conditions
of the redeployment problem and an “amphibious landing in reverse.” Suppose
one filmed an amphibious assault and then ran it backward—what would the
operation look like? It proved an apt connection and provided the starting point
(but only that) for imposing a structure on the problem and devising a course of
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action for its solution. Doyle decided that excess supplies and supporting troops
would embark first; thereafter, as the beachhead shrank with the embarkation of
combat forces, naval gunfire and air support would ensure that there was no diminution of combat power ashore. At the conclusion, naval bombardment would
be the only force “ashore.”36 Doyle had previously commenced mine clearance at
Hungnam to expand the safe anchorage area, provide an expanded safe channel
from the anchorage to seaward, and establish channels for gunfire-support ships.
On 1 December X Corps reported that 3rd Infantry Division at Wonsan was
under heavy enemy pressure and that road and rail lines between there and
Hungnam had been cut, and it requested an amphibious redeployment of the
division. Doyle decided to conduct this initial evacuation as a small-scale test
of his tentative plans and procedures for Hungnam. It would illuminate the
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed staged reduction of the defense perimeter around the Hungnam harbor—in effect, telling him whether or not he
had gotten about right the structure of the problem. In the event, at Wonsan the
evacuation plan was simple and direct. The troops ashore described around the city
an arc whose radius they progressively reduced as supplies and personnel within the
beachhead loaded and left. The fire support ships isolated Wonsan by shellfire, fired
any observed missions [i.e., spotted by controllers, in observation aircraft] requested,
and at night provided random harassing and interdiction fires on pre-selected targets
and fired star shells for battlefield illumination.37

Fortunately, it was already clear when Doyle arrived at Wonsan on 4 December
that there was no significant enemy pressure and that all but the rear elements of
3rd Division had already moved by road to Hungnam. Consequently, he revised
lift requirements downward. Ultimately, 3,800 3rd Division troops, seven thousand refugees, 1,146 vehicles, and ten thousand tons of cargo outloaded by ship
from Wonsan from 3 to 5 December.
The experiment validated Doyle’s initial hypothesis, and his staff began preparing detailed plans for Hungnam based on lessons learned there. Subordinate
units proceeded simultaneously in their own planning, communicating continually with Doyle and his staff, who remained on board his flagship, USS Mount
McKinley (AGC 7), anchored in Hungnam harbor. On 6 December, Doyle sent a
small force from Wonsan to lift ROK I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam. Operations at Songjin closed out on 10 December.
ORGANIZATION AT HUNGNAM
As map 2 indicates, Hungnam was well suited to serve as the principal port for
the redeployment. As one historian describes it, the

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012

127

122

Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 1

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

city of Hungnam, manufacturing center as well as seaport, lies in the northwestern
corner of the Korean Gulf near the delta of the Songchon River. Although Hamhung,
its inland satellite, is an important road and railway center, Hungnam is the larger of
the two, with a population in 1950 a third again that of Wonsan. The bay on which
the city lies is open to the south, but the inner harbor is protected by a 2,200-foot
wharf with four fathoms of water and by a breakwater. Other smaller wharves existed, as did heavy loading equipment, developed to handle the products of the city’s
chemical industry. As at Wonsan, a 100-fathom curve runs 30 miles offshore and the
approaches are easily mined.38

In addition to the inner port facilities, shown in map 3, which would allow effective employment of standard cargo and transport shipping, Hungnam possesses beaches immediately adjacent to the port, shown in map 4, that were entirely
suitable in their hydrography for beaching amphibious shipping and were readily
defensible within the planned perimeter. Nearby Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and
4) served as the primary base for the 1st Marine Air Wing, which was to provide a
major portion of the close air support and combat air patrol. Equally important,
X Corps headquarters had been established and remained at Hamhung, facilitating easy communication between the ground commander and the amphibious
commander and their staffs.39 Moreover, in order to facilitate the logistic support
MAP 2

Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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of X Corps, beginning on 7 November the Navy had addressed the Soviet-laid
mines at Hungnam, declaring the port open four days later. Thus, the port was
well located, suitable to the endeavor, and for Doyle a known quantity.
The amphibious group staff held an operations planning conference on board
Mount McKinley on loading and ship control on the afternoon of 9 December,
followed by another planning conference ashore with representatives of X Corps
and the Army 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. Firm plans for loading were made
during a final staff conference that night and were approved by Doyle. The Control and Loading Plan, based on a staff study of the harbor’s physical capabilities,
established a series of control posts, for which a special task organization was
formed. Doyle assigned to each control station the most able and experienced
officer and enlisted personnel available from the staffs of CTF 90; the Military Sea
Transportation Service (MSTS), Hungnam; Fleet Activities, Hungnam; and other
naval units. “The general experience and ‘know how’ of all hands was utilized to
the utmost as no one present [had] previous actual experience with an operation
of this type.”40
The CTF 90 operations section (on board Mount McKinley) constituted one
of the control stations; it coordinated all ship movements, assigned anchorages,
issued docking instructions, and prepared and issued sailing orders for all Navy
and SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority, Japan) shipping.41 It also supervised
operations of all other control stations. MSTS activities at Hungnam were integrated with the operations section on the flagship, with responsibility for all
MSTS shipping engaged in the operation. Physical colocation facilitated easy,
close, and clear communication between the two entities.
A radio-equipped harbor-control vessel stationed in the port managed shipping, twenty-four hours a day. An officer boarded each MSTS-operated ship immediately on its arrival to assess its load status, capacity, amount and condition
of loading equipment, and any peculiarities relevant to loading. This information
went to CTF 90 Operations by radio. All such ships were directed to be ready for
movement on immediate, two-hour, or later notice as required.
On 9 December a X Corps embarkation control group was established to
provide overall Army supervision of corps loading, with a control officer, an
executive officer, representatives from each of the corps’s technical services, and
the CTF 90 staff combat cargo officer as liaison officer. Transient members, as
required, included embarkation control groups from 1st Marine Division, 7th
Division, 3rd Division, and ROK I Corps. As during the Inchon and WonsanIwon landings, Colonel Forney’s Marines did the actual planning for X Corps.
Forney himself served as the shore-based control and loading officer, performing with “consummate skill.” Set up in a shed on the docks, Forney assigned his
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MAP 3
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officers and enlisted personnel to key positions in this control station, “where
their four months on the X Corps staff resulted in excellent relationships.” Doyle
found that General Almond “cooperated fully and ensured that his subordinates
followed his example. He established X Corps embarkation priority as personnel,
[then] vehicles, [then] equipment, supplies, and refugees. But he never objected to
departures from that order, knowing that we had good reason when we did so.”42
Forney and his staff “selected the X Corps units to be loaded on the basis
of available tactical and administrative information and assigned shipping in
consultation with the operations section of TF 90. Port operating units were
then advised of dockside requirements, the loading section ground out its plans,
the movement section got the traffic down to the water, and the rations people
laid down these useful items alongside.”43 This control group maintained nearly
constant direct telephone communication with all relevant units and CTF 90
Operations.
Each corps unit provided its embarkation control group with a “readiness for
loading” report (covering personnel, vehicles, and bulk cargo, etc.) prior to its
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time to commence loading as promulgated in the master schedule, which hinged
on the tactical situation. X Corps broke the report data into shipping requirements, as advised by the combat cargo officer. CTF 90 Operations assigned suitable shipping, on the basis of these requirements and available berths. The embarkation control group was provided the identities of the ships assigned, along
with data on their capacity, booms, etc., and planned a “paper load.” Shortages
and overages of shipping space were immediately reported to CTF 90 Operations,
and the embarkation control group adjusted plans as necessary.
The port director maintained operational control of actual docking and undocking of all ships and of the movement of all shipping in the inner harbor.
Three qualified CTF 90 staff officers were assigned to Port Director Control. A
radio-equipped landing craft assigned to the port director (and shared with the
beachmaster, described below) served as a dispatch boat. Ships moored at one of
seven berthing spaces alongside four docks. Experimentation quickly led to procedures for the most efficient use of these limited spaces (including, importantly,
double-banking ships at the docks). Two radio-equipped Army yard tugs made
it possible to dock and undock ships rapidly.44
CTF 90 Operations advised the port director that a given ship was to be
docked at a given berth as a replacement for the ship there, then directed it to
proceed from its anchorage and wait in the vicinity of the breakwater for a pilot,
who docked the ship. Doyle and his staff contrived so to “time the process that
the new ship reached her berth at the same time the first troops and supplies to
be loaded came alongside,” and they usually met that goal.45 The embarkation
control liaison officer advised CTF 90 Operations of the time a given ship would
finish loading, and the latter assigned it a “chop time” that was given to the port
director. At that time the ship was undocked and got under way.
The Beachmaster Control Unit controlled beaching and retracting all tank
landing ships (LSTs) in the LST beaching area (Green Beaches 1 and 2; see map
4), a function analogous to that of the port director. An MSTS officer with a
great deal of previous LST experience, assigned as beachmaster, piloted most of
the SCAJAP LSTs onto the beach (where they would open their bow doors, drop
a ramp, and “onload” vehicles and cargo directly, backing off the beach, with the
help of an anchor dropped astern, when ready). The beaching area could handle
eleven LSTs simultaneously; additionally, three LSTs could be berthed at Dock
No. 4 when the Green Beaches were full, or immediately adjacent to that dock
at Blue Beach. CTF 90 Operations delivered sailing orders to each LST before it
was loaded. Once the Shore Party (below) notified the beachmaster that an LST
was loaded, the latter forwarded that information to the CTF 90 liaison officer
at X Corps headquarters by radio. The liaison officer then obtained final clearance for sailing and in turn informed the beachmaster, who directed the LST to
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Hundreds of aviation gasoline drums await evacuation on the Hungnam docks, 14 December 1950. USS LST-898 is in the center, with a LCU at right and the
harbor entrance control frigate (PF) in the background. View looking northeast from Blue Beach across the inner harbor.
U.S. Navy

execute its sailing orders (and assisted, with boats, in its retraction from the beach
if required). Additional assistance was provided by a SCAJAP headquarters staff
officer temporarily assigned to CTF 90 Operations.
A control officer and small staff (on board the Control Ship) directed movement of all utility landing ships (LSUs) and smaller craft in the inner harbor. The
control officer also assisted in directing movements of the LSTs, in coordination
with the beachmaster and the port director. This was a busy station, twenty-four
hours a day.
Doyle assigned his staff civil engineer to the Army 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, which served as the Shore Party—responsible for physical aspects of the
loading. The civil engineer liaison officer advised the brigade in order to expedite
loading and kept CTF 90 Operations informed of loading progress in real time.
Doyle later commented that this “Liaison Officer solved any problems which
arose and was extremely valuable as an ‘expediter’ who had direct contact with all
Army and Navy Control Stations connected with the operation.”46
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A truck convoy moves along a beach road to the evacuation beach, 18 December 1950. Two Japanese-manned LSTs and USS LSM-419 are loading.
U.S. Navy

Each control element worked independently on those matters that it could
handle without reference to the other elements and coordinated with the others
when required. However, given the extremely compressed time frame, the discretion Doyle granted his subordinates would have been for naught absent a simple,
effective, real-time communications system: the admiral believed that “the most
important factor in the operation of the control organization was the establishment of special primary and secondary very-high-frequency voice radio circuits
directly connecting Control Stations.” All stations used the primary circuit except
the station manned by the CTF 90 liaison officer at the X Corps embarkation
control group, who had near-exclusive use of the secondary circuit. Ultimately,
however, both circuits were used whenever necessary due to difficulties in communication. A simple numerical code was employed to identify ships easily and
still maintain security.
Qualified operators served on each station on both circuits, but in order to
eliminate delay or misunderstanding in operational traffic, “all except routine
messages of minor importance were transmitted by the officers concerned speaking
directly to each other.”47 Officers spoke directly to other officers and therefore
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Amphibious shipping beached at Hungnam during the evacuation, December 1950. LCUs present include LCU-520, LCU-638, LCU-742, & LCU-783.
U.S. Navy

solved problems, kept everyone concerned informed, made or obtained decisions rapidly, and issued orders in the most efficient manner possible under the
circumstances.
In the harbor, CTF 90 Operations primarily used visual signals (flag hoist and
flashing light) to handle administrative traffic and to communicate with MSTS
ships present. During 7–24 December, Mount McKinley’s signal bridge handled
1,124 outgoing and 1,104 incoming dispatches. Overall, 44,750 dispatches were
handled on the flagship during the period, including 24,630 on the tactical circuits and 17,982 in Radio One (the ship’s “radio shack”). Such communications
arrangements permitted ready adjustment and adaptation as circumstances
changed and as new, unanticipated problems arose. At the same time, individual
control posts were not overburdened with information they did not require to
conduct their activities.
“WALK, DON’T RUN TO THE NEAREST EXIT”
Because the outloading could function smoothly without Doyle’s direct supervision, he was able to focus on “preventing the enemy from establishing itself close
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enough to our troops to cause casualties. To that end [he] used air attacks and
naval gunfire to maintain the necessary separation. Basically, [he] put in front of
the U.N. units a zone of fire through which the enemy could not pass.”48
Doyle directly controlled the naval gunfire support element. From 7 to 15 December he stationed ships of this element where, as shown on map 2, they could
simultaneously deliver emergency “call fire” (that is, requested by troops without
notice) for X Corps and defend local shipping against enemy air attack. On 15
December, stationed in the assigned mineswept channels (extending ten miles
north and south of Hungnam), the ships of the element began deep-support
fires (while X Corps artillery provided close support)—principally eight-inch
interdiction and harassing fires and five-inch illumination rounds (enemy
forces tended to press on friendly lines at night). As the perimeter contracted,
the gunfire support ships moved to closer stations as required for direct troop
support. Both observation and fighter aircraft located targets of opportunity and
supplemented ground observation. Missouri (BB 63) arrived at Hungnam on 24
December to provide additional fire.49
The 1st Marine Air Wing at Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and 4) provided air
support during the initial phase of the operation. It controlled all air support
(including carrier-based) and served as the tactical air control center until 15
December, when Yongpo was uncovered by the contracting perimeter and it was
flown out. The center moved to Mount McKinley, and CTF 90 assumed control
of all air support within a thirty-five-mile radius of Hungnam, including TF 77
aircraft and Task Group (TG) 96.8 escort carrier aircraft, night hecklers from the
Air Force and TF 77, and all reconnaissance and transient aircraft (see figure 2).
Throughout, Marine pilots in observation aircraft provided forward air control
—they “understood the requirements of the troops and the capabilities of the
covering aircraft and their armament loads.”50 Detachments from the Marine Air
and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) served with X Corps Army
units to maintain radio contact with the forward air controllers, supporting aircraft, and naval gunfire ships—the “ANGLICO’s had the expertise necessary to
call for and control the available support.”51 At sea, under TF 77, there were never
fewer than four Essex-class carriers to provide air support, coordinated by CTF
90 Operations with CTF 77, as for the July 1950 Pohang Dong landing. Doyle
handled air and naval gunfire communications in the manner prescribed for assault amphibious operations.
Doyle also shifted from shore-based to seaborne logistics, using floating petroleum and ammunition dumps, along with an evacuation center and a prisonerof-war camp afloat. He ordered life jackets and debarkation ladders. He directed
Thackrey to send all available attack transports and attack cargo ships (along with
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one dock landing ship, or LSD) from Inchon to Hungnam and requested that Joy
provide ten empty cargo ships daily at Hungnam until further notice.52
Doyle published his loading and control plan for Hungnam on 11 December.
He issued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 December, incorporating his Operation
Order 19-50 and consolidating previous dispatches. Plans for gunfire support
and air support were finalized in coordination with the TF 77 operations officer, X Corps, and Commander, Cruiser Division 1.53 Operations would proceed
twenty-four hours per day.
That same day, Doyle assumed direct command of Hungnam port functions
and commenced loading X Corps personnel, vehicles, and supplies. General Almond had proposed that the 1st Marine Division provide security for the operation. However, because the Marines had already borne the hardest fighting, Doyle
insisted that they load first, while the 3rd Division supplied security, with the 7th
Division taking over portions of the perimeter until the ROK I Corps cleared the
port; then the last U.S. division would embark.54
The operation continued to present surprises. Doyle’s staff had initially estimated, for example, based on Wonsan, that lift would be required for twenty-five
thousand refugees. The number evacuated grew to almost four times that number. Aside from the shipping they required, the refugees had to be fed and kept
warm while awaiting embarkation. Similarly, when the redeployment order was
received 9 December, ships were still unloading supplies; some of the supplies
were required to maintain the defensive perimeter, and the necessity for unloading them tied up some port facilities for several days. Doyle halted unloading
when possible, but then his loading officer had to devise loading plans for ships
that were not empty at the outset.
The 12th showed a marked acceleration of the loading operations. By the next
day, 55 percent of the personnel, 40 percent of the vehicles, and 70 percent of the
bulk cargo of the Marines had been loaded. Doyle finalized plans for lifting the
ROK I Corps from Hungnam to Samchok, as requested by X Corps. The corps
had estimated a requirement for twelve thousand personnel and “a few vehicles,”
and accordingly three ships had been committed. However, X Corps continued
to revise the lift requirements upward—now twenty-five thousand personnel,
seven hundred vehicles (including four hundred two-and-a-half-ton trucks), fifty
tractors, and other heavy equipment. Consequently, additional shipping was allocated. Intelligence studies and aerial reconnaissance on 13 December led to the
selection of Bokuko Ko as the landing site for the Korean units. Doyle formed TG
90.8 for that purpose on 16 December. It departed for Bokuko Ko on 17 December and commenced disembarking the following day. Meanwhile, by the 14th, 90
percent of the Marines’ personnel, 95 percent of their vehicles, and 97 percent of
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their bulk cargo had been loaded. The division sailed for Pusan the following day,
and the 7th Division commenced loading.
Loading continued on the 17th, amid forty-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures. Ships dragged anchor, and small boats drifted loose in and out
of the harbor. Winds reached sixty knots in the open sea, and all carrier flight operations were suspended.55 At 1600 (four o’clock in the afternoon) on 19 December, General Almond embarked on Mount McKinley, and command of all shore
operations, including defense of the perimeter, passed to Doyle. The admiral
pointedly told the general, so that there could be no mistake, “You understand . . .
that these troops are now under my command.”56 It was precisely the reciprocal
of the procedure by which during an amphibious assault command passes to the
ground commander once he has established his command post ashore and so
notified the amphibious commander. At the same time, 3rd Division took over
the ground defenses.
By 20 December Doyle was confident enough of the operation’s trajectory to
set the 24th as the tentative “reverse” D-day—or “Dog Day,” as it was then known.
On the 20th, 7th Division completed loading and 3rd Division commenced
loading. By the 22nd it emerged that sufficient shipping was available to outload
another four thousand tons of ammunition and thirteen railroad boxcars (South
Korea desperately needed rolling stock). Instructions for the Dog Day embarkation were completed and distributed. On the 23rd, additional refugees went on
board U.S. ships, and Missouri reported to its assigned fire support station. Doyle
informed the beachmaster of prospective movements and the beaching sequence
of LSTs and LSUs on Dog Day. For the final withdrawal, Doyle maintained a naval gunfire barrage in a zone 2,500 yards wide about three thousand yards from
the beaches and harbor. Call fires in addition to this barrage prevented enemy
movement through the zone during the day. Doyle ordered the port director to
commence undocking all ships at the quays at 2000 (8 PM) and increased harassing fire from naval gunfire support ships. When the last friendly troops were off
the beaches, destructive fires rained down on the port area. Particular attention
was given the destruction of the remaining railroad cars.57 Hungnam port closed
at 2300. The beaches remained to be cleared the next day.
Early on the day of Christmas Eve, Doyle confirmed H-hour as 1100 (11 AM).
Simultaneously, aircraft napalmed a hundred to three hundred enemy troops
who had begun to press on the perimeter. As shown on map 4, the perimeter
was progressively and rapidly reduced until at 1100 initial combat elements, less
the covering forces, commenced loading into the LSTs and LSUs. At 1217, Army
personnel prematurely detonated two Pink Beach ammunition dumps, causing
loss of personnel and boats. By 1405, friendly forces had cleared all beaches. Five
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USS LSMR-404 and USS Begor (APD-127) stand by as U.N. troops demolish the Hungnam port facilities at the end of the evacuation, on 24 December 1950.
U.S. Navy

minutes later, demolition charges were detonated around the waterfront of the
inner harbor. At 1457, the hospital ship Consolation (AH 15) got under way, and
the general sortie from the harbor commenced. Mount McKinley departed at
1632, and the operation concluded. Not a single friendly had been left behind.58
{LINE-SPACE}
In the end, the Chinese and North Koreans elected not to attempt any serious
interference with operations at Hungnam—in part, because the 1st Marine Division and Navy and Marine air had combined with Old Man Winter to render
their forces substantially ineffective, and also, no doubt, because they understood
that “their losses would certainly have been greater than they could have hoped
to inflict. Fire power from the sea would have dwarfed what they had already
absorbed during their attack on the Marines at Chosen.”59 More ammunition
was ultimately expended at Hungnam than at the Inchon landing—but then, the
operation lasted much longer, plenty of ammunition was available, and as Doyle
later pointed out, powder and metal were much less valuable than human life.60
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Koreans prepare to board an LST during the Hungnam evacuation, 19 December 1950. Other Koreans are transferring their belongings from an ox cart to a
fishing boat, at left. Taken on Green Beach.
U.S. Navy

During fourteen days at Hungnam, the U.S. Navy embarked and redeployed
105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of supplies (including fuel and ammunition stores). It also lifted 91,000 civilian refugees to safety
—a number limited only by time and available shipping. Marine and Air Force
air transports flew out an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of
cargo. The number and types of ships employed reveal the operation’s magnitude
and complexity: one amphibious command ship (AGC), three attack transports,
three attack cargo ships, eight MSTS-operated transports and one MSTS cargo
ship, five heavy-lift time-charter vessels, fifty-one regular time-charter vessels
(Victory ships), two SCAJAP time-charter vessels, eleven U.S. Navy LSTs, twentysix SCAJAP LSTs, and three LSDs. Most vessels made multiple trips in and out of
Hungnam; for example, thirty-seven LSTs made a total of eighty-one trips.
A DECENTRALIZED, SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEM
Doyle later commented that the command relationships and operational procedures for Hungnam were unique to that special situation and probably ought not
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to be used as a template for future amphibious operations. Insofar as the principal factors (and their interrelationships) of future operations were not largely
identical to those that obtained at Hungnam, the admiral was absolutely correct.
At another level, however, the admiral was quite wrong and altogether too
modest. The key to the remarkable military feat at Hungnam resided in Doyle’s
implicit recognition that, however experienced they were in amphibious operations, he and his staff had never before encountered a problem even remotely
resembling that presented by Hungnam, nor did amphibious doctrine provide
any foundation. That is, he and his staff correctly assessed that they faced an illstructured problem—although they did not have that name for it.
Doyle’s decision to devise an ad hoc plan and C2 organization predicated on
the analogy of an amphibious operation executed in reverse therefore proved
pivotal. That approach allowed experts to exercise their professional judgment
freely in their areas of responsibility, to impose structure on the problems each
confronted and generate solutions for them, and to communicate informally,
directly, and quickly with others whose advice, cooperation, and coordination
were necessary. Doyle essentially established and maintained a decentralized,
self-organizing system that proved highly adaptive and flexible, well suited to the
primary constraint on the operation—time. Experimentation and rapid learning,
inevitably essential to the solution of ill-structured problems, were the rule, not
conformity to preconceived notions of doctrine and to military formalities. Even
the plan and organization themselves resulted from unusually consultative staff
planning conferences that facilitated input from those with the requisite expertise. The profound lesson of Hungnam is to be found in the manner in which the
operation was approached and organized.
UN control of adjacent sea and air enabled Doyle the complete freedom of
action sought by every commander but rarely attained by any. The responsible
naval commanders correctly understood that they could hold a perimeter at
Hungnam as long as they wished to do so, given established and sustainable control of the sea and air, and the ready availability of naval air and gunfire support.
This allowed United Nations forces to control the timing and completion of a
well organized and well executed extraction. Conversely, the enemy was limited
to ground action only, and that by an already attrited force without the heavy
weapons to threaten seriously the redeploying forces.61
That historians and the popular imagination have heretofore focused on the
Inchon landing is understandable (after all, it was an audacious assault, while
Hungnam was a withdrawal) but unfortunate. Although the decision to land at
Inchon was a difficult and daring one and succeeded operationally and tactically,
it presented no particular novelties to Doyle and his amphibious experts. MacArthur’s insistence on Inchon may have violated their professional sensibilities,
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but they possessed both doctrine and experience by which to act effectively.62 By
contrast, Hungnam presented novelty at almost every turn, and yet the amphibious group rose to the occasion.
Doyle’s ability to emplace a self-organizing system at Hungnam was predicated on the granting by Vice Admiral Joy of his demand that unlike in the Inchon
and Wonsan operations, he be permitted to exercise command independently of
the Seventh Fleet commander. Joy acceded because of his long-standing professional and personal relationship with Doyle and his practical understanding that
amphibious expertise was the factor critical to success at Hungnam. Notwithstanding his own misgivings about Joy’s decision, the CNO was unwilling or
unable to overturn it directly, and his subterfuge of sending a “representative” to
Hungnam had, in the event, no effect. For his part, Admiral Struble of Seventh
Fleet, for whom Joy’s decision must have been a bitter pill, responded fully to
Doyle’s requests for air and naval gunfire support and at the same time was able
to focus on his broader Seventh Fleet responsibilities. Similarly, the presence of a
second fully capable amphibious group in Korea under Doyle meant that Doyle
could allocate responsibility for west-coast redeployment operations to that
group, freeing himself from their detailed supervision and allowing him and his
staff to focus on Hungnam.
Several other factors also contributed both to Doyle’s willingness to employ
a self-organizing system and to its success. His initial amphibious operational
experience was as operations officer at Guadalcanal. Because such an operation
had never before been attempted, it constituted an ill-structured problem, unlike later operations in the Central Pacific, which were much better structured.63
Subsequently, Doyle served for two years in Admiral King’s amphibious planning
section. He thereby had firsthand experience with the practical matters of dealing
with ill-structured problems and the need for an adaptable and self-organizing
C2 organization.
Doyle’s staff comprised entirely officers with extensive World War II amphibious experience, men who were virtually all overqualified for their billets. The
same obtained for the officers and men of Forney’s Mobile Training Team Able.
Doyle’s staff was no ordinary collection of skilled individual officers. Rather, it
had seen little turnover and had worked together on landing exercises both stateside and in Japan prior to planning and conducting the Pohang Dong, Inchon,
and Wonsan landings, along with myriad lesser amphibious lifts. In consequence,
Doyle knew his staff members (and those of Team Able) personally and professionally in detail; the staff members knew each other in like manner, and they had
evolved effective working relationships. Experience at Inchon and Wonsan had
also established effective working relationships also with the principal ground
commanders and their staffs. These factors all conduced to the development and
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maintenance of trust among the key participants. These men could be depended
on to do their jobs without central direction and to improvise when required.
Underlying all of this was an effective communications system at Hungnam that
permitted ready lateral coordination among the control posts.
In the end, the worst fears of the military commanders in Korea and of the
American popular press were not realized in December 1950. Hungnam was no
Dunkirk, nor from the Navy and the Marine Corps perspective had it at any time
been likely to become one. Many factors contributed to success in Hungnam,
including the availability of specialized amphibious shipping and complete
control of air and sea, but the defining factors were the presence of experienced
professionals, organized effectively, and the willingness of their commander to
let them do their jobs.
{LINE-SPACE}
After rest and recuperation at the “Bean Patch,” near Ulsan, 1st Marine Division,
still part of X Corps but the latter now integrated with Eighth Army, was ordered
out of Army reserve on 9 January 1951 to reenter the fight. The Army’s 3rd and
7th Divisions followed close behind.
In spring 1951, Rear Admiral Doyle returned to the United States for a well
deserved rest and new duties. In September that year he became president of
the Board of Inspection and Survey, serving until the following May, when he
assumed the chairmanship of the Joint Amphibious Board. Doyle retired in November 1953, in the grade of vice admiral on the retired list, on the basis of his
combat awards. He practiced law for many years in Austin, Texas, and died in 1982.
His work on the Joint Amphibious Board, rewriting existing doctrine for amphibious operations (then embodied in Naval Warfare Publication 22), proved,
in the aftermath of the defense unification battles, highly contentious. The board
completed its work at the end of Doyle’s tenure, publishing its report in January
1954. The report set forth divergent service views on “doctrines and procedures
governing joint amphibious operations” that were delaying finalization of a
jointly acceptable solution—each page was divided into thirds, with the views of
the Navy and Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force for each issue given separately.
Curiously, given its chairman’s immediate past experience at Hungnam, the report addressed only the problems of the assault, primarily matters of phasing and
of command and control.64
Today, joint doctrine, although entirely consistent with the lessons of Hungnam,
provides only minimal guidance for structuring the problem of the amphibious
withdrawal. Naval commanders and staffs not already well practiced in the amphibious assault will find only a very rough outline for approaching the problem
of the amphibious withdrawal. They are better advised to study Hungnam and its
many relatives systematically, to consult the superseded Joint Publication 3-02.1,
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Joint Doctrine for Landing Operations, of 2004, and regularly to plan and exercise
the amphibious withdrawal. The requirement for such does not come along often, but when it does, fortune will favor the prepared.

NOTES

The author thanks Capt. James Cook, USN
(Ret.), and his colleagues in the Joint Military
Operations Department of the Naval War
College for their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts.
1. The title refers to a 21 December 1950 message (date-time group 210836Z) from Vice
Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval
Forces Far East, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Forrest Sherman, and Commander, Pacific Fleet, Adm. Arthur Radford,
in reference to the Hungnam operation:
“Doyle with Struble’s excellent air cover and
complete support is performing remarkable
military feat in withdrawal plan [sic] army
with all of their equipment and without
heavy losses” [emphasis supplied]; U.S.
Navy Operational Archives, Naval History
and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C.
[hereafter Navy Operational Archives]. The
epigraphs are as quoted from the original
sources in Michael Duffy, “Festering the
Spanish Ulcer: The Royal Navy and the Peninsular War, 1808–1814,” in Naval Power and
Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns
and New Theaters of Naval Warfare, ed. Bruce
A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (London:
Routledge, 2011), pp. 15–28. The epigraphs:
from Molyneux’s Conjunct Expeditions: or,
expeditions that have been carried on jointly by
the fleet and army, with a commentary on a littoral war (1759); an observation by Wellesley
(later Lord Wellington) on his 1808–1809
Peninsular Campaign.
2. U.S. Defense Dept., Amphibious Operations,
Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, D.C.:
Joint Staff, 10 August 2009) [hereafter JP
3-02], p. xi, available at Defense Technical
Information Center, Joint Electronic Library,
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/.
3. The National Defense Program: Unification
and Strategy: Hearings before the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on the Armed
Services, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (October 1949)
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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1949), p. 521.
Strictly speaking, as has been pointed out, the
general was correct: massive over-the-beach
assaults against strong enemy defenses, such
as those at Sicily and Normandy, have not
been, and are not likely to be, practiced by
the U.S. military—although one suspects that
they just might be by other nations perhaps
less chary of high casualty rates. The United
States has found other ways to skin that cat,
given developments in improved intelligence,
vertical-lift capabilities, long-range precision
fires, and the concept of ship-to-objective
maneuver; see Keith F. Kopets, “Omar Bradley
Was Right . . . ,” Marine Corps Gazette (August
2003), available at www.mca-marines
.org/. One need observe only casually the
trend of investment by rising powers, such as
India and China, in amphibious capabilities
to grasp the continued importance of such
operations in both peace and war.
4. Recognizing that an entire generation of Navy
and Marine officers has, after the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, virtually no practical
experience of amphibious operations, U.S.
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Marine Expeditionary Brigade–sized Landing Force (2d MEB) consisting of a complete Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a
Regimental Landing Team (RLT), a Marine
Air Group (MAG) and a Combat Logistics
Regiment (CLR); a Carrier Strike Group
(CSG—aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, 3–4
surface combatants); Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships; Mine Counter-Measures
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U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002);
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General Edward Hanna Forney, USMC:
Lessons from the Hungnam Redeployment,
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correct; at the operational and tactical levels,
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the planning and execution of amphibious
assaults.
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withdrawal. See JP 3-02, pp. III-70 to III-71.
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one-third were confirmed as Soviet boats;
see “Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report,
Antisubmarine Operations, 25 June to 15
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by General MacArthur that if things went
awry at Inchon, UN forces would withdraw.
Vice Adm. James H. Doyle, USN (Ret.)
(lecture, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 14
March 1974) [hereafter Doyle lecture], p. 12,
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
18. Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and Andre Thoret, “The Structure of ‘Unstructured’
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Quarterly 21 (1976), p. 246.
19. The surface suicide-boat threat, in particular,
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the operation was concluded, Adm. R. K.
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for such efforts. Plans based on that doctrine
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Chisholm, “Industrial Scale Asymmetric Warfare: Japanese Surface Suicide Boats” (paper
presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the
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Army Center of Military History, 2000), app.
C, available at www.history.army.mil/.
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24. “Because of the lack of essential knowledge of
amphibious operations existing in the Tenth
[X] Corps, and the lack of time for instruction and training of Army personnel, the only
practical solution was to provide qualified
personnel for temporary duty with the Tenth
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CINCNAVFE. Joy was several numbers junior
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Marine Corps Historical Center, Quantico,
Va.; Doyle lecture, p. 12.
29. Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at
Hungnam,” p. 49.
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61. By the time of Hungnam the Soviets had
already begun delivering MiGs to the North
Koreans in Manchuria, but they elected not
to approach the perimeter closely.

50. Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at
Hungnam,” p. 53.
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Place, Right Time: Richmond Kelly Turner
(1885–1961),” in Nineteen-Gun Salute:
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during World War II.
64. Joint Amphibious Board, Doctrines and Procedures Governing Joint Amphibious Operations,
with Divergent Service Views, Report on Joint
Amphibious Board Project No. 1-52 (Little
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Army Center of Military History Library,
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THE SOUTH AFRIC AN NAV Y AND AFRIC AN
MARITIME SECURIT Y
Deane-Peter Baker

T

he onset of pirate attacks on merchant vessels off the Horn of Africa in recent years has put Africa’s maritime security increasingly in the international
spotlight. Recent times have also seen the advent of the African Union and with
it a commitment to “African solutions to African problems.” Despite this, African
states have made little active contribution to securing Africa’s maritime domains.
Yet, as the scholar and analyst Augustus Vogel, of the Africa Center for Strategic
Studies in Washington, D.C., points out, doing so
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is vitally important to Africa: illegal fishing undercuts
Africa’s economic development and exacerbates its food
security challenges; piracy makes badly needed trade and
investment in Africa more risky and expensive; the continent is becoming an increasingly active drug trafficking
hub; the growing drug trade, in turn, is giving international criminal syndicates a foothold within certain
African governments, weakening their ability to address
other national priorities; and illegal commerce (such as
oil bunkering, transport of counterfeit materials, and
theft) impacts legitimate businesses and world markets.
In short, many of Africa’s emerging threats arrive by sea.1

Most glaring has been the lack of a significant contribution by the South African Navy (SAN), arguably
sub-Saharan Africa’s most capable naval force. This article begins with a brief outline of the history of South
Africa’s navy—a history that accounts for some of the
151
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contemporary navy’s shortcomings. The article then outlines the SAN’s current
capabilities and addresses the current constraints it faces. The article closes by
looking to the future and advocating steps and measures that will need to be
taken if the South African Navy is to make a significant contribution to African,
or indeed even South African, maritime security.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY
To grasp fully what we might call the “philosophical” factors that limit the effectiveness of today’s South African Navy, it is helpful to have a sense of the history
of this force. The first officially recognized naval unit formed in South Africa was
raised in 1885 in what was then the Natal Colony, as a consequence of a perceived
threat emerging from tensions between Britain and Russia over Afghanistan.
Technically a coastal artillery force, this unit, the Natal Naval Volunteers, never
took part in a maritime engagement. It did, however, serve with some distinction
as part of the British forces engaged in the second Anglo-Boer War, and again
during the Zulu rebellion of 1906.2
In 1905 the Cape Colonial government followed the lead of the Natal Colony
by establishing a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), commonly known as the Cape Naval Volunteers.3 With the 1910 formation of the
Union of South Africa in the aftermath of the second Anglo-Boer War, this system of naval volunteers was extended to include the whole of the Union, through
the formation in 1912 of the South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer
Reserve (RNVR[SA]), under the command of the Royal Navy.4 Mobilized for service in World War I, the RNVR(SA) contributed twelve officers and 267 sailors,
who between them served in every theater of the war.5
The experience of the First World War convinced the Union government of
the need for a full-time naval capability, and in 1922 the South African Naval
Service (SANS) was established to complement the capability provided by the
volunteers of the RNVR(SA). The advent of the SANS brought with it South
Africa’s first naval vessels—a survey vessel and two minesweeping trawlers on
loan from the Royal Navy. The recommissioning of these vessels under the prefix
HMSAS (His [or Her] Majesty’s South African Ship) on 1 April 1922 is marked
as the South African Navy’s birthday.6
Despite this promising start, things quickly went badly for the fledgling SANS.
The global effects of the Great Depression led to severe budget cuts. By 1934
all three of the SANS’s vessels had been returned to the Royal Navy, and by the
time of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 it “had virtually ceased
to exist.”7 The pressing demands of the war stimulated the Union government to
relaunch its full-time naval capability under a new name, the South African Seaward Defence Force (SDF).8 The service experienced rapid growth, and by 1945
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1

152

Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue

BAKER

147

the authorized personnel establishment “had grown to more than 10,000 officers
and ratings, with some 89 assorted vessels [all converted commercial vessels]
in commission.”9 SDF vessels did duty in the South African and Mediterranean
theaters. In addition, as in the First World War, the volunteers of the RNVR(SA)
provided manpower to the Royal Navy, with members eventually serving in every maritime theater of the war. South Africa’s navy was once again renamed in
1942, this time as the South African Naval Forces, and in 1944 it received its first
genuine warships, in the form of three Loch-class antisubmarine frigates. (One of
these vessels, HMSAS Natal, performed a remarkable, probably unique feat: only
hours after leaving the builder’s yard and en route to workup training, it located
and sank a German submarine, U-714.)10
In the aftermath of the Second World War the navy underwent its final name
change, becoming known in 1951 as simply the South African Navy.11 What followed was a period of expansion that is generally considered to have been the
navy’s heyday. Between 1957 and 1962 the SAN received six blue-water-capable
vessels—a Type 15 frigate, two W-class destroyers, and three Type 12 frigates—all
purchased from Britain under the terms of the Simon’s Town Agreement.12 The
addition of a squadron of Avro Shackleton long-range maritime patrol aircraft
and a squadron of Blackburn (later Hawker Siddeley) Buccaneer maritime strike
aircraft to the inventory of the South African Air Force (SAAF), as well as Westland Wasp shipboard antisubmarine helicopters, added significantly to South
Africa’s ability to patrol and secure its maritime environment. The purchase of
the Danish tanker Annam in 1967 and its subsequent conversion into the underway replenishment vessel SAS Tafelberg gave the SAN the ability to conduct longduration and long-range missions. The additional acquisition of three Daphnéclass submarines from France during the late 1960s and early 1970s rounded out
the SAN as a small but capable and well-balanced navy, optimized for operations
against other naval forces.13
The Afrikaner nationalist government that ruled South Africa from 1948 until
the end of the apartheid era in 1994 harbored a deep hostility toward Britain, as
a consequence of that nation’s colonial history in South Africa. Despite this, and
because of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union, from the end of the
Second World War until the mid-1970s it seemed virtually axiomatic that South
Africa would side with Britain and the West in any future war against the Soviet
bloc, serving as “the vigilant ‘Guardian of the Cape Sea Route.’”14 For this reason,
in light of the close historical ties between the South African Navy and the Royal
Navy, “the SA Navy was perceived by many of the senior officers in both navies as
simply an extension of, and in all but name and administrative function, an operational section of the Royal Navy.”15 However, the South African government’s
policy of apartheid led to British withdrawal from the Simon’s Town Agreement
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in 1975, thereby ending the historical close ties between the South African and
Royal Navies.16
By the latter part of the 1970s South Africa was facing increasing international
isolation as well as the heavy budgetary demands imposed by its counterinsurgency campaign in South West Africa (now Namibia) and its involvement in civil
war in Angola and warfare in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). This isolation and the
imposition of a mandatory United Nations (UN) arms embargo made it increasingly unlikely that the SAN would be called on by the West to play a role in countering the Soviet navy. As a result, in February 1977 the leadership of the South
African Defence Force (SADF) effectively reduced the role of the SAN to that
of a coastal force.17 The planned acquisition of two Type A69 corvettes and two
Agosta-class submarines from France was canceled. A project to acquire Reshefclass missile strike craft from Israel did, however, go ahead, with a final tally of
nine entering into service, three built in Israel and six in Durban.18 The strike
craft, armed with between six and eight Scorpion surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) and two OTO Melara 76/60 mm compact dual-purpose guns, entered
service between July 1977 and July 1986.19 By the latter date the last remaining
frigates that had entered service with the SAN in the late 1950s and early 1960s
had been withdrawn from service;20 the strike craft were left as the backbone of
South Africa’s coastal navy of the 1980s and 1990s.
Struggling under a much-reduced budget, by the end of the 1970s the SAN
had nonetheless found a niche that enabled it to maintain its relevance. The
strike craft were used on a regular basis to insert and recover special forces teams
behind enemy lines, and “for some of the more distant and covert operations the
Navy demonstrated how rapidly and how effectively it had mastered the complex
and difficult task of operating submarines by using them to insert small numbers
of men and then recover them on completion of their task.”21 More traditional
naval tasks were also carried out. It was proclaimed by one observer in 1985 that
“Soviet naval movements in the region are shadowed routinely . . . [mainly by]
the submarines. Apparently they [South African submarines] have grown quite
adept at [these operations], not least vis-à-vis other submarines.”22
Apart from the purchase of four small, locally built minehunters in the early
1980s, the only major naval acquisition of that period was the domestically designed and constructed six-thousand-ton (12,500 tons full load) support vessel
SAS Drakensburg, which was commissioned in 1987. Three years prior to that,
the navy’s other support vessel, the ageing SAS Tafelberg, had completed a refit
“that allowed her to carry a company-strength landing force, two medium helicopters and six small landing craft as well as the addition of a small hospital. This
provided the SA Navy with a limited amphibious support capability.”23 This was,
in all likelihood, an attempt to afford additional maneuver capability to SADF
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commanders conducting cross-border operations against the South West Africa
People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the supporting People’s Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Cuban forces in Angola. This amphibious
capability was, however, never used operationally, and SAS Tafelberg was decommissioned in 1993.24
The period of South Africa’s transition to democracy (from 1990 to 1994) was
a particularly painful one for the South African Navy. Massive cuts to the defense
budget forced the SAN to cut its personnel complement by 23 percent, with effect
from the SAN’s sixty-eighth birthday, 1 April 1990. Another consequence of the
cut was the cancellation of a long-running and fairly advanced program to build
submarines in South Africa. The one positive development of this period was
the purchase in February 1993 of Juvent, originally built as an icebreaking Arctic
supply vessel for the Soviet navy. Renamed SAS Outeniqua, this vessel replaced
the decommissioned Tafelberg and proved particularly useful in supporting the
South African research base in Antarctica. The capability represented by this vessel was, however, lost to the SAN in 2005, when Outeniqua was sold back into the
private sector as a cost-cutting measure.25
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY TODAY: CAPABILITIES
With the fall of the apartheid regime, the African National Congress (ANC),
under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, came to power in South Africa’s first
democratic elections in 1994 and has remained in power since. The South African Navy inherited by the new government was in a poor state. The personnel
cuts instigated in 1990 had affected both morale and capability, and operational
capability amounted primarily to two support vessels (reduced to one in 2005),
a handful of small ageing strike craft optimized for the more peaceful waters of
the Mediterranean, and three diesel-electric submarines rapidly reaching the
ends of their useful service lives (all three Daphnés would be decommissioned by
2003).26 There was considerable concern that the SAN might not survive at all in
any useful form. Given the very pressing socioeconomic needs that had to be addressed by the new government and the fact that South Africa was now at peace
with its neighbors and facing no discernible military threat, many believed that
the South African military would be significantly reduced in size and capability,
possibly even disbanded altogether.
Thankfully for the SAN, this did not happen. Rather than “disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate” the apartheid-era South African Defence Force, its proxies,
and the armed wings of the liberation movements, the new government instead
integrated them into a new national military force, the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF).27 The ANC government also launched an ambitious
and controversial Strategic Defence Procurement (SDP) package, announced in
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September 1999, which focused on purchasing new ships for the navy and new
aircraft for the air force.28 Under the terms of the SDP the navy has since received
four MEKO A200SAN frigates, three Type 209/1400 submarines (SSKs), and four
Westland Super Lynx maritime helicopters.29
The frigates, designated as the Valour class in SAN service and displacing 3,590
tons, combine a modular architecture with an X-form superstructure that very
effectively reduces radar signature. Propelled by two MTU sixteen-cylinder, Vconfiguration 1163 TB 93 diesel engines and a fully independent “combined diesel and gas turbine–waterjet and refined propellers” (CODAG-WARP) propulsion system, these vessels have a sustained speed of twenty knots, with a cruising
range of eight thousand nautical miles, and they are capable of over twenty-eight
knots. Primary armament consists of eight MM40 Block 2 Exocet SSMs and one
OTO Melara 76/62 mm compact dual-purpose gun. Air defense is secured by
sixteen vertically launched, locally developed Umkhonto surface-to-air missiles
(plus sixteen reloads), missiles that can engage multiple targets at ranges in excess
of twelve kilometers. Secondary weapons include one twin 35 mm gun, two 20
mm guns, and two 12.7 mm machine guns. Antisubmarine warfare capability is
provided by hull-mounted sonar and an embarked Super Lynx Mk 64 helicopter.
(Each ship can accommodate two medium helicopters, though normally only
one will be deployed.)30
The Type 209/1400 submarines displace 1,454 tons dived and are capable of
a dived speed of 21.5 knots (ten knots surfaced). They can dive 250 meters and
can cruise up to fifty days without replenishment. Primary armament comprises
eight twenty-one-inch torpedo tubes that can be reloaded under way (and, if necessary, submerged) from a store of an additional six torpedoes. Four of the tubes
are also capable of minelaying, and the South African Type 209s have been modified from the standard design to give them the ability to support special forces.
In addition to the new frigates and submarines, the SAN of today is rounded
out by a number of legacy vessels. Chief among these is the support vessel Drakensburg. Two of the original nine Warrior-class strike craft remain operational,
now with their SSMs removed and redesignated as offshore patrol vessels.31
Three small T-Craft inshore patrol boats of glass-reinforced-plastic sandwich
construction, ordered in 1991, were commissioned in 2003. The unarmed SAS
Protea, commissioned in 1971, undertakes hydrographic survey duties, and the
SAN also operates two small minehunters, a number of locally built Namacurra
harbor patrol boats, and three tugs.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY TODAY: CONSTRAINTS
On paper, at least, the South African Navy is the most capable naval force in
sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this, barring a handful of fishery protection and
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antismuggling operations conducted in home waters and the occasional sea
rescue operation, the SAN has made little apparent contribution to African
maritime security.32 Yet securing the maritime domain must be considered to be
among Africa’s more significant challenges.
The SAN’s relative inactivity in this regard is somewhat surprising, given the
leading role South Africa has taken on itself in addressing security challenges
across the continent over the past fifteen years. Since being welcomed back into
the international fold and shedding its pariah status, South Africa has played a
leading role in addressing conflict and defusing tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, and São Tome and Principe, and it
has contributed additional forces to African Union (AU) and UN missions in the
Comoros, Darfur, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia. Under the leadership of former
president Thabo Mbeki (Mandela’s successor), South Africa was also one of the
driving forces behind the creation of the AU out of the ashes of the largely irrelevant Organization of African Unity. In recent times the AU has increasingly
acknowledged the importance of maritime security. Despite all this, until recently
the only direct use of South Africa’s naval capability in support of African security was the deployment of a flotilla of three Namacurra harbor patrol boats
(increasing to five in 2005) to the Burundian section of Lake Tanganyika between
2003 and 2007, as part of the AU and subsequent UN peacekeeping forces in
Burundi.33
One notable operational contribution by South Africa to maritime security in
recent times, however, involved the Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols.34
For one month, March 2009, officials from Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa,
and Tanzania conducted joint patrols on board the South African offshore patrol
vessel Sarah Baartman. During the operation forty-one vessels were inspected,
ten of which were fined; a further six were arrested for violations of national
maritime laws. One of the seized vessels, detained in Tanzanian waters, had on
board over three hundred tons of illegal tuna. While this cooperative venture was
an important step in the right direction, it must be noted that it did not involve
South African Navy assets but rather an environmental-protection ship from the
Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.
An important recent exception to the SAN’s disengaged status quo has been
the commencement of antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel. According to comments by Lindiwe Sisulu, South Africa’s Minister of Defence and
Military Veterans, the first informal steps in launching these patrols were taken
in response to an attack by Somali pirates on a Mozambican vessel in “the waters
of SADC [Southern African Development Community] around the 28th of December,” in 2010.35 Although information is somewhat scarce, calls for assistance
by the Mozambican government and that of Tanzania seem to have led to the
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formalization of these patrols. The patrols involve a single frigate on station at
any one time, apparently “carrying a contingent of Special Forces and Maritime
Reaction Squadron (MRS) commandos to conduct boarding operations.”36 An
unconfirmed report suggests that additional support is being provided by landbased aircraft launched from a strip at the popular diving resort of Pemba, in
northern Mozambique.37
Though antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel by the SAN must be
seen as encouraging, this seems to be largely a symbolic and ad hoc arrangement,
and there are questions as to whether it can be sustained. It must, therefore, be
conceded that thus far the SAN’s contribution to African maritime security has
been very limited indeed. What, exactly, explains the lack of impact of this seemingly capable naval force? The answer is a combination of a mismatch between
the assets the navy has available and the security challenges it needs to combat,
budget constraints, and a lack of political will.
The Capability/Challenge Mismatch
As its brief history as given above illustrates, the South African Navy has traditionally played the role of “Guardian of the Cape Sea Route,” first in service of
Great Britain in the First and Second World Wars and later as a perceived part
of the “West,” in response to the threat posed by the naval forces of the Soviet
Union. This history is relevant today because of the impact it has had on the
SAN’s perception of its own role and function. First and foremost, the SAN of
today is conceived of and equipped as a “counternavy” force. That is to say, it is
structured and equipped to give South Africa the ability to engage in battle with
an as-yet-undefined enemy naval force.
This is clearly evident when one considers its primary assets—stealth frigates, armed primarily with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and
torpedo-armed diesel-electric submarines. One can easily see in these acquisitions a harking back to the service’s “golden era” of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Yet it is plain that the likelihood of the SAN engaging enemy surface combatants,
maritime strike aircraft, or submarines in the Cape sea-lanes is extremely remote
indeed. While the frigates do have a certain general-purpose utility beyond their
conventional war-fighting capabilities, that same utility could most certainly
have been achieved with cheaper vessels. Also, one has to wonder at the usefulness
of the SAN’s submarine force: only three ships have been sunk by submarinefired torpedoes in the sixty-six years since the end of the Second World War.38 The
submarines do obviously have some value in their ability to conduct surveillance
operations and support special forces, but this hardly seems to justify the expense
of these demanding and sophisticated vessels.
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As Vogel points out, this misalignment of operational philosophy, structure,
and equipment with the actual threats being faced is a common one in the African context:
Of the 33 independent maritime nations in sub-Saharan Africa, only five—Cape
Verde, Liberia (when legislation is finalized), São Tome and Principe, the Republic
of Mauritius, and the Republic of Seychelles—have maritime forces that identify
themselves as coast guards rather than navies. Yet Africa’s maritime security challenges are most often comprised of threats such as illegal fishing, narcotrafficking, and
maritime disaster response—threats requiring the technical skills and collaborative
relationships with civilian organizations typical of a coast guard.39

Given that the most pressing maritime threats facing South Africa and the continent as a whole are in fact illegal fishing, piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal
commerce, the most glaring gap in the SAN’s current capabilities is the lack of a
genuine inshore/offshore patrol capability.40 The frigates can be used for offshore
patrol, but as Minister Sisulu recently commented, “some of our frigates are too
big to move around the coast.”41 The two remaining operational Warrior-class
strike craft, though redesignated as offshore patrol vessels, are of limited utility,
having reached the end of their effective service lives. The three T-Craft inshore
patrol vessels have inadequate range and often struggle in the rough seas off
South Africa’s coast. The SAN shares responsibility for patrolling its waters with
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (which operates Sarah
Baartman and three Lilian Ngoyi–class inshore patrol vessels) and the South
African Police Service (or SAPS, operating a handful of small boats), but even
this collective capability falls well short of what is necessary to patrol effectively
South Africa’s territorial waters and its vast (1,553,000 square kilometers) exclusive economic zone (EEZ).42
Exacerbating the situation is a much-eroded South African Air Force maritime
patrol capability. Since the retirement in 1984 of the venerable Avro Shackletons
and, in 1993, of the smaller P166S Albatross maritime patrol aircraft purchased
in the late 1960s, the SAAF has relied for maritime patrol primarily on five ancient, though upgraded, Second World War–era Douglas C-47TP Turbo Dakotas
(referred to affectionately as the “TurboDaks” or as “Dakletons,” in reference to
the Shackletons they replaced).43 Even setting aside their frailty, these senior citizens of the air lack the necessary range to cover the far reaches of South Africa’s
maritime area of responsibility. As one analyst points out,
In September 1996 the South African Air Force flew its last long range patrol to the
South African owned Prince Edward Island group in the South Atlantic. The aircraft
that undertook this flight, a Boeing 707, has since been retired from service because
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of a lack of funding to maintain it. Since that time it is estimated that nearly a million
tonnes of Patagonian toothfish have been illegally harvested from the area because of
a lack of military control over the area by the South African Government, resulting in
a substantial financial loss to South Africa.44

The air force’s Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft once offered a secondary
maritime patrol capability, but they have been discarded and not replaced. There
is no evidence that the SAAF plans to employ its new light, multirole SAAP
Gripen fighters in this role; given their relatively short range, these aircraft are not
particularly suited for maritime patrol, even as a secondary function. Some capability is provided by the SAAF’s Cessna C208 Caravan light turboprop aircraft,
for which three sets of Argos 410-Z airborne observation systems were purchased
in 2007.45 However these aircraft, along with the “Dakletons,” are scheduled for
retirement in 2015, with no certain replacements on the horizon.
Budget Constraints
The creation of the South African National Defence Force in 1994 was, in domestic political terms, a considerable success. While there were inevitable tensions
among former enemies, the process was achieved relatively smoothly, and significant follow-on hostilities were averted. In purely military terms, however, the
SANDF has been less successful. Perhaps inevitably, the impressive war-fighting
capability that it inherited from its primary predecessor, the apartheid-era SADF,
has been eroded by such factors as the higher priority accorded to the ten-year
process of integrating the various former apartheid-era forces into one national
defense organization; downsizing of the SANDF (particularly the army) and the
slow pace at which it is proceeding; the increasing obsolescence of military equipment (despite big-ticket purchases for the air force and navy under the Strategic
Defence Procurement package); and severe budgetary constraints in the face
of pressing national social and health problems, especially a high rate of HIV/
AIDS. In addition, the SANDF, particularly the army, has faced an unexpectedly
high operational tempo in its contributions to peacekeeping missions across the
African continent.
All of this has meant that, as has often been the case in its eighty-eight-year
history, the SAN currently finds itself low on the budgetary priority list. Defense
expenditure in South Africa is a mere 1.3 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP);46 this amounts to a paltry ZAR 30.4 billion (about U.S.$4.4 billion) for
the 2010–11 financial year.47 Approximately 7 percent of the defense budget is allocated to the navy’s operational budget, around ZAR 2.1 billion (about U.S.$308
million). In a briefing to South Africa’s parliament in March 2010, a Department
of Defence spokesperson announced that this budget meant that in 2010–11 the
SAN would be able to spend only ten thousand hours on patrol at sea. According
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to a media account of the briefing, “in 2012 and 2013 this would be cut . . . to just
9000 hours. Divided between the operational fleet [not including inshore patrol
vessels or support vessels,] . . . this translates to just over 41 days per ship for the
financial year . . . ; or about one ship or submarine patrolling SA’s 71,460 square
km territorial waters on any given day. Each ship will spend about 324 days in
port.”48
Lack of Political Will
Limitations in budget and capability, while obviously important, do not alone explain why the South African Navy has not contributed to such maritime security
efforts as the multinational effort to combat piracy in the waters off the Horn of
Africa. In a briefing to Parliament’s Defence Portfolio Committee in November
2010, Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg (SAN Director Maritime Strategy)
stated that the SAN is capable of mounting antipiracy operations off the coast of
Somalia (though he warned that this would be difficult to sustain for more than
six months and that even a short deployment would have “implications”).49 To
paraphrase an old saying, where there is political will, there is a way. For example,
“in December 2004, SAS Drakensberg deployed to Haiti with SA Police Service,
SA Special Forces, SA Air Force and SA Military Health Service assets to provide
logistic support and protection for the South African and Haitian Presidents
during the . . . island’s 200th Anniversary of its independence.”50 That round-trip
journey of over twelve thousand miles illustrates the South African government’s
willingness to order significant naval operations when it deems necessary. So
what accounts for South Africa’s lack of willingness to employ its naval assets for
significant maritime security operations, particularly beyond its home waters?
One possible contributing factor for South Africa’s reluctance to contribute
to antipiracy efforts is that it has virtually no merchant fleet (the only vessel on
the commercial register, SA Oranje, will soon be retired). Political rhetoric aside,
therefore, policy makers may have felt that South Africa has little vested interest
in antipiracy operations in international waters. This view would unquestionably
ignore the broader impacts of piracy on trade affecting the South African economy.51 (The newly commenced antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel,
as well as other developments I will discuss below, suggest that this perception
that “piracy is not our business” is now starting to change.) Another factor in the
short and medium terms has been the continuing effects of South Africa’s focus
on the FIFA World Cup, which ran to its completion in mid-July 2010. Preparations for the World Cup included large-scale government investment in public
works, from new and upgraded stadia to public transport infrastructure, at an
estimated cost of U.S.$3.5 billion.52 This included a very significant investment
in security, with the SAN playing its part in Operation KGWELE (the SANDF
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World Cup security mission) by deploying three of its Valour-class frigates off
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban in support of army special forces and
the navy’s own MRS. The frigates also provided radar feed to assist the air force
in securing the skies over the World Cup venues against a 9/11-style attack. Two
submarines were also sent on patrol, and a number of other vessels were deployed
as support platforms.53 This operation, while apparently successful, absorbed
considerable resources, leaving the SAN, already suffering under the budget constraints outlined above, somewhat anemic.
Perhaps more significant is the fact that recent defense decisions under South
Africa’s current president, Jacob Zuma, suggest a shift in policy. Under his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s foreign policy was driven by the notion
of an emerging “African Renaissance,” to be made possible in part by a vigorous
commitment to peace and stability operations on the continent. President Zuma
was elected to the leadership of the ruling ANC in an acrimonious contest with
then-president Mbeki in 2007 (thereby effectively reducing Mbeki to lame-duck
status), largely riding on a wave of dissatisfaction over Mbeki’s perceived lack of
focus on domestic issues. Zuma was elected president in 2009, and since then
South Africa has maintained its existing peacekeeping and related commitments
but has notably taken on no significant additional external missions. This is
particularly noteworthy in that June 2009 marked the end of the SANDF’s tenyear deployment to Burundi.54 That effectively reduced the number of externally
deployed troops by around a third.55 The Zuma administration has preferred to
commit troops to secure South Africa’s borders, reversing a decision made under
Mbeki to turn over border security entirely to the SAPS. Currently it is planned
that under Operation CORONA over 3,600 SANDF troops, a significant proportion of the South African Army’s deployable manpower, will be on South Africa’s
borders by 2014.56 Taken together, these factors suggest that South African national policy is shifting away from expeditionary engagements involving military
forces and focusing more on domestic priorities.
INTO THE FUTURE
Despite the many negatives outlined in this article, there have in recent times
been signs of movement in the right direction. One has been the emergence of a
new, as yet unpublished, maritime security strategy. While the value of this strategy will obviously depend on its content, the fact that maritime security has received high-level attention is itself encouraging. Comments made in Parliament
relating to the content of the strategy also give reasons for hope. For example,
Minister Sisulu indicated in response to a question posed by a member that there
are plans afoot to cover all of South Africa’s EEZ with “some form of sensor, or
combination of sensors that will produce the most optimal coverage.”57
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Another potentially positive development is the possible revival of Project
BIRO, a program to replace the SAN’s ageing and limited inshore and offshore patrol capability. By Minister Sisulu’s admission, BIRO had been “shelved,” but a recent media report indicates that the Simon’s Town–based Institute for Maritime
Technology has been issued a “request for quotation” by the SAN for “strategic
technology and engineering support services during the project study phase of
the acquisition of a multi-mission patrol capability.” Furthermore, “the Estimates
of National Expenditure (ENE) tabled by Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan in
February noted that the National Treasury will fund the acquisition of new ships
for the Navy from the 2013/14 financial year,” specifically “the replacement of the
offshore and inshore patrol vessels, procurement of new harbour tugs and the
replacement of small boats.”58
Further potentially good news concerns Project SAUCEPAN, the South African
Air Force’s program to replace its almost septuagenarian Douglas C47 Dakota
maritime surveillance aircraft. In the words of the chief of the SAAF, Lieutenant
General Carlo Gagiano, SAUCEPAN has been “pulled to the left”—that is, pushed
higher on the agenda—by the arrival of piracy in southern African waters and is
now considered “urgent and important.”59
While these are certainly encouraging signs, they do not necessarily indicate
that South Africa is moving toward a comprehensive and well designed approach
to ensuring its own maritime security and contributing to that of other African
nations. For one thing, there is every chance that these developments will founder
on the rock of budgetary constraint. Perhaps even more importantly, there are
worrisome indicators that the new maritime security strategy is an ad hoc, kneejerk reaction to the fact that piracy has finally reached SADC waters.60 While piracy is one of the things the SAN must be capable of addressing, it is by no means
the only, or even the main, security threat that must be considered.
Ultimately what is needed is a broad and comprehensive rethinking of South
Africa’s approach to securing its borders, people, and interests. A recalibration
of this kind will have to be realistic about the level of defense expenditure South
Africa can afford (given the pressing social challenges that must be addressed
by the government on a very small tax base) and must be set against a realistic
assessment of the threat environment that South Africa is likely to face.61 These
considerations together will likely point to a reduction of South Africa’s ability to
contribute to peace and stability operations on the ground in far-flung parts of
Africa (as mentioned above, this reduction seems already to have begun, under
the current administration’s policy priorities), but this must be weighed against
the impact that a more stable and economically successful South Africa will have
on the southern African region in the long term.
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As I have argued elsewhere, South Africa should focus to a considerable
degree on engagement with neighboring countries, with the goal of ensuring
their viability as secure and prosperous democratic states.62 The primary tools
in achieving this goal will be economic, legal, and diplomatic. The SANDF and
other security organs of the state will have roles to play as well, through such
activities as offering training and assistance and sharing intelligence. The tools
of so-called developmental peacekeeping will be critical here, though employed
preemptively rather than only when an emergency arises that requires the deployment of a traditional peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission.63 From
another perspective, this approach is what one counterinsurgency expert has
called “anti-insurgency.”64
Critical in this approach is, first, the fact that it could potentially have a far
greater impact on African security in the long term than the current “firefighting”
model (in which South African efforts go primarily toward addressing conflicts
that have already broken out). Second, though self-interested, this approach does
not represent a shirking of South Africa’s international responsibilities. For as
South Africa’s neighbors grow in prosperity and security they will develop both
the desire and the capability to sustain that success by seeking the security and
prosperity of their own neighbors. What should ideally emerge is something like
the “ink-spot theory” of counterinsurgency, in which “spots” or areas of security
and stability spread and eventually merge with other zones of security and stability, just as drops of ink coalesce on paper.65
Like those of most African nations, South Africa’s military has historically
been, and is currently, “army heavy,” most of its budget and capabilities invested
in (largely conventional) land forces. A reconceptualized force would undoubtedly better serve South Africa’s interests. Given that a conventional military threat
emerging from one of South Africa’s neighbors or any combination thereof is
extremely unlikely, even more so from a power outside the region, South Africa should redirect a significant proportion of its current military expenditure
toward the formation of a gendarmerie-style border guard (with a secondary
counterinsurgency capability) and the development of a significant coast guard
—what, together, I call “Shield forces.”66 The remainder of the SANDF should be
converted into a small but well trained and well equipped joint expeditionary
formation—a “Spear force.”
Under this “high-low” model, the SAN would have two primary functions—
namely, providing a coast guard–style Shield capability as well as assets to enable and support Spear forces. For the Shield capability, “coverage” will be more
important than “clout.” Airborne surveillance assets, such as maritime patrol
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, will be vital for situational awareness of
the nation’s vast EEZ. An adequate number of naval platforms, split between
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1
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inshore and offshore patrol vessels, will be required to take advantage of the
situational awareness these aerial surveillance assets provide. Significantly more
platforms than are currently in the SAN inventory will be necessary to ensure that
the nation’s EEZ is adequately patrolled. Here the navy’s 2030 forward-planning
process, as articulated in November 2010 by its Chief Director Maritime Strategy,
Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg, seems to point in the right direction, proposing adding three inshore patrol vessels to the currently mandated force structure
—an increase of 100 percent.67 Funding indications from the government, however, suggest an inclination toward maintenance of the status quo, replacing, but
not adding to, the current patrol vessels.68
Expeditionary (Spear) missions would in all likelihood primarily engage land
targets, but naval forces nonetheless would have a critical role to play, particularly given the fact that 70 percent of African states are littoral. Recent examples
abound of operations of kinds likely to be undertaken. In the first three months
of 2011 alone the SANDF stood up forces for one actual and two potential noncombatant evacuation operations, in South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya.
Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire led in January to SAS Drakensburg’s being diverted from
its duty as a communication and guard vessel for the 2011 Cape to Rio yacht race
to the Gulf of Guinea to render “possible assistance to SA diplomats, designated
personnel and other South African citizens in Ivory Coast.”69 A special operations
force was also put ashore in Guinea. One might hope that similar situations in the
future, if political circumstances and SANDF capabilities are appropriate, will see
intervention by South African forces. (It is arguable that early intervention by an
African force in Côte d’Ivoire in early 2011 could have saved the lives of many of
the hundreds, if not thousands, who were killed in what is now being called the
Second Ivorian Civil War.) The noncombatant evacuation actually conducted by
the SANDF, the extraction of South African embassy personnel and other citizens
from Libya, could well also have involved maritime assets, Libya being a littoral
state. In the end, though, lack of appropriate capabilities forced the SANDF to
rely on goodwill from the Qadhafi regime (itself an embarrassment) and a chartered Boeing 767 to fulfill its mandate.
What is clearly missing from the SAN’s current capabilities is the ability to
offer strategic lift, firepower, and force protection for joint Spear forces. The ability to project significant force from the sea is in general of inestimable value for
deterrence, dissuasion, denial, disruption, and defeat of potential adversaries, and
to the SAN it would be of equal value as a means to contribute to African maritime security and deliver humanitarian and other support to neighbors and allies.
This fact is not lost on its leaders, and their plans for 2030 include, under Project
MILLENNIUM, the addition of three “strategic sealift and sustainment (SSS) vessels” within a planned fleet of twenty-two warships and submarines.70 No official
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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details have yet been given as to the nature of these proposed SSS ships. If, as has
been suggested by some, the vessels are to be like the twenty-seven-thousandmetric-ton Canberra-class amphibious assault ships (LHDs) being built for the
Royal Australian Navy by Navantia, or the similar but smaller French Mistralclass LHDs, the idea of adding three of them is probably overreaching somewhat,
given their cost (though perhaps the idea is to ask for three in hope of securing
one or two). Smaller vessels, perhaps even in the range of the 1,500-metric-ton
Spearhead-class Joint High Speed Vessel, are more likely to be affordable and may
even be of greater utility for the kinds of Spear operations the SANDF might realistically conduct, and are more likely to contribute significantly in a secondary
Shield function.71 Whatever vessel, or mix of vessels, is chosen, there can be no
doubt that adding a capability to project force from the sea, even on a relatively
limited basis, would radically shift and enhance the utility of the South African
Navy’s force structure in a way appropriate to the nation’s position as a regional
power. To add this capability will, however, require a significant rethinking of approach and resource allocation within the South African National Defence Force
and the government.
CLEARER POLICY AND MORE FOCUSED ENGAGEMENT
African maritime security forces are currently misaligned to meet the security threats
they face. They have navy bureaucratic affiliations and training programs but have
a predominance of coast guard missions, operate in coast guard zones, and require
coast guard partnerships. . . . Accordingly, they are not efficiently organized and
trained to meet their challenges. They are also hampered by their dependence upon
the poorly matched foreign equipment they purchase or are given. Inefficiency and
small budgets reinforce each other, allowing maritime security challenges to remain
substantially unchecked. Billions of dollars of fish are stolen every year from a continent facing some of the world’s highest levels of malnutrition. International drug
syndicates are gaining a foothold among what are already some of the world’s most
fragile states.72

This statement is as true of South Africa in particular as it is of African nations
in general. Given the additional need for South Africa, as a regional power, to
be able to project force where necessary within its sphere of influence, it is clear
that the SAN of today is inadequate to the task of carrying out South Africa’s
maritime security mandate. There is, however, currently a window of opportunity by which just such a significant change could come about. On 20 April 2010
President Zuma appointed members to a newly devised national planning structure, the National Planning Commission (NPC), which is to “produce reports
on a range of issues that impact on our long term development, such as water
security, climate change, food security, energy security, infrastructure planning,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1

166

Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue

BAKER

161

human resource development, defence and security matters, the structure of the
economy, spatial planning, demographic trends and so forth.”73
It is at least conceivable that the influence of the NPC could lead to the reshaping of the SANDF, and South Africa’s national security forces in general, into
structures that are equipped, trained, and employed in ways calibrated to the
actual needs of the nation. It is very much in the interests of the United States
and other members of the international community having an interest in Africa’s
maritime security, and in African security more generally, to assist the NPC and
the South African government in developing an appropriate national security
strategy and matching structures.
What can the United States, and other members of the international community, do? Vogel suggests a useful first step when he writes that
for Africa, a series of threat assessments would be highly beneficial, as no one really
knows what is going on in African waters. Many of the statistics frequently advanced
on drug traffic, illegal fishing, illicit commerce, and other prohibited activities are at
best educated guesses. It is also not known how much activity is occurring relatively
close to shore (within territorial waters) or over the horizon in EEZs. A comprehensive survey using satellite imagery to quantify ship traffic would be a good place to
start.74

At a more general level, more purposeful engagement with the SANDF and
the South African government could help to bring about constructive change.
Regular exchanges with the U.S. Coast Guard would be of benefit in reshaping
the philosophy and operational approach of the SAN, more than is, for example,
the hosting of SAN personnel at U.S. Navy “schoolhouses.” Diplomatic assistance
in such projects as collaborative southern African production for the navies of
the region of inshore patrol vessels (craft that the SAN greatly covets, to ensure
the viability of Project BIRO) could also be of great benefit. Other opportunities
would emerge, given clearer policy and more focused engagement. Clearly it is
in the long-term interests of the United States and allied nations to expend the
resources necessary to ensure that this happens.
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A RELATIVELY INDECISIVE WAR

Jack A. Gottschalk

Daughan, George C. 1812: The Navy’s War. New York: Basic
Books, 2011. 411pp. $32.50

This is an excellent book about a relatively unknown war. Perhaps only the Mexican
War (1846–48) is less known to Americans. The War of 1812 was America’s first declared war, one that neither side really wanted and that resulted in a military draw.
Beginning with the introduction, George Daughan, a distinguished academician and recipient of the 2008 Samuel Eliot Morison Award, has created a work
that is almost the equivalent of an exciting novel. The first three chapters provide
a clear understanding of the relationship between the United States and Great
Britain in the years following the Revolution. The political scene in America is
also examined to show the deep differences that existed between the Federalists
in the north, particularly in New England, and the Republican interests. These
differences were to persist throughout most of the war.
Jack A. Gottschalk is a lawyer and best-selling author.
From the earliest days of the nation, the Federalists
He has worked as a reporter for several news agencies, was an assistant prosecutor for Essex County, held that a positive relationship with England was of
New Jersey, and hosted a cable television show, Lebenefit to the United States given, among other things,
gally Speaking. He served as a U.S. Army Reserve
a common language and an established history of
captain in military intelligence, and is a graduate of
the Naval War College. In addition to his publication trade. Southern leaders, including Thomas Jefferson,
of many articles, Jack Gottschalk is the author of The were hostile toward Great Britain and highly sympaGlobal Trade and Investment Handbook (1993);
Firefighting (2002), on the world history of fires; and thetic to France and its perceived democratic ideals.
Jolly Roger with an Uzi (2000), on the problem of
Daughan notes, as he sets out the prewar years, that
modern-day piracy. Jack Gottschalk holds a master’s
the Jay Treaty (also known as the Treaty of London)
degree from Salve Regina University, and a juris doctor degree from the University of Baltimore. He is an was a disappointment to George Washington. One
adjunct professor at the Stillman School of Business, important point was its restriction on American trade
Seton Hall University.
with France, a fact that eventually led to the undeclared maritime conflict between the United States
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and France, the Quasi-War (1798–1800), during the John Adams administration.
The American navy grew rapidly during that conflict, but once the war ended the
Navy became a political issue and fell into disfavor in the eyes of Thomas Jefferson, even though he had deployed warships against Tripoli’s pirates.
By the time Jefferson took office in 1801, the problems caused by Napoleon
were major and growing, and the questions of sailors’ rights and free trade increasingly came into focus. In 1806, Napoleon sealed European ports to all British
ships. Great Britain responded by restricting neutral shipping with France, and
at about the same time British warships off the New Jersey coast seized American
merchant ships and impressed sailors.
American political disagreement on the issues of ship seizure and impressments only gave way to a united front in June 1807 when there was a confrontation between the USS Chesapeake and HMS Leopard that resulted in the seizure
of several seamen aboard the American ship. Tensions ran high, but Jefferson
avoided a war by successfully having Congress pass the Embargo Act in December
1807, which was a crippling blow to American foreign trade since it prohibited
all shipments abroad.
The intent had been to force Great Britain to end its seizure of seamen and to
cancel its neutral shipping restrictions. The measure failed on both counts and
was so unpopular that it was replaced after James Madison’s election with the
passage of the Non-Intercourse Act, which allowed Americans to trade with every
nation except Great Britain and France.
Meanwhile, the British continued to impress sailors on American merchantmen despite warnings from Madison and attempts to resolve issues by negotiation. By the end of 1811 Madison was convinced that the only action that would
force meaningful negotiations was a declaration of war. With the exception of
the Federalists, in June 1812, both the House and the Senate voted for war, even
though America was ill prepared.
The Army was small, with too much reliance placed on the militia; however,
the Navy, which Madison initially believed to be of little use, proved instead to be
of enormous value on the lakes and rivers, and as a blue-water force. Experienced
naval officers and hundreds of privateers were used to raid British commerce.
Despite the lack of preparation, the author notes that Madison did have a war
plan that called for the invasion of Canada, a move motivated by the fact that the
British Army was tied down in Europe. The British strategy called for invasions
from the north and south, a naval blockade along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts,
and coastal raids.
The Canadian land actions were marked by a lack of American success—
notable campaign examples were those of Generals William Hull and Henry
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Dearborn. American naval actions on Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Lake Champlain were, however, critical to the prosecution of the war.
On the ocean, well-known American victories included such blue-water shipto-ship contests as those between the USS Constitution and HMS Guerrière; the
USS Constitution and HMS Java; the USS Hornet and HMS Peacock; and the
USS United States and HMS Macedonian. Naval officers to include Commodore
Oliver Hazard Perry, Captain Stephen Decatur, Commodore Thomas Truxtun,
and Commodore William Bainbridge all gained permanent historical notice in
America.
Daughan points out that it was a relatively indecisive war, marked by events
of which neither side could be proud. Those incidents included the American
burning of York (Toronto); the later burning of Washington by the British (in
retaliation for York); the unnecessary shelling of Stonington, Connecticut; and
the raid—complete with rape and pillage—by the British at Hampton, Virginia.
Finally, it seems somehow fitting for a war that neither side wanted that the Battle
of New Orleans took place two weeks after the war ended.
Almost until the end of hostilities, the political division in America between
the antiwar Federalists and the Republicans continued. So deep were antiwar feelings among some that New York and Vermont farmers openly provided supplies
to British forces along the Canadian border, and New England merchantmen
carried supplies to Field Marshal Wellington’s armies in Spain.
By the autumn of 1814 both sides were looking to end the conflict. The war
was unpopular in Great Britain and some Federalists were urging secession of
New England states and a separate peace. Discussions about the war took place in
Hartford, Connecticut, in December, but secession was either not on the agenda
or not seriously discussed.
On Christmas Eve 1814, the Treaty of Ghent was signed by American and British representatives and ratified in Washington in February 1815. Many issues over
which the war had been fought were not addressed in the treaty, such as British
blockades and impressments, these having ended with the defeat of Napoleon.
This work is marred by some editorial errors that are unfortunate since they
tend to jar the reader, who is otherwise proceeding happily through the book.
They are as follows: on page 212 “ordinance” is incorrectly used instead of “ordnance”; on page 278 “coarse” is incorrectly used instead of “course”; on page 400
“manage” is mistakenly used instead of “managed”; and on page 416 “initiating”
is used instead of “initiated.”
However, despite these lapses, the book should win a place on the shelf of
any student of American history. There are an excellent glossary, many relevant
maps, and a helpful illustration that shows the names and locations of sails on a
square-rigged ship.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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“OUR FIRST TRUE WAR”
Maffeo, Steven. The Perfect Wreck—“Old Ironsides” and HMS Java: A Story of 1812. Tucson, Ariz.: Fireship, 2011. 382pp. $19.95

Singapore Harbor, 1845—Commodore
Henry Ducie Chads, Royal Navy, is
rowed over to an American frigate visiting the port where he is senior officer.
Chads is met by the second in command of USS Constitution and ushered
below to pay his respects to the captain.
After a friendly chat, Chads notes that
he has been on the ship before, in 1812.
He had then been first lieutenant of
HMS Java, and he had stood on that
very spot while surrendering his ship
to Commodore William Bainbridge.
This opening scene is a poignant and
accurate account of an actual meeting.
So begins this outstanding and fascinating novel by Steven E. Maffeo, a retired
U.S. Navy captain and author of two
previous books on the age of sail.
During the war between Britain and
France, both countries routinely
violated American neutrality at sea.
The stakes were high, and the sensibilities of small powers were easily
overlooked. The depredations of the
British were much worse, however,
than those of the French, and in June
1812 the United States declared war.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012

The two sides were not a match. The
Royal Navy possessed 180 ships of the
line—the battleships of the day, sporting at least seventy-four guns (some
had over a hundred). The U.S. Navy had
nothing so large, but its pride was six
frigates, some carrying over fifty guns.
The most famous of these was USS
Constitution, nicknamed “Old Ironsides”
during a victory over HMS Guerrière
when British round shot bounced off its
thick oak sides. The Royal Navy hoped
to redress this embarrassment, but the
frigate HMS Java, commanded ably by
Captain Henry Lambert but saddled
with a raw crew, left Portsmouth in
November with a load of passengers
and cargo, hoping to avoid a fight.
In contrast, Constitution was newly
commanded by Commodore William
Bainbridge. Not well liked, Bainbridge
was known throughout the service as
“Hard-Luck Bill.” He had been the first
U.S. Navy captain to surrender his ship
to the enemy; indeed, within a period
of five years Bainbridge “hauled down
the flag of the United States three times
in the face of the enemy—without any
fighting.” Nonetheless, Constitution
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left Boston in late October to seek
out and engage British shipping.
Maffeo alternates between the two
vessels and their crews, providing an
outstanding primer on the workings
of a large warship two centuries past.
He is adept at describing everything
from victualing to lading and storage,
rigging, discipline, sail maintenance,
and gunnery. In a clever device, the
author uses three British Army officers traveling aboard Java as props.
These men—who were actually present on the voyage—are tutored by
Chads on the strategy and tactics of
naval warfare. The reader listens in on
these chats and learns a great deal.
The climax of the book occurs on 29
December 1812, when the ships meet
off the coast of Brazil. The description
of the battle itself is masterful. Lambert
worries about his largely untrained crew
of “landmen,” but Maffeo implies that
he had not trained his green crew nearly
often or rigorously enough. Bainbridge,
a stickler for discipline, had made no
such mistake. The sea battle at close
range, with heavy cannon disgorging
round shot, grape, and canister—as
well as the continuous musket fire of
the marines on board both ships—takes
a murderous toll. Although initially
Constitution suffers worse and Bainbridge himself goes down twice with
wounds, the battle slowly and inexorably reverses. The bigger guns and
thicker sides of the American frigate,
combined with its more seasoned crew,
allow “Old Ironsides” to wreak havoc on
Java. Dismasted and its bowsprit shot
off, Java’s ability to maneuver is lost.
Lieutenant Chads, taking command
from his mortally wounded captain, sees
that all hope is illusory—an attempt
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to board Constitution so as to carry on
the fight with cutlasses and pistols is
skillfully thwarted by Bainbridge. Java
is a perfect wreck and strikes its colors.
This ripping yarn fascinates, educates,
and entertains. The exploits of the U.S.
Navy in our country’s first true war
after independence should never be forgotten. This terrific account is a mustread for naval personnel of all ranks.
COL. PHILLIP S. MEILINGER, U.S. AIR FORCE,
RETIRED

West Chicago, Illinois

Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2011. 928pp. $39.95

For those seeking to understand
China’s place in the world, Ezra Vogel
has performed a great service through
his meticulous decadelong work on
this biography of Deng Xiaoping, who
emerged as China’s leader following
the death of Mao Zedong in 1976.
Vogel may be overstating the case when
he suggests that Deng was the most
important world figure of the twentieth
century, but it is hard to find a serious
rival for the last quarter of that century.
Deng ruled China between 1978 and
1992, when he retired at the age of
eighty-eight. Since his retirement, to
the present day, Deng’s policies have
continued, in contrast to the immediate changes that took place following
the death of Mao. No Western scholar
of China in 1976 predicted the “rise
of China” that resulted from Deng’s
leadership. How did Deng come to be
central to the transformation of China?
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Born in 1904, Deng took the reins of
leadership at age seventy-four, long
after most give up trying to change
the world. Despite many hurdles, he
energetically steered China back on
track, continually pursuing his vision.
He was an unwavering nationalist as
well as a communist. His focus was on a
competent, proud, and successful China,
not the humiliated China into which
he had been born, the descendant of
literati in Sichuan Province, to which
he never returned. His years in France
and Moscow in the 1920s developed in
him a mind cognizant of the ways of the
world, well before his leadership role began. Deng went on to do political work
with Zhou Enlai, his mentor, during
the 1930s, and he jointly commanded
the 129th Division of the Eighth Route
Army from 1937 to 1949 in Shanxi.
Although he worked side by side with
Mao to become general secretary of the
Central Committee, Deng was purged
by Mao as a “capitalist roader” early in
the Cultural Revolution. Vogel offers a
vivid account of Deng’s exile in Jiangxi.
The author emphasizes that Deng was
very successful in his conduct of foreign
affairs. While many scholars consider
Deng a student of Zhou Enlai, less
polished and capable than his teacher,
Vogel turns this idea on its head, using the example of how Deng broke
through the U.S.-China normalization
impasse during the December 1978
talks with American negotiator Leonard
Woodcock. Despite Deng’s red-faced
ranting that China would never accept
weapons sales to Taiwan, he, perhaps
realizing that Woodcock was unable to
guarantee subsequent decisions by Congress, in the end simply said “Hao,” fine.
The deal was finally complete six years
after the Nixon-Kissinger initiatives.
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Regarding domestic affairs, Vogel outlines a mixed record for Deng. Once in
control, he consistently moved China
toward the First World and increased
the country’s wealth. However, Deng is
most remembered for the cloud he cast
over what Vogel calls the “Tiananmen
tragedy.” The author has come under
attack by Fang Lizhi and others for
glossing over Deng’s repressive role in
crushing the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989.
While Deng was being elevated to the
position of power over Hua Guofeng
at the Eleventh Party Congress Third
Plenum in December 1978, in what the
author refers to as “succession without
coronation,” Vogel was just publishing
his best-selling nonfiction work Japan
as Number One. Vogel directed the
East Asian Studies program at Harvard
University, subsequently publishing
more on China than on Japan, until his
retirement in 2000. Like Deng, Vogel
wished to make an impact in his later
years and so determined to write a
detailed account of the man who had
transformed China during his own
lifetime of studying East Asia affairs.
To prepare himself, Vogel spent a year
refreshing his Chinese, so he could
conduct his interviews unassisted and
read primary sources more easily. He
interviewed scores of Deng’s colleagues
and most of his family. It took him
ten years to complete the project.
This work raises the research and
literary standard for political biography. We must thank Ezra Vogel for
giving us this detailed and measured
look at China’s great man at the
hinge of history between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
GRANT F. RHODE

Brookline, Massachusetts
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Swaine, Michael D. America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century.
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2011. 690pp. $49.95

Since 2009, U.S.-China relations have
lurched from crisis to crisis, jeopardizing the “long peace” that has enabled
an extraordinary era of prosperity in
East Asia and beyond. As Washington
gropes for a new paradigm to structure
this all-important bilateral relationship, diplomats, military strategists,
and concerned citizens on both sides
of the Pacific would do well to reflect
carefully on Michael Swaine’s new
treatise, which is a masterpiece that
will set the standard in the field of
policy analysis for decades to come.
Among the book’s many virtues are
the balance and objectivity of its assessments. Swaine explores alternative
strategies, such as a more zero-sum
approach, on the one hand, that would
rely on a “grand coalition of democracies” to balance China, as well as, on
the other, the possibilities of a more
positive-sum approach that would
emphasize both compromise and joint
action against common, nontraditional
security threats. Ultimately, Swaine
concludes that the above approaches are
both “extreme . . . because they do not
share many of the assumptions underlying America’s current strategic objectives.” The judgment is based on dozens
of interviews with this country’s most
esteemed Asia hands. He reports that a
consensus exists on a mixed strategy, incorporating a delicate simultaneous balance between hedging and engagement.
Another key strength of this volume is
the extraordinary attention to detail—a
feature that will make this work, with
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its more than two hundred pages of
endnotes, an extremely valuable desk
reference and a capable survey of
what we collectively understand about
U.S.-China relations. The fact that the
book covers issues as disparate as naval
strategy, trade negotiations, and energy
cooperation—handling each of these
complex topics and many others with
admirable sophistication—is a tribute
to the wide experience, intellectual
depth, and solid research of the author.
In this respect, the book is without peer.
What makes this work truly exceptional,
however, is the bold and sober recommendations that flow from Swaine’s
dense analysis. To be sure, he offers a
panoply of practical solutions, such as
advocating the creation of a genuinely
strategic (vice policy) planning entity
in the While House and promoting a
much-needed regular, trilateral forum
bringing together Tokyo, Beijing, and
Washington around one table. However, he also directly challenges current
conventional wisdom among U.S. policy
makers, asserting that “U.S. maritime
predominance in the Western Pacific is
probably unsustainable over the long
term . . . [and] attempts to sustain this
predominance . . . are likely to prove
. . . destabilizing.” Also, breaking with
longtime U.S. policy, Swaine is critical
of Washington’s “hands-off ” approach
to the Taiwan issue, an approach that
has traditionally included a refusal to
negotiate with Beijing regarding arms
sales to Taiwan. Finally, Swaine also
boldly declares (contrary to deeply
embedded U.S. political culture) that
“China’s democratization should not
be a strategic objective of the United
States.” Such conclusions collectively
offer American strategists a new approach and much food for thought.
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In short, this comprehensive volume
offers a much-needed corrective to
tendencies in American strategic discourse that significantly favor military solutions to the dilemmas posed
by China’s rise over the hard work
of cooperation and compromise.
LYLE GOLDSTEIN

Naval War College

Arquilla, John. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits:
How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped
Our World. Lanham, Md.: Ivan R. Dee, 2011.
336pp. $27.50

Irregular warfare has been the topic du
jour over the last few years. A search of
any bookseller’s website turns up literally hundreds of recently published titles
on the subject. While not a bad thing,
this makes it harder for nonspecialists to
separate the wheat from the chaff. Much
recent literature in the field centers on
irregular tactics and techniques, especially U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while a smaller portion focuses on
armed groups. John Arquilla, however,
takes a different approach in Insurgents,
Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World,
by focusing more on irregular warriors
than on irregular wars. Like the figures
he portrays, Arquilla attacks the
conventional-war methods and heroes
of military history. He laments
continuing overreliance on traditional methods and classical theorists,
given the evidence that the world
is now far from conventional. As a
Naval Postgraduate School professor, Arquilla has studied and taught
this topic for over two decades.
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At the time of this book’s publication
there were more than thirty ongoing
conflicts worldwide, all irregular in nature, “primarily conducted through acts
of terrorism or more classic guerrilla
hit and run tactics.” This supports the
argument that “irregular is becoming
the new regular.” Arquilla asserts that we
must now look closely at the masters of
earlier times to understand the implications of this new age. The eighteen
individuals chosen here come from a
wide variety of backgrounds. Some,
such as Nathanael Greene and T. E. Lawrence, will be familiar to most readers.
However, warriors like Abdelkader and
Christiaan de Wet are probably largely
unknown to all but specialists in the
field. Instead of trying to categorize each
of them, he draws out common themes
they exhibited, most notably their
“sheer indomitability” and recurring
encounters with advanced technology.
In addition to thematic threads of
continuity, the author weaves connecting strands along national lines. The
French appear in seven chapters, six
times fighting against insurgents and
once, during the American Revolution, on the side of the insurgency. The
experience gained in these conflicts is
another theme used by the author to
bind several hundred years of warfare.
A similar continuity exists among
supporting actors. British involvement in multiple insurgencies provides
several opportunities to study Winston
Churchill’s personal connections.
Of note, most of the irregular warriors
highlighted in these chapters gained
fame by opposing the conventional
masters of their time. Commanders like
Charles Cornwallis or Ulysses S. Grant
usually found traditional methods
insufficient when facing guerrilla or
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other unusual techniques. In these
cases, the raiding tactics of Greene and
Nathan Bedford Forrest simply proved
too effective. The obvious implications are made clear by the author and
should give readers plenty to reflect on,
in terms of evaluating the U.S. position
in either regular or irregular warfare.
This is a useful book for both specialists and general audiences, although the
themes presented here in plain, clear
writing have special implications for
military readers. Insurgents, Raiders, and
Bandits represents an important and
unique contribution to the crowded
field of books on irregular warfare.
LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., USA

Naval War College

Stone, Peter G., ed. Cultural Heritage, Ethics and
the Military. Woodbridge, Suffolk, U.K.: Boydell,
2011. 228pp. $90

When the National Museum of Iraq
(originally the Baghdad Archaeological Museum) was damaged and looted
in 2003, along with archeological sites
across Iraq, international concerns were
raised by a wide variety of political, military, and other professional leaders regarding the protection of historical and
cultural treasures. Observers around the
world were reminded that the consequences of military operations across
the spectrum of war are far-reaching
and long lasting. So too are the responsibilities of political and military leaders
during conflict. Proponents of the justwar tradition have long understood
this and have thus shaped ideas regarding the parameters of actions before,
during, and after a conflict. But there is
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sometimes a failure to appreciate fully
the breadth of responsibility. The editor
of this collection, Peter Stone, addresses
several of the many issues pertaining to
protecting and maintaining the cultural
heritage within the space of a battle.
The work also addresses questions surrounding the tension (and sometimes
hostility) between the military and
civilian specialists from, for instance,
the archeological, anthropological,
religious, and medical communities.
Drawing from a wide range of Western
and non-Western authors, the editor
has assembled a useful volume for both
military and nonmilitary professionals.
The volume consists of fourteen
chapters on various ethical challenges
and professional responsibilities of
parties involved in the preservation of
cultural heritage in war zones. After
an introduction, in which the editor
(who served as an archeological adviser
to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of
Defence in 2003) provides context,
there are essays on restitution, World
War II, African perspectives on cultural preservation, academia and the
military, archeology in war zones, and
case studies from Lebanon and Iraq.
Three essays stand out as particularly
helpful for gaining perspective: Margaret M. Miles provides a historical
overview of the issue of restitution in
“Still in the Aftermath of Waterloo:
A Brief History of Decisions about
Restitution”; “Christian Responsibility
and the Preservation of Civilisation in
Wartime: George Bell and the Fate of
Germany in World War II,” by Andrew
Chandler, shows the influence of the
Anglican bishop of Chichester, who as
a member of the House of Lords and
vocal cleric was an outspoken critic
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of area bombing and the decision to
pursue the unconditional surrender of
Germany; and Fritz Allhoff ’s “Physicians at War: Lessons for Archaeologists?” looks at ethical dilemmas of
medical professionals with respect to
military ethics, medical ethics, and torture in an endeavor to provide insight
and parallels for other professions.
Whether one is interested in archeology
and cultural preservation in a war zone,
the archeology of military and battle
sites, the erection of military monuments, or considerations for military
planners and those who subsequently
execute their plans in combat zones,
there is much to consider in this book.
The final chapter consists of a series
of responses from archeologists to
queries concerning relations between
them and the military during the
war in Iraq. Some of the respondents
have had experiences both in Iraq and
with the military, and some have not.
However, the respondents all have
connections with the preservation of
cultural heritage, and their comments
show that professionals outside the
military must also evaluate the ethics
of their own disciplines with respect
to war. For example, should a member
of a community outside the military,
such as an archeologist, provide information and advice before a conflict
commences, or only later? Though
these are not questions for the military
professional, military professionals
should be aware of them. Stone is to
be commended for bringing together
in a single volume essays and perspectives on this important issue. Interested
readers will not be disappointed.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Naval War College
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Tillman, Barrett. Whirlwind: The Air War against
Japan, 1942–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2010. 336pp. $28

Over sixty years after its conclusion, the
air war that was waged against Japan
remains one of the most controversial and brutal campaigns conducted
by any of the Allied powers during
World War II. The debate centers on
the questions of the morality and
necessity of the bombing campaign
against Japan, primarily its cities,
that culminated in the dropping of
two atomic bombs, and whether the
campaign hastened the end of the war.
In his richly detailed and well written
Whirlwind, Barrett Tillman addresses
these two arguments and the decision making that led the United States
to wage aerial war. He starts by laying the groundwork with the surprise
bombing of Tokyo by U.S. Army Air
Forces (USAAF) B-25s led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle in April
1942, relating how Japan’s leaders,
shocked at the audacity of the carrierborne attack on the home islands,
moved forward with a complex plan
to eliminate the U.S. Pacific Fleet once
and for all, thus setting the stage for
Japan’s strategic loss at the battle of
Midway less than two months later.
However, the USAAF and its chief,
General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, had
bigger plans of their own for Japan.
Arnold, a disciple and friend of General
Billy Mitchell, resolutely believed in the
power of strategic bombing to bring
about an enemy’s surrender. The Royal
Air Force and USAAF had thoroughly
tested this theory in the skies over
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Germany, with mixed results. Despite
a relentless and costly air campaign,
the German Wehrmacht could only be
defeated on the ground. A basic concept
of strategic-bombing theory held that
heavy civilian casualties would force
enemy leaders to sue for peace, but
the theorists and practitioners did not
factor in the callous nature of despotic
leaders who cared little for the welfare
of their citizenry. (For more information on this subject see Among the Dead
Cities: The History and Moral Legacy
of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in
Germany and Japan, by A. C. Grayling.)
Japan was a different story. Arnold
envisioned unleashing the as-yetunfielded B-29 Superfortresses on
Japan en masse. The USAAF first tried
conducting operations from China, but
that proved untenable for a variety of
reasons. Eventually airfields on Guam,
Saipan, and Tinian, islands that were
taken at great cost, came into existence for sustained B-29 operations.
The air war against Japan was much
more than the story of B-29 raids on
Tokyo and other targets. One littleknown operation went under the dark
moniker of Operation STARVATION, the
deployment of aerial mines by B-29s.
These sorties proved quite effective
in whittling down Japan’s merchant
marine, thus devastating Japan’s morale
and eroding its capability for war production. USAAF crews delivered twelve
thousand mines, sinking 293 ships
between March and April 1945. Yet for
all the successes that the United States
had in the skies over Japan, the USAAF
and U.S. Navy cooperated little in the
planning and implementation of the
overall campaign. Each service pursued
its own air operations, the Army going
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after Japan’s cities and the Navy after
Japan’s fleet and coastal shipping.
Tillman’s excellent book is well researched and well written. He reintroduces the reader to the pivotal leaders
who played a role in the execution of
the air war on Japan. He rounds out
his narrative with accounts from B-29
aircrews and naval aviators who flew at
the tip of the spear aimed at Japan; their
observations and recollections add an
excellent sense of humanity to the story.
His account also serves to validate joint
operations, a lesson borne out by the
experience of this war and one that our
military continues to observe today.
This book will not end the debate on the
value and moral justification of the U.S.
air war on Japan. Tillman clearly makes
the point that while the air war against
Japan did not end the conflict on its
own, it did affect Japan’s ability to continue to wage war. In the end it is clear
that Japan was willing to fight despite
the destruction of its cities and that it
was preparing mightily for the expected
invasion of the home islands. However,
it was the atomic attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki that finally forced Japan
to seek peace and end the slaughter.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE

San Diego, California

Jordan, Jonathan W. Brothers, Rivals, Victors:
Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership
That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe. New
York: NAL Caliber, 2011. 672pp. $28.95

This is an exceptional book. Although
it has its share of strategy, logistics,
and technology, it is primarily a book
about relationships and leadership.

184

Naval War College: Spring 2012 Full Issue

In what is ostensibly a triple biography, George S. Patton, Jr., and Omar
Bradley get their fair share of attention, but in the end it is Dwight David
Eisenhower who dominates the pages.
Jordan has produced what is in many
ways a paragon of modern biographies.
The darker sides of his subjects are
not overlooked or glossed over, as in
E. B. Potter’s Bull Halsey, nor does the
book descend into the merely salacious
and prurient, as sometimes occurs in
Evan Thomas’s Sea of Thunder. Jordan
paints pictures of whole men, and
with remarkable fidelity. Meticulously
researched, this work neither shies away
from nor lingers on the flaws each man
possessed. For example Patton’s philandering and alcohol abuse in the 1930s
are reasonably depicted as characteristic
of an ambitious warrior trapped in a
peacetime army, bored, restless, and desperately worried that his moment had
come and gone. Likewise, Eisenhower’s
relationship with Kay Summersby is
addressed directly. The relationship was
inappropriate and, from a security point
of view, reckless. Bradley worried about
this, as did Marshall and members of
Eisenhower’s personal staff. However,
Jordan concludes that Eisenhower
needed Kay to maintain some sense of
stability in his life and that whatever
degree of infidelity it entailed was compensated by Ike’s resulting performance.
Jordan also discusses in detail the
episode in which Eisenhower reached
a point where he was willing to force
his superiors to fire either Montgomery
or him. This was an example of superb
political acumen and the use of power.
Jordan documents Patton’s remarkable
churlishness and childishness, as well as
his extraordinary drive and sense of the
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operational moment. Jordan displays
both a keen understanding of and sympathy for the flamboyant Patton, just as
he does with Eisenhower. With Bradley,
however, Jordan is just a touch less surefooted, perhaps because Bradley was by
nature a more private man. Yet for all
that, there are few passages more moving and superbly depicted than those
describing Bradley’s reaction when, during the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower
took the First and Ninth Armies and
assigned them to Montgomery. Bradley’s rage and hurt were only magnified when his threat of resignation was
ignored. However, his rage was nothing
compared to the mean-spiritedness of
Patton, who, removed from command,
savaged in his diary his boss and former
friend, alleging that Eisenhower suffered
from moral turpitude and cowardice.
Because Jordan understands the nature
of these men’s relationships, he is able
to convey the tragedy that accompanied
them. Above all, he documents with
marked sympathy the forging and the
gradual undoing of the EisenhowerPatton friendship, as much a casualty of
Patton’s selfishness and lack of empathy as the inevitable consequence of
friends occupying different levels of
command responsibility. The friendship between Eisenhower and General Bradley was equally damaged but
much more rapidly, stemming from
what Bradley felt was a betrayal.
These friendships would in time be, if
not fully repaired, reconciled. Eisenhower, following the death of Patton,
focused more and more on his late
friend’s sterling qualities. Perhaps
this was easier in Patton’s absence.
Paradoxically, when Patton’s reputation had threatened to eclipse those
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of other generals, Eisenhower went
out of his way to laud Bradley as the
“best combat general of the war.”
Although the troika holds center stage,
Jordan looks at other relationships these
men had. The central role of George
Marshall is explored, along with that
which Bedell Smith played in supporting Eisenhower. Junior combat
commanders such as Lucian Truscott
and Mark Clark are given their due.
If all this book delivered were a
deeper understanding of these three

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/1

iconic military figures, it would be
well worth the read, but it provides
much more. For, in addition to revealing the human side of three generals,
it also compares and contrasts their
very different leadership styles and
methods. Although understated, this
comparison elevates the book even
further and makes it a must-have for
any shelf of serious leadership texts.
RICHARD NORTON
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
RECENT BOOKS
A selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as described by their publishers:
Blake, John. The Titanic Pocketbook: A Passenger’s Guide. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2011. 128pp. $18.95
“The Titanic Pocketbook is a unique guide to all aspects of this great ship, incorporating authentic period literature from sources including White Star Line themselves, Harland & Wolff shipyards, and important publications from the period.”
Orsini, Alessandro. Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of Modern Terrorists. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2009. 317pp. $29.95
“This is a uniquely insightful and comprehensive account of one of history’s
most fascinating terrorist groups, shedding new light on understanding the
modern terrorist mind-set in general and the motivations of the Red Brigades
specifically.”
Little, Benerson. Pirate Hunting: The Fight against Pirates, Privateers, and Sea
Raiders from Antiquity to the Present. Sterling, Va.: Potomac Books, 2010. 357pp.
$29.95
“More than just a vivid account of the war that seafarers and pirates have waged,
Pirate Hunting is invaluable reading in a world where acts of piracy are once more
a significant threat to maritime commerce and voyagers. It will appeal to readers
interested in the history of piracy, anti-piracy operations, and maritime, naval,
and military history worldwide.”
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s Manager for the
CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Program.

A

s Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other forms of communication have
exploded in recent years, some have seen the Navy Professional Reading
Program’s mission of advocating the reading of worthwhile books as rather
“quixotic.” This term, derived from the great Spanish novel Don Quixote of La
Mancha, in which the title character does battle with a windmill, is often used to
describe wasted effort and foolish endeavors. But in fact, promoting literature is
less quixotic these days than ever, in part because of technological developments
in electronic reading devices. The popularity of such electronic readers as the
iPad, Kindle, and Nook has actually revived the art of reading. These devices
don’t replace the art of reading—they make it easier! They also make it, in the
eyes of many, a “cool” thing to do. While reading a dusty old book from some
library shelf is decidedly “old school,” reading the same material as an electronic
book (e-book) on the screen of a high-tech tablet computer is somehow more
socially acceptable.
The purchase of an e-book reader, now costing less than a hundred dollars in
some formats, opens the door to literally hundreds of thousands of books from
every genre, most for a minimal fee and many for free. As a bonus, the wireless
communications technology that makes such devices possible means that the time
lapse between thinking about obtaining a book and beginning to read it can be
measured in mere seconds. Never in recorded history have information and entertainment been so readily available. So, if e-book readers make reading easier (and
more socially acceptable), how do we encourage people to read books on these devices and in hard copy? One way is to consider what some well-known and highly
intelligent folks have had to say over the centuries about the value of reading.

• One of the earliest recorded quotes about reading came from Chinese
philosopher Confucius, who noted: “No matter how busy you may think
you are, you must find time for reading, or surrender yourself to self-chosen
ignorance.”
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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• Dutch scholar Desiderius Erasmus (ca. 1466–1536) wrote, “When I get a
little money, I buy books; and if any is left, I buy food and clothes.”

• In the eighteenth century, columnist Richard Steele said, “Reading is to the
mind what exercise is to the body.”

• One of America’s greatest writers and humorists, Mark Twain, was quoted
as saying, “The man who does not read good books has no advantage over
the man who can’t read.”

• At least two U.S. presidents have shared their thoughts about reading. Harry
S. Truman noted, “Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers,”
and Lyndon Baines Johnson once said, “A book is the most effective weapon
against intolerance and ignorance.”

• In more recent years, management consultant and best-selling author Stephen Covey has written, “There’s no better way to inform and expand your
mind on a regular basis than to get into the habit of reading good literature.
. . . You can get into the best minds that are now or that have ever been in
the world.”

• The highly popular and prolific author Stephen King calls books “a uniquely
portable magic.”

• Publisher Charles Scribner says, “Reading is a means of thinking with another person’s mind; it forces you to stretch your own.”

• Educator and reading expert Mortimer Alder says, “It’s not how many books
you get through, it’s how many books get through to you.”

• Finally, motivational speaker Charlie “Tremendous” Jones has declared,
“You’re the same today as you’ll be in five years except for the people you
meet and the books you read.”
Many of these pithy quotes would make great bumper stickers, and they serve
an important purpose by helping to capture the joy and fascination that can be
found in reading. The Navy Professional Reading Program is a focused effort to
make books of consequence available at little or no cost to sailors throughout the
fleet. Our hope is that they will be read, in hard-copy or e-book form, in order
to improve the professionalism of the men and women of the finest navy in the
world.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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